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ABSTRACT:
This work examines the politics of how public transportation in the Chicago metropolitan area has
been organized and financed from the mid-1890s up through the mid-1990s a century later. The greatest focus
is on the years since 1970. Starting in 1970, Chicago's urban transit system became the last major transit
property in the US to cease meeting its operating costs from the farebox. A series of emergency bailouts
ensued, while the state sought a regional organization and tax base for transit carriers in the city and the
suburbs. These efforts resulted in the enactment of the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) in 1973,
and its narrow approval in a referendum in 1974 which pitted the city against the suburbs.
Although the RTA did stabilize, improve, and expand transit during the 1970s, city-suburban conflict
plagued the agency. The RTA's failure to control costs led it to the brink of bankruptcy in the early
1980s. In 1983 the state passed a package of reforms which included some cost control measures, and an
institutional component. The RTA now became an administrative agency with oversight responsibilities for
the urban system, and two new service boards: one for commuter trains and the other for suburban buses.
The major findings of this research are based on the Chicago experience, but have relevance for
metropolitan areas throughout the US and in other industrial democracies. Through most of the history of
the transit industry, there has been a tendency towards consolidation. But in Chicago (and in several other
cities) there has more recently been a move in the other direction towards smaller, more accountable units.
This move is linked to a shift in power from the city towards the suburbs. As the suburbs find a voice in
transit matters (despite their varied needs), they seek greater local control and accountability of transit
institutions. Even if the Chicago reforms have not brought about regional harmony on transit issues, they
have made it possible for the city and suburbs to work together more smoothly than before.
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PREFACE
Many people went out of their way to help me during the
course of my research, during which time (like many doctoral
students) I gathered much more material than I was able to use in
my thesis. Dozens of people helped me in little and large ways,
and I apologize in advance to all those who I omitted. I have
tried to be comprehensive within the limits of space, and fair
within the limits of trying to tell a story of political
controversy and complex organizational relationships. I accept
full responsibility for all errors which I may have allowed to
slip in, and for all of my interpretations of what went on.
Observers and participants with almost every conceivable position
on Chicago's public transportation were pleased to share their
perspectives and insights with me. I trust that any interview
informants, other resource people, and stakeholders who disagree
with anything I say in these pages will understand that I do not
mean it personally.
My research took me to my native Chicago several times, and
many people have gone well out of their way to make my way
easier. I am grateful to Joyce Malden and her highly capable
staff at the Municipal Reference Library, City of Chicago, for
accommodating my extensive research needs while much of their
collection was in the process of being relocated. Alice Schreyer
and her staff at the Special Collections department at Regenstein
Library, University of Chicago, were also very helpful while I
was examining the George A. Ranney, Jr. papers.
The staff at the regional government archive at Northern
Illinois University, DeKalb, went out of their way to facilitate
my use of the Cal Skinner, Jr. papers when they learned that I
was commuting from Chicago by bus to use their collection. I am
also grateful to CTA Librarian Violette Brooks for her help and
generosity, and to Judson Lawrie of the CTA's Corporate Planning
Department, who kindly let me dig through his files and copy
material related to the formation of the Regional Transportation
Authority.
David Young, former transportation editor and now business
writer for the Chicago Tribune, generously shared his extensive
research sources and perceptive insights with me. Without his
help, I might not have been able to track down several excellent
but obscure documents. I hope I was able to provide him with
even a fraction of the help with sources for his book as he has
given me for my thesis. Jim Jarzab, Manager of Strategic
Planning, Pace, and Paul Gross of the CTA Operations Planning
Department went above and beyond the call of duty to get me
information, both historical and current.
Special thanks go to Mrs. Alice Ryerson Hayes for putting me
in touch with her nephew George Ranney Jr. Mr. Ranney graciously
invited me into his home to talk with me further about my
research, and we conducted an interview around the very same
kitchen table where Mr. Ranney and other top officials drafted
the RTA bill during a hectic Thanksgiving long weekend in 1973.
On the opposite side of the RTA issue, State Representative
Cal Skinner, Jr., kindly set time aside from constituent business
for an interview at his Crystal Lake office, and drove me to and
from the local train station. Former state representative Eugene
Schlickman generously went out of his way to accommodate my
request for an interview shortly before I was due to leave
Chicago on one of my research visits in September 1993, and we
enjoyed a long and far-ranging conversation (including an
interview) over an extended lunch. Since then he has taken a
warm interest in my progress.
Professor Pastora Cafferty of the University of Chicago
School of Social Service Administration (and Regional
Transportation Authority board member) has been unbelievably
helpful. Our schedules did not mesh during my earlier visits,
but when we finally did meet in September 1995, she helped
arrange interviews for me with a number of highly-placed
officials. She also read parts of my thesis and provided me with
very helpful comments at the highest level of detail.
All of my interview informants (who I have listed along with
my bibliographic references) were happy to fit me into their oft-
busy schedules. I am honored by their willingness to put their
perspectives across to me. In several of these conversations I
sensed a real delight that somebody was interested in what they
had done twenty-odd years earlier.
I have also had much encouragement and help at MIT. Ralph
Gakenheimer, Professor of City Planning and Civil Engineering, my
advisor and committee head, has given me the benefit of his
sound, measured advice and his thoughtful comments on all of my
drafts. He always heard me out and took my ideas seriously. For
his ongoing help throughout the evolution, research, and writing
of my thesis I am deeply thankful.
Urban historian Robert Fogelson, Professor of City Planning,
and Nigel Wilson, Professor of Civil Engineering, generously
served on my thesis committee and gave me good, solid advice
about history writing and transit management. I am also grateful
to Professor Martin Rein, Professor of Social Policy, for kindly
consenting to serve on my qualifying examination committee and
sharing his inspirational style with me. Brenda Blais, Nimfa
DeLeon, and Debby Kunz of the staff of the Department of Urban
Studies and Planning have been of great help with many of the
little details of my life as a doctoral student.
Frederick Salvucci of the Department of Civil Engineering at
MIT and former Massachusetts transportation secretary offered me
many helpful insights based on his own enormous experience in
transportation, especially in the Boston area. Finally at MIT, I
have benefitted from conversations with Michael Shiffer of the
Computer Resources Laboratory at the Department of Urban Studies
and Planning. Mike has the rare ability to integrate the
perspectives of the transportation professional with an
appreciation of the rich technical, operating, and political
history of Chicago's transit system. It has been a pleasure for
me to share my research findings with him and enjoy his
encouragement.
Other people who are neither associated with MIT nor with
the realms of transit or politics have been invaluable to me. In
Boston, many thanks to my friend Christopher Loring, who has
followed my progress with interest and has always been happy to
share his knowledge of cities and transportation with me. He
provided me with much-needed friendship and moral support over my
years at MIT.
In Chicago, Mrs. Jane Rosenthal, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Uretz,
and Mr. and Mrs. Martin Glusberg have given me their hospitality
(including taking dozens of telephone messages for me) and
followed my progress with interest. They have all done wonders
to make my usually hectic visits a lot less stressful than would
otherwise have been the case. Gwin Kolb, Professor Emeritus of
English at the University of Chicago, provided me with
encouragement, sound advice, and help in digging out the
occasional useful book from the university's library. Arthur
Miller of the Lake Forest College Library and president of the
Ragdale Foundation has taken an interest in my thesis, and has
given me intelligent feedback and good ideas.
Mr. and Mrs. Mallory Fitzpatrick have been of enormous help
and encouragement. They have given me a place to stay in Chicago
and shown great interest in my research. Their son Thomas
Fitzpatrick generously opened the doors of the law offices of
Fitzpatrick, Eilenberg, and Zivian to me. On many occasions, his
office provided me with a telephone and a word processor whenever
I needed to obtain information or arrange an interview. I hope
he will forgive me for the extent to which I took him up on his
kind offer. His mother, the firm's erstwhile corporate
concierge, followed my progress with unflagging enthusiasm and
smoothed my use of the office. I would also like to thank Sylvia
Flores of Fitzpatrick, Eilenberg and Zivian, who went above and
beyond the call of duty to help ease my way in and around the
office. Everybody associated with the firm tolerated my coming,
going, and using the premises with the best of grace, even in the
midst of an office renovation during my visit in September and
October of 1995.
I am deeply grateful to the late Professor Helene Kantor of
the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, for all of
her enormous help in letting me stay with her and allowing me to
use her office during her last years. Her moral support for
what I was doing was unwavering. I am sorry that she did not
live to read this, but she never doubted for a moment that I
would make it. Her spirit still looks over my shoulder.
Finally, my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Greer Allen, know how
grateful I am to them for being with me all the way through this
long effort. They were always there whenever I needed them, and
encouraged me through all the usual tight spots of a doctoral
student's progress. I am indeed blessed to have parents like
these.
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CHAPTER 1
THE CHICAGO SETTING
For historians, transportation planners, students of
politics, and transportation users, Chicago is the place where
everything converges. Not only do roads, rails, and airways come
together in Chicago; so do the conflicting agendas of policy
makers, elected officials, and their constituents--with a
forceful clarity which has made the city a favorite for political
scientists.
Local public transportation in the six-county area of
Northeastern Illinois (Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, and
Will) has a long and rich history. Mass transit has been a
fiercely-disputed issue within Chicago itself for fully a
century, and the city's modern agenda for transit traces its
roots back to angry debates of the 1890s over the organization
and finance of public transportation.
As postwar growth brought increasing numbers of Chicagoans
and their daily commutes across the city limits into the suburbs,
the long-standing city debate over transit policy eventually
spilled into the suburbs. Chicago sustained its transit system
from the farebox longer than any other large American city (in
large part by deferring maintenance), but started to lose money
in 1970.
At first, state officials and their allies in the city
sought to keep urban transit afloat with subsidies, but the state
eventually insisted on a regional solution with a new Regional
Transportation Authority (RTA). Much as previous mergers of city
streetcar lines in the 1910s, elevated lines in the 1920s, and
the entire city transit network in the 1940s and 50s had resulted
in better service and management, officials in the early 1970s
now hoped that a regional approach would provide the right mix of
oversight and financial capability--in other words, subsidies
with accountability. But this was not to be. Almost from the
outset, the RTA was embroiled in city-suburban controversy.
The RTA barely won a bitterly-contested referendum in 1974,
and the divisions from the referendum plagued the agency during
its first decade. The city voted strongly in favor of the RTA,
the five outer "collar counties" were staunchly opposed, and the
intermediate zone of suburban Cook County2 formed a "swing"
constituency where residents generally voted according to their
immediate commuting interests.
To its credit, the RTA saved and sustained lines which would
have otherwise gone bankrupt. But it also extended poorly-
patronized bus routes deeper into low-density suburbs, and, most
seriously, failed to control mounting transit deficits in the
city. From the standpoint of many suburbanites (most of whom did
not depend on transit), the RTA had been implemented against
their will to use much of their money for a city transit system
which needed greater efficiency, not more money. As a result,
the politics of transit were widely framed in terms of a zero-sum
competition pitting the city against the suburbs.
By the early 1980s, the RTA itself was approaching
bankruptcy, much as the city system had been a decade earlier.
Fares soared on buses and trains in the city and suburbs alike,
and parts of the suburban bus system even shut down when the RTA
could not make its scheduled subsidy payments to financially-
pressed bus companies. Scores of school buses now came into
downtown Chicago every day, ferrying commuters who found that
they could ride to work this way for almost half the cost of the
recently-doubled commuter train fares.
2 Chicago is the seat of Cook County.
But this time, the state did not come to the rescue with
more money. Instead, the state decided that the time had come to
overhaul the agency's administration and make the institutional
setup of transit more accountable--particularly to the majority
of the region's population now living in the suburbs.
The 1983 reforms accomplished these essential goals, but in
so doing acknowledged (and strengthened) the stake that many
suburban voters and officials have in mass transit. The creation
of new, suburban-controlled bus and commuter rail agencies (along
with a suburban majority on the RTA board) has given many
suburbanites a sense of participation they lacked in the 1970s.
Suburban politicians and voters now balance their traditional
fiscal conservatism with a desire to ensure that the benefits of
mass transit are distributed to their communities. These
ambivalent suburban agendas are likely to play an important role
in the years to come as the Illinois legislature, like its
counterparts elsewhere in the country, comes to grips with the
phasing out of federal aid to transit operators.
Since the mid-1950s, the market for public transportation in
Chicago has changed greatly with the decline of many inner city
neighborhoods, yet there has been little change in the levels of
transit service provided, the routes operated, or the public
sector predominance in service provision. The urban transit
system has pursued various strategies which have enabled it to
avoid major changes in fares, routes, and the technology and
organization of rail and bus operations--at least so far. As
shrinking budgets reduce the city's maneuvering room, however,
these issues promise to become increasingly contentious. Knowing
what has happened already, and why, will make it easier to
understand the transit debates of tomorrow.
The central question is how it happened that after continued
consolidation of the Chicago area's transit operators during most
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of the 20th century, there was a move (however incomplete)
towards increased fiscal accountability and local control in the
early 1980s. We examine which political actors have benefited
and lost from different ways of organizing and paying for
transit, through a history of the politics of mass transit in the
Chicago area. These issues are important not only to Chicago,
but also to the broader question of optimum organization of mass
transportation.
Why study Chicago?
The Chicago area is an interesting laboratory in which to
study the pressures on a large mass transit system, both in
policy and transportation terms. Chicago is legendary in
political science circles for the persistence of machine-style
government well into the late 20th century, although analysts
debate the extent to which traditional machine models are
appropriate for analyzing events since the 1970s. Furthermore,
many elected officials in Illinois make decisions in terms of an
almost businesslike analysis of their choices on the satisfaction
of their "customers," as expressed in terms of their personal
prospects for reelection.
Chicago is North America's greatest transportation
crossroads, and enjoys some of the most comprehensive public
transit of any big city in the United States. Within the City of
Chicago, 98% of the population lives within three-eighths of a
mile of a bus route or a rapid transit station. Although most
suburbanites depend on their automobiles for their daily travel
needs, downtown-bound commuters enjoy some of the best suburban
rail services in the country.'
3 With a few exceptions, Chicago's suburban railroads did not
undergo the same long period of postwar decline that affected
virtually all other public transportation services in the US. For
this component of the transit system, a comparison with transit
properties in Canada might be more appropriate than with those in
Yet despite all of these advantages, transit in Chicago has
been in almost continual turmoil from the late 1960s on. Since
the early 1970s, Chicago's transit institutions have been changed
twice, amid recrimination between the city and suburbs. It is
ironic that one of the best transit systems in the US has also
been one of the most controversial.
An added dimension existing in Chicago and in very few other
US cities is the large stake that certain elite and middle class
actors have in mass transit. In the Chicago area, these groups
include downtown business interests, urban elites living in
upper-income lakefront neighborhoods, and suburbanites who ride
commuter trains to work in downtown Chicago. These
constituencies appear to have provided strategic help in the
passage of the Regional Transportation Authority referendum in
1974, and remain important latent forces in any consideration of
events since then.'
In addition to all these other important elements, Chicago
is the first and largest US city to offer an example of
administrative centralization followed by decentralization of its
public transit system. In 1983 the Illinois legislature
transferred the administration and operation of transit to
different organizations under conditions of political and
financial pressure. This 1983 legislation reformed an agency
which had been created only ten years earlier and was narrowly
approved in a referendum in 1974.
other US cities.
* Among US metropolitan areas, only in New York does there
exist similar or greater support for transit among elite groups and
the middle class. Not even the Philadelphia, Boston, or San
Francisco Bay areas seem to have pro-transit constituencies as
solid as Chicago's. All the same, transit in Chicago is widely
identified in political terms with service to the urban poor, in
contrast to Toronto and other Canadian cities.
What happened in Chicago is relevant to what is happening
elsewhere. Since 1983, reforms similar to Chicago's, with
separate bodies overseeing and operating transit, have taken
place in such varied metropolitan areas as London,' Minneapolis-
St. Paul,' Dublin,7 Detroit,' Stockholm, 9 and Buenos Aires."*
* A substantial literature has grown up around the reform of
London Transport. For instance, see Paul E. Garbutt, London
Transport and the Politicians (London: Ian Allan Ltd., 1985); John
Glover, London Transport Buses and Trains Since 1933 (Shepperton,
Surrey, England: Ian Allan Ltd., 1988); Martin Higginson,
"Deregulate: Who Dares? - The London Experience" (presented at the
International Conference on Competition and Ownership of Bus and
Coach Services, Thredbo, N.S.W., Australia, May 1989); and Peter
White, "The future for buses in London" (Transport, November-
December 1994).
6 See Metropolitan Transit Planning (St. Paul: Office of the
Legislative Auditor, State of Minnesota, January 1988); also David
Rafter and Joel Alter, "Local Government Involvement in
Metropolitan Transit Planning" (Transportation Quarterly, April
1991).
"Eire: Taking a new line" (Transport, June 1985); also
"G.T. Paul Conlon" (Transport, December 1989). For more on the
historical background of mass transit in Dublin, see P.J. Flanagan
and C.B. Mac an tSaoir, Dublin's Buses (Dublin: Transport Research
Associates, 1968) ; also "Dublin Transit: No Laughing Matter" (Mass
Transit, May 1981).
8 See Chris Bushell, ed., Jane's Urban Transport Systems
1996-96 (Coulsdon, Surrey, England: Jane's Information Group,
1995), pp. 91-92.
"SL restructures management" (Railway Gazette
International, January 1991); also Leif Axen, "Finding Economy in
Service" (Developing Metros 1991, a Railway Gazette International
yearbook) . For historical background on transit in Stockholm, see
0. Hultman, "Problems of peak hour bus services in regional
transport in selected conurbations" (Brussels: Union Internationale
des Transports Publics, 1983).
10 For recent developments involving rail privatization, see
Fernando Lozada Islas, "Una red de subterraneos inadaptada" in
Gabriel Dupuy, ed., Las redes de servicios urbanos de Buenos Aires:
problemas y alternativas (Caen, France: Paradigme, 1992) ; and
Enrique Garibotto, "TBA takes over last BA suburban trains (Railway
Gazette International, August 1995).
This makes Chicago's experience important to transportation
professionals in other cities worldwide, as they grapple with the
contradictory demands of ridership, finance, and politics.
Why study transit?
Transit is both a capital-and labor-intensive industry. As
it is currently organized in the US, mass transit is almost
exclusively in the hands of the public sector, and is often
viewed more as a money-losing charity service than as a mode of
choice (from the consumer's point of view) or as a business (from
the producer's standpoint). Thus, most public transportation is
seen as being largely for the benefit of the socially
disadvantaged. In Chicago and a handful of other big cities,
there is another important constituency, composed of (usually
affluent) city and suburban commuters who work in the city center
and use public transportation in order to avoid traffic jams and
parking problems.
What happened in Chicago is important because the Chicago
experience sheds light on similar problems of other large cities.
Although the common budgetary tensions affecting mass transit
have resulted in different outcomes elsewhere, broad similarities
are clearly visible both in terms of policy inputs and outputs in
several other cities.
Buenos Aires also experienced an earlier phase of bus
privatization in the early 1960s. See John Hibbs, "Urban Bus
Transport in Buenos Aires: The Colectivos" (Transportation Research
Record 914, 1983) ; Nora Clichevsky, "Politicas urbanas, transporte
y condiciones de vida en Buenos Aires Region Metropolitana" in
Transporte y servicios urbanos en Amsrica Latina (Joinville,
Arcueil, France and Quito, Ecuador: INRETS and CIUDAD, 1985) ;
Patricia Brennan and Olga Vicente, "Genesis, organizaci6n y
funcionamiento de los operadores privados del autotransporte en
Buenos Aires" (Buenos Aires: mimeo, April 1988) ; and Andrea
Ferrarazzo, "Mass Transit in Buenos Aires" (Mass Transit, July-
August 1990).
Illinois government
If Chicago is a transportation crossroads, then Illinois is
a political crossroads, with elements of the north, south, east
and west. Its mix of big city, suburban, and small town voters
makes it a microcosm of the nation. Since 1945, the state
legislature in Springfield has been the arena where issues of
transit funding and organization for the Chicago area have been
decided.
Much of Illinois government is similar to other states. The
governor is elected to a four-year term," and has line-item
veto powers. The General Assembly may override a veto by a
three-fifths vote, which is also the margin required for passage
of all legislation during a special session convened by the
governor. This happens with surprising regularity when the
General Assembly ends its regular session without taking care of
various items of business (sometimes as important as the state's
budget). In 1973, 1979, and 1983, important laws enacted during
special sessions changed the institutional landscape and funding
sources for transit in Chicago and the suburbs.
The Illinois Senate has always used single-member districts.
However, until 1982, each district had three members in the House
of Representatives, elected by a system known as cumulative
voting. Each voter had three votes to allocate among one, two,
or three candidates. The usual result was that a district would
have two representatives from one party and a third from the
"1 Up through 1976, gubernatorial elections were held in
presidential years. For the 1976 election only, the term was
shortened to two years in order to put gubernatorial elections on
an "off-year" timetable, as mandated in the new 1970 Illinois
constitution. Since 1978, the gubernatorial term has been four
years.
other party." This led to Democrats being elected in the
suburbs and Republicans being elected in Chicago (some of whom
were not considered loyal party members by their suburban and
downstate colleagues). There were also internal party effects:
the system helped Democrats not aligned with Chicago's machine
get elected in the city and suburbs. At its best, cumulative
voting was a system worthy of a discerning electorate.
Cumulative voting came to an end with the 1982 election,
following a referendum in 1980 on the so-called "Cutback
Amendment" (which replaced cumulative voting with single-member
House districts). The principal appeal of the Cutback Amendment
was not the elimination of cumulative voting (which many voters
may not have fully understood), but rather an overall reduction
in the number of state legislators.
Chicago politics
Although decision-making about Chicago's mass transit system
had largely shifted to the state by the middle of the 20th
century, the City of Chicago remains crucial to the politics of
mass transit. Chicago, uniquely in the metropolitan area, is the
only local government which appoints members to the boards of
transit agencies, and the city is guaranteed by law a four-to-
three majority on the Chicago Transit Authority's board.
Informal political factors also make the city of vital
importance. Chicago's Democratic machine-- properly known as the
Regular Democratic Organization of Cook County--is legendary to
12 Under the old 1870 constitution, parties were able to
minimize competition by putting up less than a full slate of
candidates. Thus, where one party was known to be dominant, the
first party would put up two candidates, and the other party would
run just one--thereby ensuring that all nominees would be elected.
The new 1970 constitution eliminated this loophole and required
parties to run three candidates in all House seats they contested.
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even the most casual observers of American politics." To many,
Chicago's machine is synonymous with Mayor Richard J. Daley
(1955-1976), even though the machine preceded and, to some
extent, outlived him. The machine's power was already on the
wane (although still strong in absolute terms) by the time
regional transit became an issue in the early 1970s. For several
years from 1979 through 1987, Chicago's traditional machine
politics appeared to be increasingly obsolete. During those
years a new politics dominated by distinct black and white voting
blocs took hold, culminating with the election of Harold
Washington as the city's first black mayor in 1983 and 1987.
Yet the city's Democratic organization has survived in an
age of increasingly professionalized government. The racial
politics of the 1980s coexist with a modernized, more managerial
version of traditional Chicago politics, heralded by the election
of Mayor Richard M. Daley in 1989. Son of Chicago's most famous
mayor, Daley won reelection easily in 1991 and 1995. Starting
with an alliance between Chicago's white, Latino, and affluent
"lakefront liberal" voting blocs, Daley has since expanded his
appeal to include a third of the city's black voters."
The mayoral primary occurs in February of the year before
13 The term "machine" is used in a non-judgmental sense to
mean a strong party organization which mobilizes its followers by
rewarding their participation with goods and services (as opposed
to rallying them with ideological proclamations). Indeed, as Fuchs
(1992) shows, any comparison of the "reformed" system which has
been in place in New York since the 1930s with Chicago's machine
government is likely to cast grave doubts on the desirability of
municipal reform.
'4 Interestingly, Daley has been able to solidify the Regular
Democratic Organization's position despite the honest conduct of
elections and court decisions outlawing much of the openly
political "patronage" hiring for city agencies. Some reformers had
once anticipated that these changes would lead to the machine's
downfall.
presidential elections, and the general election is in April. At
the primary, voters also elect their City Council representative
(alderman). If no aldermanic candidate receives a majority, the
two top vote-getters face a runoff at the time of the mayoral
general election. Each of the city's fifty wards elects one
alderman. There are no "at-large" seats.
Chicago's wards are not just voting districts; they are
electoral fiefdoms. In traditional Chicago politics (although
not any longer), the party office of ward committeeman often
overshadowed the public office of alderman. Chicago's once-
legendary ward committeemen sometimes held the alderman's seat
themselves, but more often they would hold another elected or
appointed office, or maintain a politically-connected law
practice or other business. Under the most traditional Chicago
politics, the most powerful ward committeemen had a variety of
entry-level jobs within their giving to reward the faithful--
including jobs on the transit system. Also in the old days,
aldermen who defied their ward committeemen could expect to face
a more tractable machine candidate at the next election--and more
often than not, the machine's candidate won.
Chicago's Democratic organization enjoys the solid support
of a majority of the city's voters, despite the flow of ethnic
and racial change across many neighborhoods. The Republican
party is so weak that in 1955 and 1971 liberal Democrats were
able to run under the Republican banner as a flag of convenience.
The greatest political competition is not within the city so much
as it is between the city and the suburbs. This competition is
somewhat muted within Cook County, where the city still makes up
a majority of the county's population. But in the west suburbs,
DuPage County's Republicans have taken advantage of the
demographics of suburban growth to build a strong party
organization which promises to become a suburban counterpart to
Chicago's legendary machine. Increasingly, metropolitan politics
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are dominated by bargaining between Chicago Democrats and DuPage
County Republicans.
To help understand the institutional changes sweeping
Chicago's transit landscape during the 20th century, Figure 1
summarizes the overall flow of events in the development and
revision of mass transit institutions in the Chicago area.
Figure 2 shows some of the major political and transportation
features of Chicago and its nearby suburbs. Figure 3 shows the
six county RTA area of northeastern Illinois and the commuter
railroads in the early 1990s. Figure 4 shows the city-oriented
Chicago Transit Authority system as of 1975, when the RTA was
beginning to channel subsidies to the Chicago system on a regular
basis. And finally, Figure 5 shows the Illinois Central
Electric, which has led developments on both sides of the city
line since the 1920s. We now take up the long debate on mass
transit policy in the Chicago metropolitan area from its roots at
the end of the 19th century."
15 The term Chicagoland is widely used and accepted throughout
the city and suburbs. It refers, in its most limited sense, to the
six northeastern Illinois counties of Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake,
McHenry, and Will. It is used here interchangeably with the
Chicago metropolitan area.
In a more general way, the term can be applied to the entire
commutershed encompassing Chicago and its suburbs. This wider
definition may extend beyond the 6-county metropolitan area in
northeastern Illinois to include adjacent parts of northwestern
Indiana: Lake and Porter counties, and sometimes LaPorte County as
well. An even broader definition might also include adjacent parts
of southeastern Wisconsin as far north as Kenosha, but this begins
to overlap with the Milwaukee area.
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CHAPTER 2
TRANSIT IN CHICAGOLAND BEFORE 1945:
ROBBER BARONS, NOBLESSE OBLIGE, AND BANKRUPTCY
In 1973, the Illinois legislature created the Regional
Transportation Authority (RTA). Its proponents argued that the
RTA would help the city and suburbs work together for common
purposes, but instead it turned out to be a very divisive issue
because most of the suburbs were incorporated into the new agency
against their will. Yet there was little being proposed in the
early 1970s which had not been discussed or foreshadowed in the
1950s or even the 1920s. Instead, there has been an ongoing
debate mass transit in Chicago since the late 19th century. In
order to understand the issues surrounding Chicago's transit
system during the 1970s and 1980s, it is necessary to go back to
the late 19th century, when public transportation became a
fiercely debated issue. The city responded to controversy by
pursuing plentiful service at affordable fares through the
political process--an agenda which continues to this day.
Transit Operators in the City
Historically, private mass transit carriers within the City
of Chicago were organized both by geographic area and by mode.
Until the 1910s and 1920s, a confusing variety of private
companies provided local transit within the city limits.'
Initially there were a bewildering number of street railways, but
by the early 20th century, consolidation had taken place to the
extent that there were a smaller number of firms organized along
1 This does not include commuter railroads, which are
discussed below. Today these are primarily city-to-suburb
carriers. However, two of the South Side's railroads (the Illinois
Central and the Rock Island) were principally city neighborhood-to-
downtown carriers until postwar suburban growth shifted their
centers of ridership gravity beyond the city limits. Even now many
residents of Chicago continue to use their services.
geographic lines. Thus, by the dawn of the 20th century there
was a North Side streetcar company and a North Side elevated
railroad company, with similar patterns elsewhere in the city.
Each firm had its own fares. Transfers between different parts
of the city, or between modes, did not become available until
companies merged their operations, or the regulatory authorities
mandated some degree of fare unification.
By the early 1920s, the city's public transportation system
had taken on something resembling its late 20th century form as
three large companies emerged, each with its own separate fares.
These companies were:
1.) Chicago Surface Lines (CSL). In 1914 all of the city's
street railways consolidated their operations under a single
management. CSL's primary business was streetcar service, but
the company also operated an extensive trolleybus system, and ran
shuttle buses as feeders beyond the outer ends of streetcar
routes. CSL reached into neighborhoods all over the city. Only
the Surface Lines provided crosstown service, enabling riders to
bypass the Loop, Chicago's congested downtown area. But since
most CSL routes followed Chicago's grid pattern of streets, many
riders had to change cars in order to reach the Loop via CSL.
Service was frequent and comprehensive, but slow because of
traffic congestion and snowstorms.2
2.) Chicago Rapid Transit (CRT). Formed in 1924 from four
predecessor companies, CRT operated elevated (or, to Chicagoans,
"L") lines along major travel corridors between the downtown area
2 In its later years, CSL replaced several long crosstown
lines with trolley buses. The Chicago Transit Authority continued
this practice after acquiring CSL in 1947, although bus
substitution was even more common under the CTA. Chicago's last
streetcar ran in 1958.
and the North, Northwest, West, and South Sides.3 CRT's largely
grade-separated rights of way for travel to and from the Loop
gave it an advantage over its competitors, which were confined to
the city's streets.4 The "L" offered all-weather reliability,
which was important during Chicago's long, rough winters.
However, frequent station stops, sometimes as little as 1M mile
apart, cancelled out most of the time savings made possible by
the elevated's technology.
3.) Chicago Motor Coach (CMC). In a city as large and
varied as Chicago, there was ample scope for transit services
aimed at different segments of the market. If CSL offered basic,
no-frills service to ordinary Chicagoans going to work in
factories or shopping along neighborhood streets, then Chicago
Motor Coach catered to the upper end of the market. In contrast
to the rough-hewn image of the Surface Lines, CMC provided deluxe
service for a premium fare. Unlike CSL, Chicago Motor Coach was
not saddled with slow, money-losing lines, and its buses could
maneuver in traffic more readily than streetcars. CMC's low
fixed costs (no private rights of way, no tracks, no electrical
substations, third rail, or trolley wire) enabled it to expand
readily in pursuit of opportunities. The company's aggressive
growth during the 1920s led it into conflict with CSL, which
accused CMC of poaching on its territory when it expanded onto
3 CRT was the only one of the three Chicago-based transit
companies to serve some adjacent northern and western suburbs as
well as the city. Several of these communities still enjoy rapid
transit service today. At the same time, large areas of the city,
particularly the far Northwest, Southwest, far South, and Southeast
Sides, had no elevated service.
* CRT's lines, almost uniquely in North America, included
several outer sections of line which crossed local streets at
grade. Rapid rail designers elsewhere rarely built lines with
grade crossings, but this unconventional approach allowed CRT and
its predecessors to maximize service to outlying areas (where the
companies sometimes sought to develop real estate holdings) at
minimal capital cost.
the Northwest Side.5 CMC went only where it saw the potential
for profits. In contrast to CSL, there was no attempt to serve
the entire city. Even at its peak, CMC carried only one-tenth of
the city's transit ridership.
CMC routes were of two basic types: line-haul service
between residential neighborhoods and downtown Chicago, and
downtown routes in and around the heart of the city, particularly
to and from the major railroad terminals just west of the Loop.
CMC enjoyed a monopoly on one of the most profitable segments of
the transit market: its buses were the only transit vehicles
allowed on North Michigan Avenue, which was already beginning to
emerge as a prestigious shopping alternative to the Loop by the
interwar years.
Suburban Transit Operators
Transit did not become a political issue in the suburbs
until the early 1970s. However, to understand how some suburban
services did become politically troublesome at that point, it may
be useful to consider the array of suburban carriers:
1.) Railroads, providing commuter service between downtown
Chicago and suburban locations (examples: Burlington Northern,
Chicago & North Western, Illinois Central).'
2.) Streetcar and bus lines serving suburbs adjacent to
Chicago. These services were better suited for local travel than
were the suburban railroads, as these local lines operated in
* CMC was ultimately forced to withdraw from the routes in
question. For more on the legal battle between the two companies,
see Lind (1974), pp. 353-355.
' Many of these lines also provided extensive service within
the city, especially the Illinois Central and the Rock Island on
the South Side, although the Milwaukee Road and the Chicago & North
Western also had many stops on the West and North Sides.
directions other than those paralleling the railroads. Often,
riders could make connections with Chicago streetcar, bus, and
elevated lines for travel into the city. The territories which
these companies served all bordered on Chicago and stretched for
up to five or ten miles away from the city limits. This
proximity to Chicago distinguished these companies from the third
group of transit operators.
3.) Streetcar and bus lines serving industrial cities beyond
Chicago. Several industrial cities, large enough to have
developed their own local transit services, lie at the edge of
the metropolis, about 30 to 40 miles away from downtown Chicago.
(Examples include Aurora, Elgin, Joliet, and Waukegan, Illinois;
also Gary, Indiana.)
The typical commuting suburb in the 1920s had a local
streetcar or bus company (if it was within five or ten miles of
the city limits), and by a railroad providing commuter service.
Up through the 1940s, train service to the city put a community
"on the map" in much the same way that proximity to an expressway
did for postwar suburbs. Occasionally a steam railroad had
competition from an electric interurban, or, if the suburb was
close to the city, an extension of Chicago's elevated. The
industrial cities on the edge of the metropolitan area had their
local transit systems, a commuter railroad to Chicago, and, until
the postwar period, usually an interurban as well.
It was not until the late 1960s that suburban transit
carriers began to seek subsidies and buyouts from the public
sector. Until then, the transit situation remained relatively
stable 'in the suburbs. But in the City of Chicago, transit had
become a hot political issue by the 1890s.
Charles Yerkes and the entrepreneurial era
Chicago's rapid growth attracted entrepreneurs in a variety
of economic sectors, including mass transit.7 The most
notorious figure in the history of Chicago's electric traction
was Charles Yerkes. Originally from Philadelphia (where he had
served seven months in prison for embezzlement), Yerkes came to
Chicago in 1886 and promptly began a very active career as a
financier and developer of mass transit. As Roberts explains,
Yerkes' techniques were to borrow money, obtain leases,
offer dividend guarantees, juggle accounts, create
subsidiary corporations, and then issue watered
securities. His bookkeeping methods and business
tactics were so complicated that a clear account of how
he captured control of Chicago's street railways can
hardly be made (1961, p. 348).
At the height of his career, Yerkes was in control of the
street railways on the West and North Sides, and of the "L"
linking the North Side with the downtown Loop area.'
Entrepreneurs like Yerkes did not endear themselves to commuters,
as Barrett explains:
[T]hose who could sought some form of access to the
richest territory (...) [of] the Loop... Each
[company] feasted on the daily rush hours, sending as
7 For a summary of the intricate corporate history of mass
transit in Chicago, see the "Family Tree of Chicago's Transit
Operating Companies" in Chicago Transit Authority (1966, pp. viii-
ix) . Bullard (1987) describes the various predecessor companies in
exhaustive historical detail (pp 15-34), although the sequence of
events and the causal relationships are less than clear at several
points during his narrative.
* The dominant South Side street railway company had already
converted from horse to cable traction by the time Yerkes began his
Chicago street railway dealings in 1886. The North and West Side
companies, by contrast, had failed to make this conversion. This
failure provided Yerkes with an opportunity to present himself to
dissident stockholders as a dynamic manager who would make overdue
changes in the operation of the companies, in much the same way as
a later generation of "corporate raiders" would seek out
undervalued firms in the 1980s.
many cars as possible [into the Loop] ... 9 Each ran as
few cars as it dared at other hours of the day, and
with few exceptions, none at all at night (1983, p.
13).
Despite the prominent role Yerkes played in Chicago's
political demonology, he and his contemporaries built large
amounts of infrastructure quickly which allowed Chicagoans to
move to more spacious quarters further away from their places of
work. Under Yerkes, horsecars were replaced with cable cars,
which in turn soon gave way to electric streetcars. On the "L",
Yerkes converted from steam to electric traction. He built the
Loop elevated which enabled the "L" trains of his and other
companies to circulate through the city's business center rather
than terminate on the edge of downtown. This accomplishment
still facilitates commuting in Chicago today.
Yerkes is best remembered today, however, for the negative
aspects of his regime. Overcrowding was widespread on the
streetcar and elevated lines. Once, when confronted by a group
of dissident stockholders who called for more service to relieve
overcrowding, Yerkes told them, in a reply which was to become
infamous, "It is the people who hang to the straps who pay you
your big dividends" (Roberts 1961, p. 352). Not only was
overcrowding inconvenient, but it also led to frequent accidents
in which people were hurt and even killed (Roberts 1961, p 352;
9 Since Yerkes' day, there has been a major change in the way
in which the economics of mass transit is perceived. Today,
transit managers agree that off-peak ridership is valuable and
should be cultivated because it helps counterbalance the large
costs of providing rush hour service. Since much of the fleet and
workforce of a modern transit agency are fully used for only about
four hours a day, the service strategy of Yerkes and his
contemporaries makes little sense in modern terms. Part of this
change in the prevailing wisdom in the transit industry is due to
the rising standards demanded by the traveling public, who are no
longer a "captive audience" at the mercy of traction companies
which sought to maximize profits by squeezing in as many riders as
can be physically accommodated on board during rush hours.
Barrett 1983, pp. 10-12). In one year, 46 people were killed and
336 were injured by overhead wires that were poorly strung"
(Roberts 1961, p. 352).
Yerkes, in the eyes of many Chicagoans, exemplified the
capitalist spirit of the time in the worst possible way.10 In
his efforts to secure the franchises he sought, Yerkes bribed
Chicago aldermen and state legislators on a widespread scale.11
The franchising system pushed the stakes so high that Yerkes
competed against his rivals by securing preferential treatment
through corruption as much as they did by offering more
attractive service."
Forrest McDonald, in his otherwise excellent book, suggests
that entrepreneurs like Yerkes were the victims of corrupt
legislators who made approval of projects conditional on the
payment of bribes to them (1962, p. 85). McDonald correctly
notes that many legislators insisted on direct personal rewards
for political favors and even the granting and continuation of
franchises. What McDonald overlooks is that it takes a buyer as
well as a seller of favors to do business. Entrepreneurs may not
have invented the practice of bribing lawmakers, but this by no
means made them victims of these corrupt practices. The real
10 Yerkes was the model for the principal character in
Theodore Dreiser's novels The Titan and The Financier (McDonald
1962, p. 85, footnote).
11 According to Roberts (1961, p. 351), Yerkes
was most adept at bribing aldermen and in obtaining
valuable franchises. Yerkes "always got what he wanted"
from the City Council, and in turn, aldermen "became the
owners of new race horses, new homes, and new bank
deposits." Yerkes played no small part in earning for
Chicago the reputation of being the "Boodle Capital of
the World."
12 Roberts 1961, p. 351.
victims were Chicagoans of modest means who paid higher fares and
carried increased tax burdens as a result of the arrangements
that corrupt politicians made with the likes of Yerkes.
Ginger argues that entrepreneurs who engaged in bribery, far
from being prisoners of a system not to their liking, were simply
following the logic of economic self-interest:
Yerkes saved money when he paid the alderman $250,000
for a crooked franchise instead of paying the city
$1,000,000 for an honest one. A man came out ahead if
he paid off the tax assessor instead of paying his
proper taxes (1958, p. 99).
Machine politicians instinctively understood the logic of
maximizing utility, and translated it into political terms:
The ward bosses together controlled the nominating
conventions of both major parties. When their
candidates won, it was the bosses who dispensed the
jobs on the payrolls of the city and county and state.
Also the ward bosses gave out franchises to the public
utilities and favors to other big corporations; in
return, the private firms hired men suggested by the
bosses (Ibid.).
These forces dominated the politics of Chicago's traction
companies. Prior to 1907, the City Council had the power to
grant franchises to street railway operators such as Yerkes, but
only for 20 years at a time. Yerkes was very interested in
renewing his streetcar franchises:
The ability to sell bonds was inseparable from
franchise security (...) because no one was anxious to
buy thirty-year bonds from a company which might cease
to exist in less than a decade" (McDonald 1962, p. 86).
But rather than build public support for his position,
Yerkes sought to reduce the uncertainty of the political
environment through his usual manipulations. His first effort
was the so-called Humphrey Bills, a legislative package known for
its principal sponsor in the State House. The bills provided for
a 99-year franchise extension, and were known by their detractors
(who included Governor John Altgeld) as the "Eternal Monopoly
Bills." When they passed both houses in the spring of 1895,
Governor Altgeld was seriously overextended in his own business
holdings, but he rejected a reported offer of $500,000 from
Yerkes and vetoed the bills. A legislative battle ensued to pass
the Humphrey package by a three-fifths majority over Altgeld's
veto, but the override failed by a margin of one vote (Ginger
1958, pp. 173-174).
Yerkes, however, was not daunted by the defeat of the
Humphrey Bills. With many of his most important franchises due
to expire in 1903, Yerkes pushed legislation through the state
house in 1897 granting transit operators a 50-year franchise
guaranteed by the state. Although Altgeld had been defeated in
his bid for reelection by the time the measure was passed, the
new Allen Law created a great political uproar in Chicago which
strengthened the hand of reformers (Roberts 1961, pp. 354-363).
Even though the law made 50-year franchises possible, but Yerkes
still had to go to the city to obtain the franchises he sought,
and it was city politics that proved his undoing. He had now so
deeply alienated the citizenry that few aldermen were willing to
risk political suicide by supporting Yerkes in his quest for
extended franchises.
In 1898 an alderman friendly to Yerkes proposed the 50-year
extension Yerkes sought, but Mayor Carter Harrison II called on
Chicagoans to mobilize against Yerkes. Several angry mass
meetings made the strength of sentiment against Yerkes clear to
aldermen, and the proposal was defeated. As if that were not
enough, the state legislature, responding to the demands of
Chicago voters, repealed the hated Allen Law in 1899 (Roberts
1961, pp. 363-371).
Rather than live with the political reality he had helped
create, Yerkes sold his Chicago transit interests in 1901 and
moved to London. He started several of that city's underground
"tube" lines before his death in 1906.
The Yerkes Legacy
When Yerkes sold his traction interests and left Chicago, he
left a contradictory legacy. On the positive side, he had built
miles of streetcar and elevated lines which were to serve the
city efficiently, if not comfortably, for decades to come. But
Yerkes had also left an institutional legacy of political
corruption, intense public suspicion of entrepreneurs like
himself, and a deep reservoir of bitterness among voters.
The post-Yerkes years of private sector mass transit in
Chicago were characterized by almost continuous political
controversy over the city's streetcar and elevated lines. The
disputes revolved around two distinct but closely related issues.
The more contentious of the two was whether private companies
should continue to operate transit, or the city should take over
their assets and operate services itself. The subsidiary issue
was fare integration, and was neatly captured in the slogan "One
city, one fare."
Post-Yerkes Developments
Once Yerkes had left Chicago, various contending forces
struggled to occupy the vacuum which he had left. Events moved
rapidly until the dust settled in 1907. In 1902, voters approved
an advisory referendum calling for municipal ownership. Edward
Dunne, who was mayor from 1905 to 1907, was active in the 1902
campaign. In 1903 the state passed the Mueller Law (ratified a
year later), which once again limited franchises to 20 years and
also allowed the city to build, acquire, and operate street
railways, subject to voter approval at a referendum. A simple
majority was enough for ownership, but operation required a two-
thirds majority (Barrett 1983, p. 31). In 1905 voters raised the
stakes in another referendum by rejecting a franchise the City
Council had granted the major South Side streetcar company.
A year later Chicagoans put the Mueller Law to the test,
amid concern about the extent to which their politicians could be
trusted with the city's streetcars. The electorate approved
municipal ownership by just a simple majority, not by the two-
thirds needed to allow the city to operate the lines and make
ownership meaningful. The 1906 referendum produced a deadlock:
voters had rejected the traction companies without endorsing
municipal operation. In 1907 the Illinois Supreme Court
invalidated the financing mechanism whereby the Mueller Law would
have enabled the city to buy the street railways, on the grounds
that it would raise the city's debt beyond the limits established
in the Illinois Constitution of 1870.
The outcome was a compromise in favor of private ownership
and operation, subject to government regulation. The so-called
"Settlement Ordinances" of 1907
were remarkable because they appeared to give all major
parties to the long-standing "traction wars" a large
portion of what each had wanted, and to do so without
departing (...) from the reform tradition which held
that neither corporations nor politicians could be
trusted. To achieve this unlikely feat, the ordinances
simply put off (...) some important issues and "solved"
others by attempting to create a balance of power...
(Barrett 1983, p. 37).
The companies had their operating rights secured for the
next 20 years, which could only be revoked through a referendum.
In return, the companies committed themselves to a 5-cent fare,
free transfers between streetcar lines, and various service
improvements. The same year, voters approved the Settlement
Ordinances in a referendum. The city created the Board of
Supervising Engineers (chaired by transportation engineer Bion
Arnold, perhaps best remembered for the "one city, one fare"
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concept) to oversee the streetcar companies.2
The last time that Chicagoans voted on municipal ownership
was in 1925. The 1925 proposal called for operation of the
streetcar and elevated lines by a board which would be dominated
by shareholders of the traction companies until the investors had
been reimbursed, thus ensuring that fares would be kept high
enough to pay the costs of acquiring the companies. Voters
rejected the plan by a margin of more than three to two, largely
because they saw the terms as too advantageous to the companies
(Barrett 1983, p. 204).
The other big political issue surrounding Chicago's transit
system was fare integration. The 1907 Settlement Ordinances had
given riders their demand for "one city, one fare," albeit only
as far as streetcar travel was concerned. There was a move as
early as 1911 among the streetcar and "L" companies to amalgamate
into a unified system, which would have required the city to
repeal laws prohibiting such mergers. Negotiations between the
city and the companies on the consolidation plan broke down in
1913 when the parties could not agree on the valuations of the
properties for fare regulation purposes.
The next steps towards consolidation came from the city and
the state. In 1912 the city passed a resolution calling for
street railway unification, followed by a report demanding
unified service. In 1913 the state created the Illinois Public
Utilities Commission (subsequently the Illinois Commerce
Commission,) which assumed its duties in 1914.21 This move,
20 Perhaps wisely, the creation of the Board of Supervising
Engineers had the effect of making enforcement of the ordinances a
matter between private and public sector technocrats, without the
direct involvement of the more volatile political process.
21 The Illinois agency is not to be confused with the federal
Interstate Commerce Commission of the same initials.
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which empowered the state to regulate all public services,
including transit, shifted regulatory control away from the
city.22
By the eve of World War I, the streetcar companies were
coming around to the city's view that they, as well as the
public, would benefit from unification (Barrett 1983, p.98). The
companies agreed to merge their operations under a single
management, known as Chicago Surface Lines (CSL), which took
control in 1914.23
As for the elevated lines, other forces were at work to
bring about fare and service integration among the four different
companies. The catalyst for these changes was utility executive
Samuel Insull, one of the most forceful business figures in
Chicago from the 1890s until the Depression.
Samuel Insull: Hints of the Future
If Charles Yerkes epitomized the worst sort of transit
entrepreneurship up until the turn of the 20th century, then
Samuel Insull set a much more positive tone during the 1920s.24
Born and raised in a lower-middle class London family, he became
22 Barrett (1983), pp. 90-91 ; also see McDonald (1962), pp.
180-182 for a full account of events.
23 To the public, CSL presented itself as a single company,
and continued to offer free transfers between all streetcar lines
in the city. The underlying companies continued their corporate
existence until the Chicago Transit Authority bought out CSL in
1947. See Bullard (1987), p. 25 for exhaustive legal details of
the merger.
24 Forrest McDonald's 1962 book Insull remains the definitive
biography. Bullard (1989, pp. 44-50) offers a brief synthesis of
the electric traction aspect of Insull's career, which was at best
an adjunct to Insull's role as a developer of utilities. Platt
(1991) covers Insull's career in Chicago's electricity business,
giving full attention to the economic and technological forces
which shaped the market.
the head of Thomas Edison's European subsidiary as a young man,
and came to the US in 1881 at the age of 22 to become Edison's
personal secretary. Following the consolidation of General
Electric, Insull came to Chicago in 1892 to head up the local
electric company, and stayed there for the next four decades.
From his original power base as president of Chicago's electric
utility Commonwealth Edison, Insull became commander of a
business empire which came to include the Chicago area natural
gas company, elevated and interurban railroads in and around
Chicago, and electric utilities throughout the Midwest.
The collapse of Insull's holdings during the Depression
wiped out the investments that many small shareholders had made
in Insull's firms. As a result, many Chicagoans who lived
through the Depression remembered Insull in negative terms. The
time, however, may be overdue for a more favorable reappraisal of
Insull. If Yerkes personified the worst behavior of Chicago's
business leaders, then Insull represented Chicago capitalism at
its best. Yerkes had eagerly sought political advantages to
enhance his business prospects through the widespread purchase of
legislative votes. By contrast, Insull confined his quest for
hegemony to the business' sphere and sought to get along with all
politicians (with one exception in 1926 which eventually brought
about his undoing).
Insull's primary business focus was electric utilities,
which intertwined with his real estate and electric railroad
holdings (indeed, the latter were a small part of his overall
business interests). Insull's first real estate investments were
the North Side of Chicago, in areas adjacent to the "L". Later,
he sought to develop large areas of real estate in west suburban
Westchester and north suburban Skokie, and extended Chicago Rapid
Transit and North Shore Line interurban service to these
areas. (Similarly, certain companies in Japan today maintain
real estate holdings served by electric railways belonging to the
same firms.)
Insull was arguably well ahead of his time in promoting a
mass basis for capitalism by encouraging small investors to buy
into his holdings. In particular, he offered employees of his
firms the opportunity to buy stock at reduced prices. He was
also quite advanced in his approach to labor relations,
negotiating with union leaders on a pragmatic basis well before
organized labor won nationwide political legitimacy during the
New Deal.2" Another feature of Insull's career which bears
reinterpretation in progressive political terms today was his
sustained policy of promoting his financial independence (and, by
implication, that of the Chicago area) from New York banks.
Insull did business with Chicago banks whenever possible, and
when the Chicago banks were unable to extend the credit he needed
to finance his growing interests, he preferred the City of London
to Wall Street.
Insull is best known for his dynamic leadership of
Commonwealth Edison, the region's electric utility, but he was
also a major figure in Chicago's mass transit, a field which he
entered largely by default. Insull came to control the elevated
lines because the early 1910s found the four "L" companies unable
to pay their electric bills. Insull and a bank advanced the "L"
companies money in the form of loans, for which the elevated
lines themselves were collateral. The loan was based on the
25 Yago (1984) p. 158; Central Electric Railfans Association
(1961) p. 40; Central Electric Railfans Association (1963) p. 28.
26 For a more complete discussion of Insull's attitudes and
his contributions towards the development of businesslike relations
between capital and labor, see McDonald (1962), pp. 108-112.
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shaky assumption that the "L" and streetcar companies would be
merged by 1914. When this failed to happen, the "L" companies
could not repay the loans, and Insull came into possession of the
city's entire "L" system.
On its own terms, the "L" barely paid its way at best, but
in the broader picture it supported Insull's electric and real
estate holdings. At any rate, if Insull had any doubts about his
new Chicago mass transit role with good grace, he accepted it
with good grace. Upon coming into possession of the various "L"
lines in 1914, Insull instituted free transfers between them."
In 1924 Insull formalized his takeover by merging the city's four
elevated lines into the new Chicago Rapid Transit.2"
Foreshadowings of Regionalization
Through their sheer extent, Insull's electric traction
holdings, which included the "L" and three Chicago area
interurban electric railroads, hinted at the regionalization of
mass transportation in the city and suburbs in the 1970s.
Furthermore, Insull had a stake in the well-being of all of the
region's electric railways because he supplied their electricity.
More than any figure in the public sector for the next several
decades, Insull presaged the regional approach to mass transit.
After taking control of the "L", Insull had purchased three
electric interurban railroads--the Chicago, North Shore &
27 This move brought the "L" into line with the situation
prevailing on the streetcars as a result of the 1907 Settlement
Ordinances, which required free transfers between different
streetcar routes. Customers transferring between the "L" and
streetcar lines, however, had to wait another two decades before
they could do so without paying an additional fare.
28 Bullard (1987), p. 31. The provision of free transfers
between different "L" lines downtown, of course, meant that the "L"
had been presented to riders as a single system as early as 1914,
well before the formation of Chicago Rapid Transit ten years later.
Milwaukee (North Shore Line), the Chicago, Aurora & Elgin, and
the Chicago, South Shore & South Bend (South Shore Line)--by
1926." Insull invested heavily in their modernization, buying
new cars and improving service on all three interurbans.30
At the height of mass transit in Chicagoland during the
1920s, an intensive and extensive array of streetcar, bus,
elevated, interurban, and commuter railroad lines criss-crossed
the city and suburbs. Travel opportunities and transfer points
abounded, but despite the Chicago streetcar and "L"
consolidations, no carriers offered inter-company transfers.
Nevertheless, Insull did promote travel on his own lines on a
joint basis, with advertisements promoting travel on the "L" and
29 For a comprehensive history of the North Shore Line, see
Central Electric Railfans Association (1962) and (1963), two
companion volumes published at the time of the railroad's demise.
Middleton (1964) traces the history of the North Shore in a single
volume for readers seeking a general overview with less detail.
Central Electric Railfans Association (1961) has long been the
definitive history of the Chicago Aurora & Elgin. This work has
recently been joined by Plachno (1989), which covers the
interurban's history in often absorbing detail. Johnson's (1965)
pictorial history contains considerable information (largely in the
captions), despite its brief introductory narrative.
There is no single definitive history of the South Shore Line,
but two works, taken together, offer a reasonably comprehensive
overview. Middleton (1970) covers the South Shore from the
railroad's inception up through the 1960s. Kaplan (1984) focuses
on the decade from the early 1970s through the early 1980s.
30 Most of the nation's interurbans failed to survive the
Depression, but Insull's three large Chicago interurbans fared
better. The Chicago, Aurora & Elgin lasted until 1957, the North
Shore Line survived until 1963, and the South Shore Line continues
to this day (largely thanks to its freight traffic, as its
passenger service alone would not have sustained it through the
postwar era until the advent of public subsidies in the 1970s).
the interurbans." Also, Insull's Chicago area transit
companies were closely integrated in corporate terms not
immediately visible to the traveling public. They often shared
the same top management, and technical personnel were frequently
rotated among CRT and the interurbans.
Tentative as Insull's regional approach was, in some
respects it was more comprehensive than the Regional
Transportation Authority which emerged in the early 1970s.
Because of Insull's real estate and utility interests, he saw
transportation investment as having other business benefits. For
instance, while the Westchester branch of the "L" might not have
paid its own way from the farebox, Insull justified its
construction as a business decision in terms of potential profits
from subdividing adjacent land and selling it to home buyers.
Also, Insull, unlike elected officials and government bodies,
thought in terms of markets rather than political jurisdictions.
One of Insull's interurbans, the South Shore Line, served
northwestern Indiana, which adjoins northeastern Illinois and
functions as an integral, if a minor, part of the metropolis.
Because Insull responded to commercial rather than political
demands, he was able to overlook jurisdictional boundaries in
pursuit of business opportunities.
The Illinois Central electrification
Insull was not the only force prefiguring the future scope
of transit policy. With the electrification of the Illinois
Central, the city pursued another initiative which unconsciously
31 During the Insull years and afterwards, advertisements for
the North Shore Line and the Chicago Aurora & Elgin noted the
existence of free transfer opportunities at stations along the "L"
which they served on their way to downtown Chicago. Benedict
(1988) details the various free transfer possibilities which
formerly existed during the histories of the Insull interurbans.
hinted at the direction of things to come."
The Illinois Central has long been one of Chicago's busiest
railroads. Its alignment along the South Side lakefront from
downtown to 51st Street placed the railroad in conflict with its
neighbors, who objected to the smoke of the steam locomotives."
In 1919 the city passed the Lake Front Ordinance, the most
important provision of which was to require the IC to electrify
its commuter service by early 1927. Electric service started
half a year earlier, in the summer of 1926.
Today the IC (now Metra Electric) carries around two-thirds
of its riders between the city and the suburbs. By today's
standards, the Lake Front Ordinance might seem to carry an
element of extraterritoriality on the city's part. But at the
time, the IC was an overwhelmingly urban railroad, with service
so frequent that few riders within the city needed to look at a
timetable before traveling.
Until after World War II, the overwhelming majority of the
IC's riders lived and traveled within the city. In 1926, fully
half the ridership was between downtown Chicago and 63rd Street.
In many ways, the electrified IC was more like the "L" than like
Chicago's other commuter railroads. With only one exception, the
IC had stations at every major half-mile-interval street on the
" Insull did invest in the electrification; his "Commonwealth
Edison and Public Service Company of Northern Illinois owned and
operated the seven substations along the line..." (Lind 1986, p.
74).
" Stanford (1980, pp. 11-12) shows that the Illinois Central
was one of the railroads least frequently cited by the city for
excessive smoke even before electrification; perhaps this was part
of a conscious effort on the IC's part to be a good neighbor in
environmental terms.
South Side from downtown to 115th Street.3 4 Most fare
collection took place at the stations (and conductors did not
even check all tickets until 1981). Until the postwar decline in
its urban ridership (caused by demographic shifts), the IC was
very much a city transit service with ridership volumes around
one-half of Chicago Motor Coach--and unlike CMC, the IC served
only one travel corridor.
Insull and Transit Consolidation
Samuel Insull's influence on transit policy was not limited
to his acquisition of the elevated and interurban lines. He
almost brought about the unification of Chicago Rapid Transit and
Chicago Surface Lines into a mixed private-public company."
The proposal also included plans for considerable rapid transit
extension, including subway construction. Insull's plan, which
was approved but not implemented, explicitly acknowledged the
operating, managerial, and consumer benefits of consolidation.
Insull may have stood to benefit in broad business terms from the
plan, but to some degree he may have felt sense of noblesse
oblige as one of Chicago's leading figures to find a lasting
resolution to the city's transit problems.
At the root of the problem was the 1907 street railway
Settlement Ordinance, which had been created with a twenty-year
validity period. The City Council did not renew, modify, or
34 Although the IC abandoned several of the stations on
Chicago's South Side after World War II, a majority still remain.
It is ironic that even today, the average station spacing on the IC
(theoretically a suburban railroad), is more frequent than on San
Francisco's BART, which is supposedly rapid transit.
3s For more about the proposal, see McDonald (1962), p. 259.
Under the Insull plan, the city would have owned the subway which
was planned for construction. The plan did not propose any changes
in the three Insull-owned interurbans, two of which presumably
would have continued to reach the Loop via the "L" . Insull's
proposal made no direct provision for Chicago Motor Coach, which
was the smallest of the city's three local transit carriers.
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revoke the franchise once it expired. Thus, from 1927 on,
Chicago Surface Lines operated under "day-to-day" authorization
which the city theoretically had the right to revoke at will.
The political uncertainty surrounding CSL's future interacted
with financial problems to bring the streetcar system into
receivership effective April 27, 1927.
Over the next several years, CSL became the subject of
complex and controversial political maneuvering. The decline in
surface line ridership which was to hit Chicago with a vengeance
after World War II was still a long way off in the 1920s. Thus,
Insull and his contemporaries might be forgiven for assuming that
there would be a solid basis of ridership which would make
transit self-sustaining for years to come.
The ambitious capital plans of the consolidation proposal
might not have been crucial from a transportation perspective,
but made perfect political sense for the Depression. Chicago,
with its emphasis on industry and trans-shipment of goods, was
one of the cities hardest hit by the collapse of the productive
sectors of the economy. The capital expansion aspect of the 1930
transit plan appealed to-voters because it promised jobs (Barrett
1983, p. 207).
A complex series of events led up to the 1930 referendum. A
set of bills which Insull arranged to be introduced in the state
legislature met with unexpected opposition in 1928 when several
downstate members demanded bribes in return for their support.
Insull refused to pay as a matter of principle, and the bills
went down to defeat. Major Loop interests, acting in cooperation
with Insull, continued to push for consolidation, and new
legislation was passed in 1929 (McDonald 1962, pp. 257-260).
The final step was a referendum on the proposal, which was
held on July 1, 1930. The result was a clear success for Insull:
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there were 325,468 votes for the plan versus 58,212 opposed, or
more than five votes in favor for every vote against (McDonald
1962, p. 261). But then Insull's empire crumbled during the
winter of 1931-32. Since the money was no longer there, the
transit plan was now a dead letter.
As if Insull's financial problems were not enough, he had
political troubles as well. In the 1932 electoral campaign,
Democratic presidential contender Franklin Roosevelt attacked
Insull as a manipulative financier (McDonald 1962, p. 272) ."
The US Department of Justice, presumably reflecting the Herbert
Hoover administration's efforts to position itself for the 1932
election, initiated proceedings against Insull for fraud. The US
Attorney, Dwight Green, was an up-and-coming Chicago Republican
36 McDonald portrays Insull as a scapegoat for the political
frustrations of the millions of Americans who had lost almost
everything they had in the Depression. Nevertheless, McDonald
admits that Insull's political problems were largely of his own
making.
Normally, Insull sought to enjoy good relations with all
elected officials. However, he made one ill-advised exception to
this rule. He made the fatal mistake of spending $500,000 of his
own money in the 1926 Illinois Republican senatorial primary to
defeat incumbent William McKinley, a downstate utility and electric
railway magnate with whom Insull had been feuding for the past
decade. (See Bullard 1989, pp. 32-36 for a description of
McKinley's career.)
Although McKinley was defeated, Insull's role in the campaign
led to a federal investigation of what critics described as an
abuse of his power. US Senate allies of the defeated McKinley
charged that Insull was rewarding the victorious candidate, Frank
L. Smith, for his role as Illinois Commerce Commission chairman,
during which it was claimed that Smith had granted favorable
electric rates to Insull (McDonald 1962, pp. 254-255, 262-273, and
Bullard 1989, pp. 47-48).
Insull had enough problems in 1930 trying to obtain credit
when his brother Martin made matters even worse by publicly
attacking Franklin Roosevelt, then governor of New York State
(McDonald 1962, p. 272) . Apparently Roosevelt remembered this
attack when he became a presidential candidate.
who became governor of Illinois in 1940 and would still be in
office when legislation creating the Chicago Transit Authority
was enacted in 1945. But the jury in Insull's trial was not
impressed by the government's case and acquitted Insull on all
charges." Insull returned to Europe, and died in Paris in
1938. Chicago's transit companies were now on their own. CSL
and CRT did, however, make one last attempt to solve their
problems.
After Insull: Private transit caught in the squeeze
The collapse of Insull's holdings forced the transit
companies to get by as best they could for another decade and a
half. The companies were caught in the squeeze between the
conflicting demands of their investors, employees, and creditors
on the one hand, and of the traveling public and state regulators
on the other.
The three companies were forced into a certain amount of
cooperation starting in 1935, when the Illinois Commerce
Commission ordered them to offer free transfers valid on one
another's routes on a limited basis. The 1935 ICC decision
brought about the long-held goal of many Chicagoans for a single
transit fare within the city, as exemplified by the slogan "One
city, one fare."3 In theory, expanded transfer privileges
should have been a major step forward for transit in Chicago.
"7 See McDonald (1962, pp. 310-333) for details of the trial
and preparations on both sides. In 1935 Insull was tried on
related federal and state counts alleging embezzlement and
violation of federal bankruptcy law, and again was acquitted.
38 The first and most important step in implementing the court
decision was interline transfers between CSL and CRT at certain
specified points, effective in 1935. This was followed a year
later by a similar agreement between CRT and CMC, but it still lef t
a gap in coverage for riders wishing to transfer between CSL and
CMC. In 1943 all three transit companies instituted universal
transfers (Schroeder 1956, p. 38).
But inter-company transfers did nothing to address the
fundamental lack of investment. The transfers accomplished
little besides giving riders access on a single fare to all of a
seriously rundown system.
There was one final attempt at a merger under private sector
auspices. Following a 1937 City of Chicago report urging a
merger of all of the city's transit operators, the receivers for
both CSL and CRT filed reorganization plans in 1939 which would
merge their two companies. The city cooperated with these plans
by passing an appropriate ordinance, comparable in its provisions
to the Insull consolidation plan.3' City voters ratified the
plan in a 1942 referendum by a margin of ten to one. But a year
later, the Illinois Commerce Commission, which regulated the
private transit companies, threw out the plan on the grounds that
it did not ensure the merged system's financial health (Illinois
1972, pp. 73-79). This effectively foreclosed any resolution
within a regulated private sector framework.
The final analysis
Any transit issue was almost automatically framed in zero-
sum terms of winners and losers whose interests were
fundamentally irreconcilable. This suspicion was almost an
integral part of the political culture, and the belief that the
transit companies could not be trusted reinforced the citizenry's
natural preference for low fares. The result was to make it
virtually impossible for elected officials to allow the Illinois
"9 Remarkably, this ordinance was far ahead of its time in
allowing the merged system to establish transfer privileges with
suburban railroads (Illinois 1972, p. 76). In the 1990s, two
decades after the Regional Transportation Authority had been
brought into being, there was no hint of establishing transfers
between commuter trains and connecting buses and rapid transit
lines. Today, only monthly commuter rail ticket holders can avail
themselves of this benefit by purchasing a "Link-Up Passport"
sticker allowing them to ride CTA and suburban bus routes.
Commerce Commission to let the companies price their services
according to private sector criteria, i.e., at levels high enough
to attract investors.
With the transit consolidation plans of Samuel Insull and
the traction companies, which voters endorsed in referenda in
1930 and 1942, there was finally a political common ground.
Unfortunately, by then financial realities had made it impossible
for voters and investors to carry out their reconciliation.
Thus, by 1945, when the public sector stepped in, there was
no future for CSL or CRT to earn profits in Chicago's mass
transit. The private operators had once feared and resisted
public ownership, but their poor financial prospects now made
them receptive to any reasonable offer. The reformers' long-held
dreams of a unified, publicly-owned transit system were about to
come true, albeit under the auspices of Chicago's political
machine, and more by default than by design.
CHAPTER 3
THE CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY'S EARLY YEARS, 1945-1969
In 1945 the state legislature succeeded where Samuel Insull
had failed in consolidating Chicago's transit system. The
Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) started operations in 1947 with
high hopes which were slowly deflated over the next decade, like
air leaking out of a tire. For its first decade, the CTA
concentrated on replacing technologically obsolete equipment,
rationalizing service, and converting to lower-cost technologies.
Once the agency had reached the immediate limits of
modernization, however, it lost its momentum and slowly sank into
a cautious, passive conservatism.
The CTA was the result of negotiations between Edward Kelly,
Chicago's Democratic mayor, and Dwight Green, Illinois'
Republican governor. Chicago's last Republican mayor, William H.
"Big Bill" Thompson, lost his bid for reelection in 1931 to his
Democratic rival Anton J. Cermak. Thompson, known for his
flamboyant style, colorful language, and toleration of widespread
corruption, was widely popular during the prosperous 1920s. But
his reckless fiscal policies helped bring him down in 1931, when
Thompson blamed the financial community for the city's inability
to obtain credit when the Depression struck. His successor,
Mayor Cermak, cooperated with bankers to cut the costs of city
government to the extent necessary to restore credibility with
investors. Cermak found that his working-class background and
his position as a family man in an ethnic neighborhood rang true
to many voters in a way that Thompson's attempts to appear as a
man of the people did not.
In 1933, while visiting Roosevelt in Miami in an effort to
secure federal funds for Chicago, Cermak was killed by a would-be
presidential assassin whose bullet reached an unintended target.
But his Democratic organization would continue to elect Chicago's
mayors until 1979. Edward Kelly, Cermak's successor, was
reaching the end of his political career in 1945 when he and
Governor Dwight Green helped bring the Chicago Transit Authority
into being. After a two-term Democratic interlude under Henry
Horner, control of the governor's office passed to Republican
Dwight Green, who had been the federal prosecutor in charge of
the Samuel Insull case in early 1933.
Creation of the CTA
Republicans and Democrats agreed on the need for a public
authority to address Chicago's transit problems. There was no
question but that the city could not afford to acquire and
modernize mass transit on its own. Ideally, the city would have
probably preferred an authority with taxing powers or other
access to public subsidies. However, the governor and many
legislators were Republicans who believed that the state should
help Chicago's transit without funding it. The resulting
legislative compromise produced an agency which did not offend
Republican principles about financial responsibility.'
The CTA was required by law to meet its expenses from
passenger revenues. In order to give the CTA the freedom to set
fares at a level adequate to meet its needs, the enabling
legislation removed the CTA from regulation by the Illinois
Commerce Commission. This probably reflected an awareness of the
role the commission played in crippling the financial well-being
of Chicago Surface Lines and Chicago Rapid Transit. Perhaps in
I During the late 1920s, when Samuel Insull was assembling
support for his transit consolidation plan, proposals were made
for an amendment to the Constitution of 1870 allowing the city to
exceed the constitutional debt limit and use special assessments
to buy and build transit facilities. These efforts went nowhere
in the face of opposition from downstate legislators (Illinois
1972, pp. 59-61).
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return for respecting the principle of financial sustainability,
Green was willing to give the city political control of the CTA.
Of the seven board members, the mayor named four and the governor
three, an arrangement which has continued to this day.2
As often happens in Illinois politics, the governor and the
mayor relied on help from their allies in the legislature. The
Senate sponsor of the Metropolitan Transit Authority act was
Richard J. Daley. At the time, Daley was simply one of several
capable and dedicated adherents of Chicago's Democratic machine,
but he would rise to much greater heights of power a decade later
as mayor of Chicago and chairman of the local Democratic Party.
The General Assembly created the CTA in April 1945, subject
to voter consent in a city referendum. On June 4, 1945,
Chicagoans approved by a margin of six to one, albeit with a low
voter turnout. It took the CTA two years until it could market
enough farebox revenue-backed bonds to pay for the acquisition of
Chicago Surface Lines and Chicago Rapid Transit, both of which
were taken over by the CTA effective October 1, 1947. On October
1, 1952, exactly five years later, the CTA absorbed Chicago Motor
Coach, the smallest of the three transit companies and the only
one not functioning under a court-appointed receiver.
Although on paper the CTA was in charge of its own affairs
to a degree that the private companies never were, in practice
the CTA did not use this new commercial freedom. The CTA's board
had to approve all changes in fares, thus leaving ultimate
control of the CTA's finances indirectly in the hands of the
mayor and the governor, who appointed the board's members.
The CTA modernizes
2 Each chief executive's nomination is subject to the
approval of the other.
Given the immediate problems of the transit companies'
overaged, undermaintained, and outmoded physical plants,
rationalization and modernization were obvious imperatives for
the CTA. But despite the many benefits to riders, modernization
only enabled the CTA to slow down the rate at which it fell
behind the automobile in attractiveness. By the late 1950s and
early 1960s, the CTA was operating with a largely modernized
physical plant, but served a declining market and was
increasingly balancing its budget by postponing maintenance and
deferring further replacement of its capital stock.
The centerpiece of the CTA's efforts was the authority's
modernization program, funded by bonds which pledged future
passenger revenues as collateral. The modernization affected
both the former Surface Lines, where the CTA converted from
streetcars to buses, and the former Rapid Transit, where the CTA
ordered new cars and eliminated the weaker portions of the "L".
Since the era of subsidies was still two decades away, the CTA
still largely adhered to business criteria. Thus, management had
to persuade the board and the financial community that
modernization would reduce unit costs to the point where
operating savings would more than offset capital investments.
Much of the capital stock was worn out, and the technology
dated largely from the 1920s, if not earlier. On the former
Surface Lines, the CTA had inherited a huge fleet of largely
worn-out streetcars which required a two-person crew to operate
and could not be reasonably converted to one-person operation.
Nor did the CTA see more of the modern "Blue Geese" and "Green
Hornets," streamlined cars from the 1930s and 1940s,
respectively, as the ultimate answer. As long as the CTA
continued to operate streetcars, it was burdened with the tracks
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and wires associated with street railways.'
The CTA replaced all of its streetcars with buses and
trolleybuses by 1958. Initially, the CTA simply strung a second
overhead wire above streets on many crosstown lines and replaced
the streetcars with trolley buses. Although there were few
operating problems with the trolleybuses, the CTA discontinued
them in 1973 on economic grounds.' The bulk of the former
streetcar routes, though, were replaced with buses. During the
1950s the CTA invested heavily in propane-powered buses, and by
the early 1960s the CTA's propane bus fleet was the largest in
the US (Krambles & Peterson 1993, pp. 47-49). By the early
1970s, however, the propane buses were due for retirement, and
were replaced by diesel buses which were standard in the transit
industry.
There was also a clear case for modernizing the "L". When
the CTA took over, trains made frequent stops at a number of
little-patronized stations, entire branches were rapidly becoming
3 As conditions of its franchises, CSL was required to pave
the area around its tracks and for keeping them clear of snow--
conditions which the CTA inherited. By contrast, in Toronto
local governments assume responsibility for paving and snow
removal on streets where street railways exist. These factors
helped make the economics of streetcars more attractive in
Toronto, where the Toronto Transit Commission met its costs from
the farebox for about as long as the CTA did. Toronto now has
the largest streetcar system in North America.
* Some observers questioned the wisdom of the CTA's
decision, both in terms of.the quiet, smooth ride of trolleybuses
compared with that of diesel buses, and the context of the energy
shortfall which hit the US starting in the fall of 1973. These
criticisms are valid on their own terms, but they overlook the
essential budgetary constraints in place at the time,
particularly as Chicago's trolleybuses were nearing the end of
their useful service lives. Since the Regional Transportation
Authority, with its subsidy-granting capabilities, had not yet
been created, the CTA was in no position to make decisions based
on considerations other than its shaky finances.
obsolete in the new postwar spatial rearrangement of the
metropolis, and most of the equipment was visibly, even
dangerously outmoded.
On October 1, 1947, the former Chicago Rapid
Transit Company handed over to CTA 1,028 motor cars and
595 trailer cars. Except for four articulated cars
ordered (with court permission), two of which were just
delivered that summer, the newest in this fleet were
already in their third decade of service and the oldest
dated to 1893 (Krambles & Peterson 1993, p. 56).
The rationalization of the "L" had several components.
First, there were massive station closings. Many stations were
originally spaced as closely together as every 1 mile, thus
making nonsense of CRT's claim to be operating rapid (as opposed
to merely grade-separated) transit. If CTA's "L" trains were to
compete with the automobile on a basis of choice, management had
to reexamine the optimum tradeoff between conveniently accessible
stops and the running speed of its trains. The CTA decided in
favor of increased train speed, and closed down dozens of
stations within its first several years.
Another problem was that the CTA had inherited a number of
branch lines with few riders and little prospect for growth.
These fell by the wayside during the CTA's first decade. In the
city, the Humboldt Park "L" on the Northwest Side was abandoned.
The South Side lost no fewer than three lightly-patronized
branches (Stockyards, Kenwood, and Normal Park). Rapid transit
abandonments also affected several nearby suburbs. To the north
of the city, the Skokie line was abandoned. 5 In the western
* Local service on the Skokie "L" ceased in 1948. Trains
of the.North Shore Line interurban, which had trackage rights to
downtown Chicago on the CTA, continued to operate between
Dempster Street, Skokie, and downtown Chicago on the North Shore
Line interurban. The North Shore's abandonment in January 1963
left Skokie without rail transit service, which was resumed in
April 1964 with the CTA's Skokie Swift, a nonstop shuttle between
Dempster Street and the Howard Street "L" station.
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suburbs, the last mile and a half of the Douglas Park "L" was
abandoned, as were the Westchester branch and the main line
Garfield Park "L", which the Westchester branch joined, beyond
the present terminal at Desplaines Avenue.'
Finally, many of the elevated cars which the CTA had
inherited from CRT desperately needed to be replaced. The most
obvious candidates were the wooden cars, which antedated the
years of Insull management.' They were all replaced by the late
1950s with modern cars, many of which used window frames and
other parts from modern "Green Hornet" streamlined streetcars
which the CTA was phasing out. The 1950s cars also enabled the
CTA to retire many of its Insull-era cars from the 1920s (the
last of which ran in the early 1970s). An added benefit of "L"
modernization was that the old wooden cars required a gateman on
board every car, while the postwar cars could be operated with a
motorman and a guard.
The postwar view of rationalization
The elimination of less-patronized stations was a visible
result of a unified management which was for the first time able
to see transit in the city as a coherent whole, rather than as
specific sub-systems. One of the reasons for which the CTA was
presumably founded was to allow decision-makers to do what was
best for Chicago's public transportation as a whole. Demographic
changes offered an additional reason for the CTA to take a
critical look at 50-year old station location priorities.
6 In the late 1950s, the Garfield Park "L" itself was torn
down to make way for the Congress Street Expressway (now the
Eisenhower Expressway), and a new rapid transit line was built in
the expressway's right-of-way along with the highway itself.
7 A serious accident with 8 fatalities happened in 1956
when a wooden "L" train collided with a steel North Shore Line
interurban train on the elevated line. "The accident put CTA on
the front pages, and people began to take its needs more
seriously" (Banfield 1961, p. 103).
Interestingly, although the CTA took a broad view of mass
transit, it did not consider transit's impact elsewhere in the
economy. Under Samuel Insull, CRT had been able to use the "L"
to help his real estate ventures and to balance the peak loads of
his electric utility. But neither of these considerations held
after Insull's empire fell."
Labor relations and automatic cost of living adjustments
Chicago's transit labor relations have been politicized
almost as long as the industry itself. Labor relations were
combative with bitter strikes during the free-wheeling era of
Charles Yerkes and his contemporaries in the 1890s. Under the
Illinois Commerce Commission's regulated regime which started
early in the 20th century, a grab-share arrangement developed,
whereby riders and stockholders paid for generous labor
settlements. During the 1920s there were tentative moves towards
a welfare capitalist orientation under Samuel Insull, who owned
the elevated and interurban electric lines. Under Insull,
Chicago Rapid Transit's "labor relations [were] so favorable that
labor newspapers would attack politicians who said unkind things
about the company.. ." (McDonald 1962, p. 158).
In labor relations, as in other aspects, there was an uneasy
and slowly deteriorating status quo during the 1930s. The
streetcar and elevated companies operated under court-appointed
receivers, and the Depression meant that most workers were glad
to have a steady job at any rate of pay. During World War II,
however, the transit companies, like other employers, were faced
The collapse of Insull's holdings was not the sole factor
which would have forced transit managers to see their activities
in a narrower perspective. The federal Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935 (which forced the separation of electric power and
transit companies) would have had a similar effect on corporate
strategies, even had Insull's Chicago area holdings survived the
Depression under unified management and the 1930 transit
consolidation plan been enacted.
with labor shortages, forcing them to offer higher wages and seek
out what were then non-traditional sources of labor for transit
operations--including not only blacks but also whites of non-
Irish descent. In the postwar period, after the CTA had taken
over, the ethnic composition of the transit work force came to
reflect that of the city more closely.
The labor cost issue started almost innocuously, and was a
long time in developing, well out of the public eye. The CTA's
enabling legislation assumed that both management and labor
entered into legally binding agreements with their eyes open.
The law creating the CTA had left collective bargaining rights
intact, which meant that nothing would be done until such time as
the CTA's operating costs became a serious political issue.
In 1951, the CTA granted automatic cost of living
adjustments (COLA) to its operating unions in return for their
cooperation with the CTA's modernization program. This agreement
enabled the CTA to withdraw the older streetcars, with their two-
person crews, and replace them with one-person operated buses,
without fear of labor unrest. On the "L", this cleared the way
for retirement of the remaining wooden cars, which required a
gateman on each car, with new cars which had remotely-controlled
doors controlled by a single conductor. It was not until much
later that the far-reaching financial consequences of this
decision became apparent.
The managerial approach seems to have played a valuable
restraining function at the CTA during the agency's first two
decades. The business outlook appears to have had a moderating
influence on those actors it affected. This polite fiction was
largely upheld as long as the CTA complied with its statutory
requirement to balance its budget, although by the late 1960s the
facade was wearing thin as the CTA deferred maintenance to help
balance its budget. When the CTA crossed the line between
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business and politics, it happened more by gradual osmosis than a
concentrated onslaught.
As long as the CTA met its expenses from operating revenues,
its managers could function in a manner analogous to those in a
publicly regulated investor-owned utility. Managerial decisions
came under close public analysis, but in the final analysis were
determined by the need to meet a large payroll and operate a
complex system from the fees paid by its users.
Once the CTA began to lose money openly starting in 1970,
political forces became increasingly dominant. The business
criteria which management had used to guide their decision could
no longer resist political demands in the face of the
unwillingness of management and the board alike to raise fares,
claiming that further increases would cause such a decline in
ridership as to reduce net revenue. The full effects of
politicized decision-making did not become apparent until the
late 1970s, after Mayor Daley's death.
Wages were a major factor in pushing the CTA's finances out
of balance by 1970. By the time wage costs had become a major
concern for management, there was relatively little that could be
done to reduce the CTA's labor requirements without reducing the
amount of service provided. By subsequent standards, management
was seen as "giving away the store" by agreeing to the automatic
Cost Of Living Adjustment. This had become an understandable
interpretation by the 1970s and 80s, but back in the 1950s the
COLA may well have seemed almost innocuous or even part of a
beneficial tradeoff. Inflation was, at most, moderate during the
1950s. The CTA's management may have simply assumed that the
then-prevailing economic conditions would continue indefinitely
into the future, an assumption which it shared with many of its
private sector counterparts who reached similar agreements with
their unionized employees.
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However mutually advantageous the COLA may have seemed at
the time, there were two problems with it. First, there was no
cutoff point or phasing-out process for COLA based on the reality
that one-person buses and two-person rapid transit crews had
become the standard for the North American transit industry by
the end of the 1950s. Furthermore, COLA became the basis from
which increased wage settlements above and beyond the
automatically-adjusted rate of inflation were based. It was not
until the late 1960s, when the combined effects of large
government spending on social programs at home and on the Vietnam
War abroad drove the inflation rate up, that the COLA became a
serious burden to the CTA. By then, observers took the benefits
of labor-saving postwar transit technology for granted, and began
to reinterpret COLA as a serious mistake.
As long as the CTA covered its direct operating costs from
the farebox, as it was legally required to do in the absence of
subsidies (and did up through the 1960s), there was little reason
for elected officials to invest their energy in seeking to
restrict the power of the CTA's unions. The CTA did not operate
at a deficit in accounting terms prior to 1970 (though it would
have reached a financial crisis point earlier had it not deferred
maintenance and routine replacement of life-expired vehicles and
facilities). It was not until the December 1979 CTA strike that
the level of transit workers' wages became an explicitly
political issue, by which point the CTA's rank and file employees
had become the most highly paid transit workers in the
continental US. The intervening years gave the transit unions
ample opportunity to entrench their vested interests, as
management control was being slowly but surely tilted away from
financial towards political criteria.
Political changes
Political change was sweeping northeastern Illinois rapidly,
and it took talented politicians merely to keep up with the pace
of events. Both of the chief executives who had made the CTA's
creation possible in 1945 were nearing the ends of their
political careers. Green was defeated in 1948 when he "insisted
on running for a third term with an eight-year record of alleged
corruption in office ... [when he] was actually unelectable in
the state" (Rakove 1975, p. 146). Mayor Kelly had declined to
seek reelection a year earlier, possibly saving him from Green's
fate.
Ward committeeman Jacob "Jack" Arvey became Cook County
Democratic chairman in 1946 as a compromise choice among
different rival factions. The most powerful ward bosses who
decided the affairs of the party were growing increasingly
restive under Kelly's leadership, fearing that the mayor's image
of doubtful integrity might threaten their positions if he ran
for reelection in 1947. Arvey convinced Kelly that he was no
longer electable, and persuaded him to retire from politics for
the good of the organization.
When Kelly removed himself, the ward leaders slated Martin
Kennelly, a businessman with good government credentials and a
reputation for integrity. Kennelly was more acceptable to
reform-minded voters, and since he lacked a power base of his
own, he would have to work with the machine-dominated city
council in order to govern. One of Arvey's supporters in the
move to replace Kelly was Richard J. Daley, committeeman from the
politically powerful 11th ward.
Mayor Kennelly, who was elected to two terms (1947 and
1951), was a well-intentioned and capable administrator, but
deficient in political skills and unable to carry the city
council (and especially the ward committeemen) with him on
important issues. He lacked the confidence of party leaders, in
large part because he took his role as a reformer seriously.
Nevertheless, Kennelly served the party bosses purposes until a
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more useful candidate came along.
Party chairman Arvey was a ward boss of the old style, but
was more farsighted than most of his contemporaries, and was
almost uniquely able to bridge the gap between traditional
Chicago machine politics and the rising expectations of an
increasingly affluent postwar society. No reformer himself,
Arvey was mostly concerned with keeping the party one step ahead
of potential voter dissatisfaction. Arvey was a historical
figures of pivotal importance because of his ability to straddle
a political divide hitherto thought to be unbridgeable. An
attorney by profession, Arvey anticipated the "pinstripe
patronage" that was to characterize more and more of Illinois
politics by the end of the 20th century.
Arvey was party chairman from 1946 until 1950. His stock
was at its highest in 1948, when the Democrats did very well at
both the state and national levels. Unlike earlier party bosses
who tried to end the careers of dissident candidates, under
Arvey's leadership Chicago's Democrats dealt with liberal
reformers by slating them for higher office, or "kicking them
upstairs". Unfortunately for Arvey, he failed to select a
winning slate in 1950. A poor showing by local Democrats in that
year's elections called his leadership into question, and he
stepped down in favor of a provisional chairman. Three years
later Richard J. Daley became party chairman. In 1955 he became
mayor, from which position he would play a vital role in
Chicago's mass transit.
The "Black Belt" and ethnic succession in Chicago
Another force which would have a great effect on the future
of mass transit in Chicago would be racial succession. Until the
1960s, Chicago was a city of great opportunity for millions of
people who came in hope of a more rewarding life. One of the
greatest migrations to Chicago, both in terms of numbers and of
human aspirations, was the arrival of hundreds of thousands of
blacks from the American South.
Compared to Alabama, Mississippi, or Georgia in the 1910s,
1920s, or even the 1950s, Chicago offered great rewards to black
migrants who moved north. 9 To new arrivals just off the train
from the South, Chicago presented an aspect of promise and
freedom. Chicago was not a Southern-style Jim Crow city, as
blacks and whites drank from the same water fountains and rode
together on buses, streetcars, and trains. And the city's black
middle class was among the oldest and largest in the country.
Yet on closer inspection, Chicago turned out to be among the
most segregated cities in the US. Black-owned businesses thrived
in large part because blacks could not be served at white
establishments. It was not until the 1960s that the city's best
department stores began serving blacks (perhaps not
coincidentally, many retail shops in black neighborhoods went out
of business at the same time). And most importantly of all, in
few US cities did blacks have a harder time finding housing
beyond certain specific neighborhoods.
Until the 1950s, the areas of black settlement remained
strictly limited despite the rapidly-growing black population.
As a result, blacks and whites experienced separate housing
markets. Since blacks could neither buy a home nor rent an
apartment outside certain areas, blacks paid more than whites to
live at higher densities in housing of poorer quality. Owners of
rental housing in the city's black areas benefited from this
setup, as a nonracial housing market would reduce their profits.
* Indeed, in the early 20th century one of the most telling
criticisms of any black person lacking in initiative was to say
that "he couldn't even make it in Chicago".
One of the most important developments in the postwar social
geography of the city was the large increase in the area of black
settlement. Part of this expansion was the result of migration
as modernization of agriculture in the southern US threw large
numbers of blacks off the land, but another critical factor was
the US Supreme Court's decision in 1948 that racially restrictive
covenants were unconstitutional. This decision was to have
decisive long-term impacts on metropolitan politics not only in
Chicagoland but throughout the US.
Before 1948, Chicago's black settlement had been legally
restricted in large part to the "Black Belt" on the South Side.
There were small pockets of black settlement on the West Side and
in Morgan Park on the far South Side, but most blacks lived in a
tightly-constrained area along the main South Side elevated line.
The "Black Belt" was a long, narrow zone approximately a mile
wide roughly from State Street to Cottage Grove Avenue, and six
miles in length, from Cermak Road (22nd Street) to 63rd Street.
Prior to 1948,
Restrictive covenants were widely used in
Chicago's neighborhoods. These agreements by the
landowners of a given area prohibited people from
selling, leasing, or renting property to specified
groups... If a certain percentage of property owners
signed the agreements, any owner who violated the
contract could be sued by another owner. The covenants
were appurtenant to the land, which meant that they
bound any future purchasers of the property. (...)
Ultimately, the agreements proved to be inherently
unstable. Covenants for areas that bordered the Black
Belt were particularly tenuous, and ... almost
impossible to maintain for any length of time. In
areas ... which bordered on the Black Belt, the
temptation to violate the agreement was often great
because African-Americans would, to escape the confines
of the ghetto, pay much more than whites for housing.
(Winger 1992, pp. 57, 59)
In 1948, the US Supreme Court declared racially restrictive
covenants in property deeds to be legally unenforceable. This
removed all formal barriers to where blacks and other groups
could live. But many informal barriers remained, including
imperfect information, hostility and violence from white
residents, and practices by the real estate industry such as
panic-peddling and steering which had the effect of segmenting
the housing market along racial lines. Unfortunately, the 1948
decision did not have the effect of creating a true housing
market in Chicago, but simply released a large pent-up demand for
better housing among black Chicagoans. With very few exceptions,
this resulted in formerly white areas undergoing rapid racial
change, followed by almost complete resegregation:
"Block-busting" real estate agents often offered one or
two whites on a block inflated prices for their homes,
which the agents then sold to blacks. The agents then
frightened remaining whites by spreading rumors of an
imminent black takeover... Whites sold their houses
at low prices, and these houses were resold to blacks
at huge profits. Houses for sale were those adjacent
to black neighborhoods. Thus blacks never escaped the
ghetto; they merely expanded it.
It is a migration pattern which has hurt both
whites and blacks. Whites sold houses for a loss and
abandoned streets where many lived for decades.
Blacks, even after paying inflated prices ... suffered
other hardships (Fremon 1988, pp. 107-108).
This unfortunate pattern of change continued well into the
1960s and beyond. The greatest friction occurred where issues of
ethnicity interacted with those of social class. In situations
of this sort, working class whites would fear and resist the
succession of less well-off blacks. The resulting tensions were
greatest on the city's Southwest Side, most notably in the
Marquette Park neighborhood. Ethnic tension was less pronounced
on the West Side, where Latinos (mainly Mexicans to the south and
Puerto Ricans to the north) formed buffers between areas of
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predominantly black and white settlement on the West Side."
More affluent blacks (i.e., with the greatest pent-up
demand) sought housing commensurate with their economic power in
the 1950s and 60s. Certain neighborhoods such as Avalon Park,
Chatham, and South Shore, which today are dominated by the black
middle class, underwent relatively peaceful transitions. A few
neighborhoods have sought to manage rather than resist or
otherwise delay racial change in the interest of stabilizing the
class composition of their communities. Hyde Park and Beverly in
the city and Oak Park, just beyond the city limits due west of
the Loop, have been able to make their locales attractive to
middle-class whites and blacks alike.
The rise of Mayor Daley
During his leadership of Chicago's Democrats, Jack Arvey had
helped save the party's established organization by convincing
Mayor Edward Kelly to step aside in favor of Martin Kennelly.
But if corruption had its costs, so did honesty. Mayor Kennelly
lacked the influence to implement his own agenda, yet he presided
over the city with a self-righteous style. As a result, neither
he nor the ward committeemen could govern effectively. The
consensus among the ward committeemen was that his time had come
and gone, and their choice was Richard J. Daley.
In the 1955 Democratic mayoral primary, Daley defeated both
the incumbent Mayor Kennelly and Benjamin Adamowski, whose appeal
10 Black-white frictions on the Southwest Side were
mitigated to some extent with the arrival of Arabic-speaking
immigrants, particularly Palestinians and Jordanians, during the
1980s. As these new arrivals occupied the transitional zone
between the areas of white and black settlement, they began to
play a buffer role comparable to that of Latinos on the West
Side.
was strongest among Chicago's large Polish community." In the
general election, Daley faced Robert Merriam, a liberal Democrat
who was running as a Republican. Despite his liberal,
intellectual image, Merriam gave Daley the narrowest percent
margin of victory of Daley's mayoral career. Much of Merriam's
strong showing was attributed to the still-substantial middle
class element in the city, which tended to support "good
government" candidates.
As a candidate, Daley had stated that he would resign as
party chairman if elected mayor, a pledge which he promptly
disregarded after the election. He was to hold both offices
until his death in December 1976, by which point he had become
the longest-serving mayor in the city's history, with over 21
years as mayor. Although he was not the first mayor to combine
the mayor's office with the Democratic party chairmanship,
Daley's tenure of both offices was crucial to any understanding
of his career.
Daley contributed little that was original in Chicago
politics, but he did combine existing elements in new ways that
enabled the machine to survive, even prosper, an almost unique
situation after World War II. Few observers saw the true
importance of Daley's mayoralty until the late 1960s, but his
genius was to modernize, indeed, to reform the machine to the
point where it survived the social changes of the postwar period.
Traditional machine mayors, such as Tom Pendergast in Kansas City
or James Michael Curley in Boston, had seen the public sector
largely as a source of enrichment for themselves and their
" Kennelly vanished from political sight after losing the
primary, apparently missed by few voters. Adamowski, however,
had the fighting spirit of a Chicago politician. Following his
defeat, he chose a high-risk alternative strategy for advancing
his political career by switching parties and winning election as
state's attorney as a Republican.
associates. Daley's contribution was to make the efficient
delivery of city services--including transit--a major goal of the
machine.
Daley went beyond consolidating the strong party which
Cermak had built, and centralized it more than it had ever been
before (or since). Daley's control was not absolute, however.
Kahn and Majors, who describe the machine as a polyarchy, note
that
Daley consulted often with his "board of
directors," that is, with those party leaders whose
judgment and interpretations he had learned to trust
over the years. One informant described the
relationship between Daley and this inner circle: "All
of us have access to the mayor if we need it. We don't
hesitate to go and argue with him or occasionally ask
him to reverse an action. Sometimes he will change,
very often he will not. The major thing, though, is
that we get an opportunity to make our points" (1984,
p. 102).
Daley built on Arvey's concept of proactive machine-led
reform. Arvey had seen the need to accept just enough reform to
keep the party attractive to a majority of voters. Daley had
learned this lesson, as he repeatedly responded to scandals that
arose during his administration by cleaning house--at least to
the extent necessary to convince voters that he was addressing
the immediate problem seriously.
Daley differed from all previous machine leaders by
embracing the traditional reform goals of efficiency and honesty
in government (at least at the upper levels of city
administration) so as to all but eliminate anti-machine reform as
a political force. If corruption persisted at the grass-roots
level (which, by most accounts, it certainly did), Daley could
distance himself from these excesses at the lower levels of
government.
All in all, Daley coopted much of the appeal of traditional
reform politics. To a degree hitherto unknown in American
politics, Daley gave Chicago's voters many of the better features
of both machine and reform governance in a single electoral
package. Like the machines of previous decades, Daley's
organization was responsive to the specific needs of individual
voters. At the same time, Daley's administration was sympathetic
to downtown business, and worked closely with private sector
leaders to maintain the economic vitality of the Loop--a vitality
which required plentiful transit at affordable fares.
Certainly Daley used the precinct system to mobilize voters
for machine candidates. There is little doubt that Daley turned
a blind eye towards traditional machine practices of questionable
integrity. On the positive side, though, the precinct system did
offer established channels of political recruitment and
advancement for residents of all neighborhoods of the city.
Most important of all from the voter's point of view, the
machine had the customer orientation of a market-responsive
service organization. Most Chicagoans were prepared to overlook
petty corruption as long as the city government was responsive to
their immediate concerns. Voters faced with routine, practical
problems such as broken street lights or potholes could bring the
matter to the attention of their precinct captains, who in turn
would ensure that the relevant city agencies took care of the
problem promptly. This was the grass-roots basis for the proud
claim of Mayor Daley's administration that Chicago was "the city
that works".
A good precinct captain would see to the needs of his
voters, and ask in return only that they support the machine's
candidates for city and county offices at the polls. But this
bargain was two-sided: it was implicit in the relationship
between the voter and the machine that if the machine failed to
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deliver its side of the bargain, the machine's candidates would
be held accountable for their failures at the next election.
Daley's successor found this out the hard way in 1979 when he
lost the election following a series of brutal snowstorms snarled
traffic and put much of the rapid transit fleet out of
commission.
Daley, like the early 20th century reformers, sought to
professionalize city services by appointing capable, qualified
experts at the upper echelons. This policy was reflected in the
mayor's appointments to the most important transit positions.
Nevertheless, the mayor did make some decisions on an avowedly
political basis, and early on in his administration defended
himself with the remark that "good politics is good government".
Finally, if good politics was good government under Daley,
it was good business as well. Daley was the first machine mayor
to bring business, traditionally a stronghold of efficiency-
minded reform efforts, into his coalition. Business leaders were
somewhat skeptical of Daley in 1955, but by 1959 they had largely
become his supporters, and provided all his reelection campaigns
with financial backing. Daley, unlike many Democrats, prided
himself on maintaining good relationships with the city's
business community. He identified the future of the city with
that of the Loop and other prosperous areas which contributed to
the city's tax base.
The many urban renewal and public works projects undertaken
during his administration (including expressways, new rapid
transit extensions, and O'Hare Airport) pleased the business
community, provided thousands of construction jobs at union
wages, and made the Loop more accessible, thus encouraging more
construction downtown. Such a growth coalition was dependent on
general economic prosperity, but the Daley administration
provided an environment in which private construction was
encouraged as much as possible, given Chicago's limits as a large
city with serious social problems.
Although a loyal Democrat, Mayor Daley was an intensely
pragmatic politician who dealt only in the currency of the
politically feasible. His classic response, when asked why a
candidate slated by the machine lost, was "He didn't get enough
votes" (Rakove 1975, p. 69).
The 1957 subsidy issue: a dress rehearsal?
Mayor Daley soon had an opportunity to use his legendary
political skills on behalf of the CTA. In early 1957, the CTA
was facing a deficit which could only be avoided if the agency
raised its base fare from 200 to 25t or found new sources of
funding. Before resorting to a fare increase, Mayor Daley
decided to seek support from the state legislature."
By subsequent standards, the CTA's situation was far from a
crisis. The CTA board could have raised its fares to keep its
budget in balance at any point. Before the CTA took this step,
however, Daley decided to seek outside sources of funding for
capital and operating costs.
Daley was dealing with Republican governor William Stratton
on the CTA issue. The departure of two-term Democratic governor
Adlai Stevenson II to run for president in 1952 cleared the way
for Stratton to win the governorship. Reelected in 1956,
Stratton, like Daley, understood that rank-and-file followers
wanted to enjoy the traditional rewards of politics. Neither the
mayor nor the governor sought to impose moralistic standards on
12 For a full account of the events of January-June 1957,
see Banfield (1961), pp. 91-125. Under the Illinois Constitution
of 1870, then in force, the General Assembly met only in
alternate years. Thus, if Daley had chosen to wait in seeking
state aid for the CTA, 1959 would have been the next opportunity.
the lower echelons of their respective parties. With this
similarity in outlook, Stratton was able to conduct business with
Daley on a pragmatic basis, much as Stratton's predecessor Dwight
Green had dealt with Mayor Edward Kelly.
As early as 1956, the CTA board had presented the mayor and
the governor with a policy statement urging the diversion of
highway funds to the CTA to help finance its modernization
efforts and to hold down the fare. The board offered several
possible financing mechanisms for consideration by public
officials, without expressing a preference among them. One of
the more attractive (but controversial) options under discussion
was the gasoline tax. The city had a powerful argument for using
the state gasoline tax for the CTA. Chicago motorists paid the
same taxes at the pump as did their suburban and downstate
counterparts, but about four-fifths of the gasoline taxes raised
in the city were spent on downstate and suburban roads.
When the legislature convened in January 1957, Governor
Stratton, Mayor Daley, Cook County Board President Dan Ryan, and
the CTA's general manager met to discuss mass transit. The most
pressing item on the agenda, however, was not the CTA, but one of
the former Insull interurban lines, the Chicago Aurora & Elgin
(CA&E). The CA&E wanted permission to discontinue all passenger
service, and the state was considering stepping in to save the
line from going under. Daley apparently sought to link his
effort to obtain subsidies for the CTA to suburban efforts to
rescue the CA&E, but the mayor bet on the wrong horse.
Stratton may have been willing to consider Daley's CTA
initiative on its own merits, but it became clear to both men
that the prospects for passage of any cross-subsidy from
motorists via the state gasoline tax were dim. Not even in the
CA&E's territory did solid support exist for using state highway
funds for any public transportation purposes. In the face of
solid and unyielding opposition from highway interests, both
leaders backed away from the issue. Stratton agreed that if
Chicago or Cook County voted to tax itself for the CTA, he would
not stand in the way, but refused to commit himself any further.
The city's daily newspapers reflected the consensus among
downtown business in favor of subsidies. The downtown interests
themselves, however, were not willing to fight for subsidies,
preferring to let elected officials embroil themselves in the
controversy. Governor Stratton had expressed public support for
diverting some highway funds to the CTA, but he did little to
support the necessary legislation. Daley, sensing that downtown
business groups would not back him politically, went through the
motions of pushing for the subsidy but did not put his political
weight behind CTA subsidy bills awaiting passage in the state
house.
The transit subsidy bills expired with the end of the
legislative session at the end of June 1957, the CTA raised its
fares from 200 to 250, and the CA&E case, which had been under
litigation, came to an end as the court allowed the railroad to
drop all passenger service in July 1957. As soon as the judge
granted the interurban permission to go out of the passenger
business, the CA&E halted all service immediately, forcing
commuters who had taken the CA&E into Chicago that morning to
find other transportation home. All further proposals for
reviving the CA&E came to naught.
Without the CA&E, Mayor Daley lost the only hope he had of
building a coalition with suburbanites who might have gained from
more diversified uses of gas tax monies. Rather than do battle
with suburban and downstate legislators who were overwhelmingly
against any subsidy for the CTA, and the highway interests, the
mayor apparently decided to invest his political influence
elsewhere."
Stagnation in the Sixties
The next decade was one of slow decline for the CTA, a
decline which was for the first several years masked by the
completion of much of the postwar modernization program. This
decline manifested itself in falling ridership throughout the
postwar period, but became increasingly visible as the buses and
"L" cars which were brand-new in the 1950s began to show their
age with alarming rapidity during the 1960s. Reluctant to raise
fares, the politically appointed CTA board instead approved
budgets which held maintenance costs to a minimum.
Another, more subtle change underway was invisible to the
average rider, but not to administrators or politicians. When
the CTA was created, the agency was strongly identified with its
general manager, a transit professional who had risen through the
ranks. Starting in the mid-1950s (when Daley became mayor) the
CTA became more strongly linked with the mayor's top political
appointee in charge of the system.14 Although Daley saw the
choice of competent top-level administrators as crucial to the
consolidation of his power, this shift did suggest that political
considerations were gaining strength--a problem not limited to
Chicago."
13 Mayor Daley dropped his goals for transit subsidies
until the early 1970s. The city did, however, persist in its
efforts to obtain state aid which would reimburse the CTA for the
transportation of school students at half fare. In 1965 the
Illinois General Assembly granted funds for this purpose.
14 Interview, Harold Hirsch, Manager, Operations Planning,
CTA, June 1992.
" In fairness to Daley, he resisted the temptation to use
the CTA for short-term political gain by undermining its future.
By contrast, the New York City Transit Authority (and its riders)
suffered from years of short-sighted decision making during the
1960s and 70s under the Wagner, Lindsay, and Beame
On the state government front, the 1960s passed with few, if
any, policy initiatives in the field of mass transit. In 1960,
Otto Kerner, the last Democratic governor who enjoyed the support
of the machine, was elected to the first of two terms in
office.16 Although Kerner showed a certain amount of liberalism
in the wake of the urban riots of the late 1960s (he headed the
Kerner Commission on Civil Disorders), the governor never
challenged Mayor Daley or the machine head on. In 1967, with a
year left in his term of office, Kerner resigned to accept a
federal judgeship, and was succeeded by the lieutenant governor.
Chicago Republican Richard Ogilvie won the 1968
gubernatorial contest. Aside from the machine's ability to get
along with Ogilvie (if not agree) on most issues, the new
governor vacated the Cook County board president's office, to
which he had won election in 1966. The board appointed George
Dunne, a powerful ward committeeman from Chicago's Near North
Side, as acting county board president when Ogilvie assumed the
governor's office in 1969. Dunne was elected in his own right in
1970, and retained the county board presidency until his
retirement in 1990.
Civil unrest, Chicago politics, and mass transit
If Mayor Daley paid the CTA scant attention during the
1960s, he had more pressing big-city matters on his agenda to
deal with. In April 1968, the social climate in Chicago took a
turn for the worse as a result of several days of riots on the
city's predominantly black West Side following the assassination
administrations, especially by cannibalizing New York's transit
capital budget to pay for operations.
16 Kerner had one very personal link with the machine: his
wife was the daughter of Anton Cermak.
of civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr."
Although much of Chicago was tense during April 1968, the
bulk of the violence, arson, and looting took place on the West
Side. By contrast, the South Side, the larger and more
historically-established base of Chicago's black community,
remained relatively peaceful. Therefore, instead of the liberal-
versus-conservative debate about the riots, it makes sense to ask
why the West Side burned while the South Side did not."
According to Fremon (1988, p. 178), one factor may be
historic patterns of black settlement and politics in Chicago.
With its decades of residential segregation enforced by property
deed restrictions, the South Side has had a firmly established
black community with recognized political influence from the
beginning of the 20th century. Black voters on the South Side,
whatever problems they may have faced in other aspects of life,
have been able to draw upon a large pool of local political
17 The Kerner Commission report (headed by former Illinois
governor Otto Kerner) offers a liberal interpretation of the root
causes of rioting in black neighborhoods of US cities. For a
contrasting discussion from a conservative perspective, see
Banfield (1974), pp. 210-233.
18 One explanation has to do with the higher levels of
organization among community groups and street gangs on the South
Side, where community activists and street gangs worked to
restrain people from taking the law into their own hands (see
Mike Royko's journalistic Boss [New York: E.P. Dutton, 1971]).
Community organizations did not wish to see their gains wiped out
by the senseless destruction that swept across parts of the West
Side. Presumably, street gangs followed a similar course of
restraining would-be looters in order to enhance their own
prestige vis-a-vis the community organizations, which otherwise
might have competed with the gangs for the loyalties of
underprivileged youth. The gang leaders also wished to avoid a
full-scale police crackdown in the neighborhoods whose residents
they intimidated, thus disrupting their routine criminal
operations.
talent when electing their aldermen, state representatives and
senators, congressmen, and ward committeemen. In contrast to
this rich political history prevailing on the South Side, West
Side blacks have been poorly organized, at least prior to the
1980s.19 The West Side did not become predominantly black until
the 1950s, and as far as political control was concerned, the
process of ethnic succession was delayed until even later.
However the riots may be interpreted, their effects were
clear. On the one hand, they increased fear and suspicion
between black and white Chicagoans. Another effect, less
conspicuous but vitally important all the same, was to heighten
the class divide among blacks. If racial polarization helped
increase black political solidarity, the riots also helped
undermine class solidarity among black Chicagoans. Blacks who
shared the same values of personal achievement and community
stability that prevailed among white Chicagoans redoubled their
efforts to move into better neighborhoods in the city, and beyond
the city limits altogether into the suburbs.2"
19 In much the same way that a pervasive informal North
Side-South Side rivalry exists among many white Chicagoans, there
exists a comparable black rivalry between the South and West
Sides. In this rivalry, South Siders perceive West Siders as
being politically unskilled, perhaps owing to their later arrival
in the city. Other differences between the South and West Sides
have to do with class and geography. Both parts of Chicago
contain large areas where the social tone is established by the
sub-proletariat. However, there are many working class and
middle class black neighborhoods on the South Side, with few or
no parallels within the city limits to the west of downtown
Chicago. (A few comparable areas do exist for West Side blacks,
but these are in suburbs rather than inside the city.)
20 At the political level, the efforts of the black middle
class to find its own voice have been largely ignored by white
observers, who tend to treat black voters as a single
undifferentiated bloc. Grimshaw (1992), however, describes this
process in its richness and complexity. It was in middle class
black neighborhoods like South Shore, Avalon Park, and Chatham
that the voter mobilization for Harold Washington in 1983 and
1987 was greatest.
The CTA's 1968 annual report made it clear that the rioting
had a serious impact on the transit system. The CTA suffered
little direct property damage during the riots, but the long-run
impact on ridership (and thus on revenues) was serious, even
devastating. The rioting undermined investor confidence in the
very areas with the most intensive transit service, as businesses
and residents with the means to leave did so.
At the same time, for political reasons it became
increasingly difficult for the CTA to rationalize its route
structure in response to declining patterns of ridership. From a
market standpoint, the logical response would have been to
consolidate bus routes, close elevated stations with poor
ridership, and even prune poorly-performing elevated lines. This
strategy had become almost unthinkable by the late 1960s, because
by that point a more market-driven approach might have been
interpreted as a racially-motivated reallocation of municipal
services away from already-disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Widespread rationalization of service might well have hurt the
electoral fortunes of the machine.
In contrast to the April 1968 West Side riots, the violence
surrounding the Democratic National Convention in August 1968 was
of greater significance outside Chicago than it was locally."
The 1968 convention violence may have had a traumatic impact on
the national Democratic Party and its liberal supporters, but it
certainly did not hurt Daley's standing with most Chicagoans
(Allswang 1986, p. 131). To the machine and its supporters, it
seemed as though the demonstrators had showed up largely for the
21 Unlike the April riots on the West Side, the August
disturbances were largely confined to the city's lakefront parks,
although marches and incidents did occur downtown as well.
purpose of embarrassing Mayor Daley's "show".22
The violence at the 1968 Democratic convention probably had
the effect of boosting the anti-Daley candidacies of Richard
Friedman in 1971 (a liberal who ran on the Republican ticket as a
flag of convenience in the mayoral general election), and William
Singer, who opposed Daley in the 1975 mayoral primary. In both
1971 and 1975, however, these reform candidates only carried the
north lakefront and the University of Chicago areas, while
elsewhere in the city Daley won reelection by record margins.
The convention violence did not affect ridership the way the
riots did, but it did have subsequent impacts on the politics of
transit. Dan Walker, the author of the Walker Report on the
convention violence, was able to translate his criticism of the
Daley administration into a successful gubernatorial campaign in
1972. Although Walker lasted only one term as governor, he was
to play an important role in the formation of the Regional
Transportation Authority in 1973. Over the long term, the
convention violence helped set into motion a more mature politics
of reform, many of whose supporters became part of the coalition
that made Harold Washington the first black mayor of Chicago in
1983 and again in 1987.
Mayor Daley and the suburbs
One of the two most serious mistakes of Daley's career was
to underestimate the aspirations of black Chicagoans, although
the full implications of this did not become apparent until 1979,
22 Of course, given the temper of the times, it is likely
that violent protests would have marred the Democratic convention
no matter where it had been held. The choice of Chicago as the
site probably had little more than a marginal effect on the
number of demonstrators and the strategy they followed. Their
primary interest was in national politics; any embarrassment they
were able to cause Mayor Daley was merely an additional benefit
from their standpoint.
when black voters helped unseat the machine's mayoral candidate.
The mayor's other great error was his failure to appreciate the
significance of postwar suburbanization. This failure was to
have serious consequences for the politics of mass transit for
the 1970s and beyond.
Suburban opposition to expansion on the part of the City of
Chicago can be traced all the way back to 1889. The annexation
of Hyde Park that year, against the community's will, served as
an object lesson for other localities seeking to maintain their
independence from the city.
When the 48 square mile village of Hyde Park voted
in favor of annexation to the City of Chicago by a five
to three margin on June 29, 1889, the old Village
Center (present-day Hyde Park-Kenwood) found itself in
the minority opposed to annexation. It was the ...
precincts in the southern part of the Village along the
Calumet River that ... really carried Hyde Park into
Chicago. (...) In regarding annexation to the central
city as the proper solution to the problems of suburban
growth, the majority ... was typical of 19th century
American attitudes; in opposing annexation, however,
the Village Center was foreshadowing a stance that
would become dominant among suburbanites in the
twentieth century (Markun 1980, p. 54).
By 1893 the city had expanded to include most of its present
area, with a few subsequent, incremental annexations taking place
mostly on the northwestern and southwestern edges. Young (1986)
argues that the example of Hyde Park resulted in a heightened
wariness of the city's political motives on the part of
communities wishing to preserve their political independence from
the city.23 Community leaders in Evanston and Oak Park learned
23 It is questionable today whether annexing Hyde Park-
Kenwood (known as the Village Center at the time) was in fact a
good idea from the standpoint of Chicago's political machine.
The Hyde Park-Kenwood community, anchored by the University of
Chicago, has long been a stronghold of the politics of reform in
Chicago. If Hyde Park-Kenwood had been able to escape annexation
in 1889 and instead incorporate itself as an independent village
(much as Oak Park is today), the community's liberal politics
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from the example of Hyde Park and developed successful techniques
for resisting annexation by the city. As the metropolis grew
over the decades, housing, jobs, and transportation spread
steadily outward from the Loop, beyond city neighborhoods, and
further into the suburbs. By the time transit became a political
issue in the suburbs, the population of the six-county
Northeastern Illinois region was about equally divided between
the city and suburbs.
Public transportation in the suburbs
Virtually all suburban mass transit carriers remained in the
private sector until the early 1970s, but they went through the
same processes of modernization and retrenchment as did the CTA
in the city. Once streetcar lines had been converted to buses (a
process which was largely completed during the 1930s), there was
little change in service patterns or operating technology.
Except for the Illinois Central (which was electrified in
1926), the commuter railroads waited until the postwar years to
transform their technology and operating practices. The first
operator to modernize was the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
(CB&Q), which became the Burlington Northern in 1970. The
Burlington's postwar modernization set the standard which most
other Chicago area commuter railroads eventually followed.
Faced with the need to replace its oldest coaches in
suburban service, the Burlington chose a creative design for its
new coaches. The Burlington took full advantage of the generous
vertical clearances which dharacterize North American railroading
west of the Allegheny Mountains. In 1948 the railroad introduced
air-conditioned bilevel cars, and refitted other cars with air
conditioning (Dorin 1970, pp. 125-126). The railroad retired its
would have been isolated from the city government, thus removing
a thorn from the side of the machine.
remaining single-level coaches and replaced them with additional
bilevels in the early 1960s.2 4
By the 1960s, the bilevel had become the standard commuter
railroad car in the Chicago area. The bilevel had a set of
sliding double doors at the center of the car, usually with room
for three passengers to board or alight simultaneously. Once
inside, passengers could select seats on the lower level, or else
climb a narrow set of stairs on either side to reach a long
"gallery" on the upper level where additional seats were located.
The greatest postwar private sector accomplishment in public
transportation in Chicago, and probably in all of North America
as well, was on the Chicago & North Western (C&NW). By the
1950s, several decades of deferred maintenance were showing on
the railroad's suburban lines, which used steam locomotives and
coaches dating back as far as 1910. Rather than try to get out
the commuter business (which would have been politically
difficult), the railroad made the most of the situation and
modernized its operations. The C&NW started by following the
Burlington's lead and buying new bilevel coaches and then
introduced an innovation of its own, push-pull operation, around
the beginning of the 1960s. Push-pull operation, with trains
driven either from the locomotive or from a cab at the other end
of the train, enabled the North Western to enjoy the same
operating flexibility that the "L", the Illinois Central
Electric, and the interurbans had long enjoyed with their
multiple unit cars.
When it modernized its equipment, the North Western
24 One factor influencing the Burlington's choice of
bilevel cars was the financial arrangements at Union Station,
where the railroad was a tenant. The station assessed per-car
"wheelage" charges, irrespective of the carrying capacity of each
car.
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introduced hourly off-peak service on repeating headways, and
publicized its improved services through aggressive marketing
(Dorin 1970, pp. 103-104). Starting in 1962, the North Western
began to earn profits on its commuter trains, a situation which
continued until 1975. Although the other railroads were unable
to duplicate the North Western's profitability, the push-pull
revolution quickly spread to all but Chicago's smallest diesel-
operated commuter services, as it made operations more efficient
and economical.
The North Western's commuter rail profitability was
certainly an accomplishment. All the same, the North Western was
serving a finite market. The railroad might not have been able
to earn a profit on its commuter service if it had not been for
the abandonment of two of the three Insull interurbans, which
competed directly with two of the North Western's lines.
The demise of the CA&E
The first interurban to go was the Chicago Aurora & Elgin
(CA&E). Physically, the line emerged from the Depression and
World War II in relatively good shape, and the CA&E was even able
to afford ten new cars in 1945--the last interurban cars to be
bought with private capital. With a service area that included
established bedroom communities and semi-rural areas ripe for
suburbanization, the CA&E was optimistic about the future. Its
rapidly-accelerating electric cars were able to make more stops
than the competing steam and diesel railroads and still maintain
competitive schedules, and the CA&E's Wells Street Terminal was
closer to most downtown locations than Northwestern or Union
Stations.
But the state and city undermined CA&E's competitive
position in the early 1950s. Highway planners chose the
alignment of the Garfield Park "L", which the CA&E used to reach
the Loop, for the new Congress Street Expressway. The
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construction work forced the interurban off the "L'. Starting in
1953, CA&E passengers had to transfer to "L" trains at Desplaines
Avenue in west suburban Forest Park to continue to Chicago--at a
time when the use of temporary tracks during expressway
construction slowed "L" operations considerably. Ridership fell
as many CA&E passengers sought other, faster ways (including the
Chicago & North Western) to reach their destinations.
In 1950 and again in 1952 the interurban petitioned the
Illinois Commerce Commission to abandon its passenger service,
but the ICC rejected these requests. Now with the change of
trains at Forest Park and the disruption of "1L" service caused by
the expressway construction, the CA&E lost its former comparative
advantage, and was locked into a downward spiral of falling
patronage.
For the first time suburban actors entered the political
arena over a transit issue affecting them directly. Some CA&E
riders sought to preserve service through the political process--
logically enough, as politics had brought about the decision to
build the Congress Street Expressway which now threatened the
CA&E. West suburban DuPage County, the interurban's core service
area, was an electoral stronghold of vital importance to Illinois
Republicans. Governor Stratton was reluctant to spend public
money on mass transit, but he convinced the CTA to study a
takeover of the CA&E from a purely operating perspective, i.e.,
assuming that the political and financial issues could be
resolved. In February 1956, six weeks after the governor's
request, the CTA completed its study."
25 The CTA suggested two alternatives. One was a through
service over the rapid transit line in the median strip of the
Congress Street Expressway, using the interurban's more modern
cars dating from the 1920s and 1940s. The other option was a
shuttle service between Forest Park and Wheaton. This would have
used streamlined one-person streetcars which were being made
surplus by the CTA's conversion of its remaining streetcar lines
But then Illinois' longstanding and bipartisan tradition of
political corruption derailed efforts to save the line:
Attempts were made to sell the line to the state, and
in fact, Governor Stratton agreed to buy it in 1956.
But a scandal broke in the state government with the
indictment and subsequent conviction of Orville Hodge,
State Auditor, for having "appropriated" millions in
state funds. It was rumored that Hodge held a large
block of CA&E stock in trust, and stood to "clean up"
if the state purchased the railroad. Both Hodge and
Stratton were of the same political party, so the deal
was off (Johnson 1965, foreword).
The so-called "Hodgepodge" scandal eliminated any
possibility of a public takeover of the CA&E.2 ' Following the
demise of the CA&E in 1957, which coincided with that of the
city's short-lived efforts to seek gas tax money for the CTA,
transit advocates retreated from the political arena for the next
decade. This change in orientation was evident when the North
Shore Line sought to abandon service. The failure of political
action to save the CA&E may have convinced North Shore Line
commuters that their interurban could not be saved through
political pressure, and instead they concentrated their efforts
on attempting to purchase the line.
"Do-it-yourself" fails on the North Shore
After the North Shore had emerged from bankruptcy in the
to bus operation. The streetcars would have required certain
modifications for operation on the CA&E, including the
installation of shoes for electrical pickup from the third rail
which CA&E used almost exclusively (rather than overhead wires,
as on the other interurbans). See Shapotkin (1988) for more
about the CTA's study.
26 See Kenney and Brown (1993), pp. 87-88 for a concise
description of the Hodge scandal. Hodge himself served six and a
half years of a 12 to 15 year sentence. Governor Otto Kerner,
overlooking partisan differences between himself and Hodge,
commuted the remainder of Hodge's sentence for reasons of the
former auditor's health. See "Hodge Will Be Paroled Jan. 31,"
Chicago Sun-Times, January 18, 1963.
1940s, the interurban's prospects, although far from rosy, were
not hopeless, either. The 1955 abandonment of the interurban's
old, slow Shore Line, which competed directly with the Chicago &
North Western, seemed to give the rest of the railroad a new
lease on life.
But this reprieve was short-lived. During the 1950s, the
Delaware-based Susquehanna Corporation bought the hitherto
locally-owned interurban. Many observers believed the holding
company had bought the North Shore largely for its value in tax
credits if the railroad were liquidated, a theme which came to
dominate much of American business during the "quick buck" 1980s.
In 1958 the North Shore's management applied to the US,
Illinois, and Wisconsin commerce commissions for permission to
abandon the entire railroad. The abandonment proceedings dragged
on for several years before the last trains ran in January 1963.
During those years, there were efforts to save the railroad, but
in contrast to the CA&E, a public sector takeover of the North
Shore did not enter the realm of serious political discussion."
A group of commuters responded by forming the North Shore
Commuters' Association (NSCA). Initially, the group limited
itself to arguing its case before the regulatory authorities. In
1962, however, NSCA changed its strategy:
Possibly realizing that a case against abandonment
had not been made, the commuters' association solicited
for pledges of money from riders and employees for
27 In 1958 the CTA carried out a study, limited to
operating issues, of how the CTA might provide North Shore
service to Waukegan and Mundelein, possibly with new cars. In
1961, by which time the abandonment of the North Shore appeared
imminent, the CTA updated the study. This appears to have been
purely a matter of contingency planning, as no serious
suggestions emerged as to how a CTA takeover of the North Shore
would be organized or paid for. Portions of the study and the
update are reproduced in First & Fastest, Autumn-Winter 1988.
purchase of the railway at salvage value. No specific
figures were made public, but it is thought that only
about $750,000 was pledged. (...) Postponement [of an
order permitting abandonment] came on June 15 [1962],
partly in order to allow the commuters' association
time to raise funds for purchase [of the railway]
(Central Electric Railfans Association 1963, pp. 83-
84).
In November 1962, the commuter group formed the North Shore
Commuters' Railroad as a legal vehicle for taking over the line.
Standard historical accounts cite eleventh-hour negotiations with
the holding company, which failed because NSCA did not raise
enough money to buy the line, even at its salvage value.
However, a former NSCA activist offered another, more political
version to the Sun-Times' Dennis Byrne:
... a pro-railroad Interstate Commerce Commission
ordered the abandonment. And when the commuters raised
what they believed was enough money to buy the line,
the Kennedy White House quietly blocked the sale...28
The last straw for the North Shore may well have been the
opening of the Edens Expressway in 1960, which closely paralleled
the interurban's Skokie Valley Route along much of its alignment.
The North Shore's last trains ran on January 20, 1963. The NSCA
disappeared shortly thereafter, and took with it the idea that
commuters could successfully mount a market-based, rather than a
political initiative to preserve threatened transit services. It
would be nearly another ten years before transit became an issue
in the suburbs again, and when suburban commuters attempted to
defend their interests, it would be through political rather than
market forces.
So it was that by the early 1970s, the CTA's problems were
becoming acute. The city and state governments soon became
preoccupied with the CTA, and their efforts on the CTA's behalf
28 Dennis Byrne, "North Shore Line Battle Wasn't In Vain,"
reprinted in First & Fastest, Summer 1988.
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overwhelmed whatever suburban agendas might have otherwise
developed for stabilizing mass transit. The political drama of
1957, when the city first sought subsidies for the CTA, would be
played out again on a changed stage, with a different outcome.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CTA FALTERS AND THE STATE CHIPS IN, 1970-1972
The early 1970s were years of irony for mass transit in
Chicagoland. No sooner had the Chicago Transit Authority
triumphantly opened two new rapid transit lines in 1969 and 1970
than it entered its worst financial crisis to date. In the late
1940s and early 50s, the CTA took over the worn-out streetcar and
"L" companies and, by making hard choices, fused them into a more
modern and efficient system. But the vigor had gone out of CTA
management by the end of the 1960s. The CTA was rescued from its
financial shortfall not by its own managers, or even by its own
board, but rather by the state in the form of subsidies.
Meanwhile in the suburbs, the future of Chicagoland's
commuter rail service, considered the best in the country, grew
clouded, and suburban bus companies started to fall by the
wayside. Transit in the suburbs crossed a point of no return in
the early 1970s, as the same financial problems which were
afflicting the CTA now spilled across the city line. With few
exceptions, the 1970s found the suburbs unprepared to deal with
the challenges of mass transit.
The CTA: the best of times, the worst of times
At first glance, the CTA seemed to have a lot going for it
in the late 1960s and early 1970s with new lines and equipment.
Yet the CTA's finances were in decline despite some of the
highest fares in the country, and as the agency began to lose
money, it sought repeated bailouts from the state and city. The
state government became increasingly frustrated with the CTA's
problems, but it lacked a coherent mechanism for addressing the
needs of the CTA or of financially-shaky commuter railroads and
suburban bus companies. These problems led to a growing
consensus among transit managers (in both the public and private
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sectors) and state government officials that the entire Chicago
region needed a new area-wide transit organization to channel
funds both to the CTA, and to suburban carriers which (unlike the
CTA) might otherwise go out of business.
The CTA's triumphs were highly visible in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. In 1969 a completely new rapid transit line opened
in the median strip of the Dan Ryan expressway, opening up the
far South Side to "L" service. The terminal at 95th Street,
which immediately became one of the CTA's busiest rapid transit
stations, was a major transfer point where a variety of CTA and
suburban bus routes met the "L".
In 1970 the CTA opened the Jefferson Park extension of the
Milwaukee Avenue "L". From the former "L" terminal at Logan
Square, the extension proceeded north in a subway to reach the
Kennedy Expressway, where the rails ran in the median strip to a
new terminal at Jefferson Park. There, riders could change to a
wide variety of CTA and suburban buses, or even to the Chicago &
North Western's Northwest Line commuter trains.
Yet at the same time the agency's finances were going over
the brink from a shaky (and largely illusory) solvency to the
equivalent of bankruptcy. The CTA was the last large transit
system in the US to receive public subsidies, and the state's
failure to act earlier were now bringing matters to a head. To
make matters worse, years of capital neglect were about to catch
up with the agency, thus forcing the region's elected officials
to find more money for the CTA.
Even the CTA's presumed accomplishments were by no means
good news to all transit providers in the region. The importance
of the 95th Street and Jefferson Park "L" terminals as convenient
connection points probably helped the suburban bus companies
which routed their buses there. But whatever marginal advantage
the suburban buses may have gained were offset by the impacts of
the new "L" lines on nearby commuter railroads. 1 In response to
the publicly-funded competition, the Illinois Central raised its
fares, the Rock Island shifted its services, and the Chicago &
North Western threatened legal action.
The Illinois Central, and to a lesser degree, the Rock
Island, served the far South Side surprisingly well by the end of
the 1960s. This part of the city had been a declining commuter
travel market for both railroads. This was particularly the case
by the 1960s as the far South Side beyond 63rd Street underwent
widespread racial change as a result of pent-up demand on the
part of blacks who sought a better life outside the traditional
"Black Belt". In some areas, the change was largely in the
ethnicity of the residents as middle class blacks replaced middle
class whites, but elsewhere ethnic succession was compounded by
(and widely confused with) class change. The six-flat apartments
and the modest bungalows across the far South Side were definite
improvements in the lives of their new black residents. But they
were less inclined to ride the commuter trains than their white
predecessors, reflecting the increasing working-class composition
of much of the far South Side that accompanied racial change.
On the heels of these slow but steady demographic changes,
both railroads felt sharp declines in their ridership counts from
the day the new Dan Ryan "L" opened in 1969. The Illinois
Central Electric accepted its ridership losses (which were no
doubt partly reflected in subsequent requests to the Illinois
Commerce Commission for higher fares). The Rock Island, however,
which was less secure in financial terms, responded by cutting
1 Ironically, by setting up new, publicly-funded competition
to several of the commuter railroads, the city may have accelerated
the regionalization of transit in the Chicago area--which, along
with increasing deficits, ultimately led to reduced autonomy for
the CTA.
service.
Before the Dan Ryan "L" opened, the Rock Island had offered
separate off-peak trains between Chicago, Blue Island, and Joliet
on its Main Line, and between Chicago and Blue Island on its
Beverly branch, which rejoined the Main Line at the latter point.
The Beverly branch was considerably slower than the Main Line,
but had more local ridership on Chicago's far South Side,
particularly from the middle class neighborhoods of Beverly and
Morgan Park. When the Dan Ryan "L" opened, the new line drew
away many riders from the Rock Island, but more so along the Main
Line, which was closest to the new "L", than from the Beverly
branch.
The Rock Island decided to withdraw as best it could from a
market segment where it could no longer compete. The railroad
eliminated Main Line service between Chicago and Blue Island in
the off-peak hours, and moved its off-peak Chicago-Joliet trains
from the Main Line to the Beverly branch (which was slower but
better-patronized) between Chicago and Blue Island. The Rock
Island announced its service reductions and train consolidations
in a May 1970 brochure to its riders. The folder's headline
announced "Impact of Dan Ryan CTA Line Forces Adjustment of
Commuter Schedules Between Downtown Chicago and Blue Island."
On the Northwest Side, the Chicago & North Western had
invested much of its own money in buying new diesel locomotives
and bilevel coaches, modernizing stations, and publicizing the
improved services on its three commuter lines--one of which
competed directly with the new Jefferson Park extension of the
"L". Although the North Western's commuter trains mostly carried
suburbanites to and from the Loop, they also did some business at
stations on the far Northwest Side of the city.
Understandably enough, the North Western was not amused to
see tax money being used to help the "L" compete with a line
which the railroad had improved with its own money. The North
Western had considered trying to get out of the commuter business
entirely during the 1950s, but decided to invest in an ambitious
program of modernization instead. The North Western's suburban
trains were returning a modest profit, thus enabling the railroad
to recoup some of its investment. Then in the late 1960s the
city and the CTA planned to extend the Milwaukee Avenue "L" in
the median strip of the Kennedy Expressway, first to Jefferson
Park and ultimately to O'Hare Airport. An extension to O'Hare
would have brought the "L" uncomfortably deep into the North
Western's commuter territory.
Making the most of a bad situation, the C&NW noted the
Jefferson Park "L" terminal's convenient location next to the
railroad's own station in its publicity. Nevertheless, the
station's major beneficiary was the CTA.
The most ... comprehensive intermodal interchange
... is at Jefferson Park station, which is served by a
dozen city and suburban bus routes, the Chicago & North
Western Railway as well as ... rapid transit trains to
the city center... Here the railroad lies between the
rapid transit in the Kennedy [Expressway] median and
Milwaukee Avenue [the principal thoroughfare of
Chicago's Northwest Side]. The bus terminal is on land
connected to the railroad and rapid transit platforms
by a passageway under the railway and over the
southbound expressway... (Krambles 1970, p. 9).
Particularly once a regional resolution to the area's
transit problems had been implemented, the Jefferson Park
transfer point would facilitate intermodal connections. But
there was little cooperation between the CTA and the North
Western in 1970. Indeed, as Krambles explains, the railroad
threatened to take the CTA to court over the issue:
Ultimate extension of rapid transit to ... O'Hare
International Airport was anticipated in the planning
for the Kennedy [Expressway rapid transit extension]
project, as it was in the design of the expressway
itself. However, the short supply of both city and
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federal funding and the urgency of spending what was
available to meet the highest priority transit needs
... made Jefferson Park the logical terminal a this
stage [i.e., 1970]. Although the North Western
Railway, which claimed that rapid transit to O'Hare
would irreparably damage its suburban service through
rider diversion, threatened to block the whole project
until [the] CTA agreed not to operate in the median
beyond Jefferson Park, the decision to build rail
[rapid transit] only that far had already been reached
(1970, p. 10).
It was not until 1976, when the Regional Transportation
Authority signed a purchase-of-service agreement with the North
Western, that the railway dropped its opposition to further
extension of the expressway rapid transit line. The "12" reached
O'Hare Airport in 1984.
The commuter railroads
The principle of public sector subsidies for commuter rail
reached Chicagoland a good 10 to 15 years after it had become
commonplace in the large cities of the Northeast. Part of the
reason was historical. As Christopher Knapton, director of
public information for Metra (Chicago's commuter rail system)
explained in a 1987 interview,
Chicago has a tradition of very good commuter rail
service. Chicago having been the rail hub [of the US]
for a century, an awful lot of shipping decisions
having been made here, the private railroads probably
went the extra mile to make sure that their money-
losing commuter services still looked good (quoted in
Kunz 1987-a, p. 32).
Another factor may have been the continued profitability of
railroad freight service in the Midwest as compared to the
Northeast. By the early 1970s, all of the railroads which
operated commuter trains in Philadelphia, New Jersey, New York,
and Boston were bankrupt (except for the Long Island Railroad,
which was bought out by New York State in the 1960s). Most of
the Chicago area railroads which had extensive commuter service
were in better financial shape than their eastern counterparts,
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and were financially able to cross-subsidize suburban trains with
profits from freight service, even if they did not wish to do so.
Although all was not perfect, the commuter lines to the
north and west of the city presented a generally positive
picture. The Chicago & North Western was able to operate its
suburban trains at a profit until 1975. The railroad had
completely modernized its rolling stock by the early 1960s, and
had pruned some of its less-patronized stops within the city in
the interest of expediting service to and from the suburbs.
The Milwaukee Road offered service of a comparable standard
to the North Western until the Milwaukee Road's financial
problems became severe in the late 1970s, culminating in
bankruptcy in 1979. Although service quality suffered as a
result of bankruptcy, by that time the RTA had been subsidizing
operations, and took over commuter operations in 1982.
Despite the North Western's claims to excellence, Chicago's
best commuter railroad may have been the Burlington Northern. By
the early 1970s, the BN operated a fully modern fleet of cars,
and provided creditable service to some of the area's most
rapidly-growing suburbs. Although this was largely an accident
of political geography, the BN had a minimum of inner-city
stations, a happy accident which allowed the railroad to focus on
its busy suburban stations.
The railroads serving the suburbs to the south of the Loop,
by contrast, were the most troubled, regardless of their
financial condition. These problems were caused by various
combinations of financial and demographic woes. The region's
first commuter railroad to go bankrupt was the Rock Island,
although this was for reasons having nothing to do with its
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suburban trains.2 The Rock Island's unsteady finances prevented
the railroad from following the lead of the North Western, the
Milwaukee Road, and the Burlington Northern in buying an all-new
fleet of cars in the 1950s and 60s. The best that the Rock
Island was able to do was to buy enough new cars for its off-peak
trains.
In 1926, when the Illinois Central inaugurated electric
operation of its suburban services, it was the pride and joy of
Chicago railroading, but the IC's former glow of modernity had
long since tarnished into old-fashioned obsolescence. The
Illinois Central's fundamental problems were not financial like
the Rock Island's, but were instead the product of demographic
change and an aging physical plant. The North Western (and other
railroads to a lesser degree) had eliminated many marginal inner-
city station stops by the early 1960s, but most of the IC's
numerous stops on Chicago's South Side remained in service.3 As
2 Much of the blame for the Rock Island's troubles may be
attributed to the Interstate Commerce Commission. In the late
1960s the Union Pacific requested permission to acquire the Rock
Island. By the standards of the 1990s this would have been a small
merger, but it was a substantial proposal by the standards of the
time. The federal regulatory body weighed the pros and cons of the
proposed merger with glacial slowness, and before the agency had
finished its deliberations, the Union Pacific had lost interest in
the Rock Island, contributing to the Rock Island's bankruptcy in
1975. The railroad underwent court-ordered liquidation in 1980.
3 A purely market-driven logic would have dictated that the
Illinois Central take a critical look at its South Chicago branch,
and reexamine its Blue Island branch in an even harsher light, in
addition to reevaluating the need for many of its main line stops
between 59th and 115th Streets.
The IC did close six stops within the city limits by the mid-
1960s, but by the standards of the "L" or the C&NW, additional
stations might well have been closed. The IC's conversion to
automatic fare collection in the late 1960s, however, may explain
much of the railroad's willingness to tolerate marginal stations.
Automatic fare collection cut the operating expenses of all
stations to a minimum, which may have been the line of least
resistance for the IC.
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the 1970s opened, old wooden platforms remained in use at all of
the IC's stations except the downtown terminal at Randolph Street
and a single suburban stop. The IC's electric cars were still
remarkably reliable despite their 45 years of age, but their
wicker seats were hardly in keeping with the rising standards of
comfort of the postwar era.
Finally, the South Shore Line, the only surviving interurban
from the Insull era, was the most trying of Chicago's major
commuter railroads for its riders. The railroad's mechanical
department did a commendable job of keeping late 1920s cars in
service right up to the early 1980s when new cars finally
arrived. Nevertheless, during their last decade the old cars
(and their remarkably patient riders) suffered with each
successive Midwestern winter.
The South Shore also had unique political problems which the
Illinois legislature could alleviate. All but one of the
railroad's outlying stations were in northern Indiana and
therefore outside the purview of the State of Illinois. The
presence of that one Illinois station, however, provided a basis
for transportation agencies on both sides of the state line to
work together, especially by the early 1980s once the Indiana
legislature had given the South Shore a secure source of
revenues.
Commuter service was a money-losing annoyance for all of the
railroads except the still-profitable Chicago & North Western
suburban lines. With the exceptions of the Rock Island and the
South Shore, however, it was still a tolerable burden.
Politically, it would have been all but impossible for any of the
major commuter railroads to get out of the business, so to some
extent the pride that many of them showed in their operations may
have been making the most of the situation.
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All the same, the railroads, including the North Western,
wanted the public sector to buy them out. As early as the late
1960s they had suggested a "Chicago Metropolitan Area
Transportation System," which was the first detailed proposal to
anticipate in broad outline the RTA which was enacted in 1973.
The railroads had been pushing their CMATS proposal in the
General Assembly for several years, but without success. Their
failure to enlist the support of the CTA and the suburban bus
companies (whose problems were more serious than those of the
railroads) may have been a key factor in the failure of the CMATS
proposal to take hold.'
Also, most of the commuter railroads were still in
relatively healthy financial shape. Many Chicago residents and
Illinois lawmakers may have figured that the railroads, as
profitable freight carriers, could afford to wait until the CTA's
more urgent problems had been addressed. The lack of a credible
threat by the railroads to go out of the commuter business
deprived them of much of the negotiating leverage their eastern
counterparts had enjoyed in their negotiations with
transportation authorities.
Suburban buses
Despite the high visibility of the CTA and the commuter
railroads, the suburban bus companies were in the shakiest
financial shape of all. The companies were not in a position to
receive direct subsidies like the CTA, they did not have
profitable services to cross-subsidize money-losing operations as
most of Chicago's commuter railroads did, and they lacked
influential friends in downtown Chicago. For many suburbanites
it was a status symbol to ride the commuter train, but most
* Another factor which may have contributed to the General
Assembly's unsympathetic reception of the railroads' CMATS proposal
was the higher average incomes of commuter railroad passengers
compared with CTA or suburban bus riders.
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suburban bus riders were too young, too old, or too poor to
drive.
The relatively few riders the suburban bus companies had
tended to be blue-collar workers, students, and senior citizens--
in short, people at the margins of America's motorized suburban
society. When they could, suburban bus riders switched to their
own automobiles, and when they did not have this option, they
endured slow, infrequent, inconvenient service in silence. A few
suburban village governments such as Wilmette and Downers Grove
had their own shuttle routes feeding rail commuters to their
local stations, but the fact of having local government sponsors
meant that these services were not at risk.'
In 1972 several suburbs formed the North Suburban Mass
Transit District (Nortran) .6 The district was formed to
subsidize United Motor Coach, which had just gone bankrupt.
United had staved off bankruptcy for several years by buying out
its rivals, but this strategy had reached its limits by the early
1970s. Nortran eventually bought out United Motor Coach in 1975.
Evanston, a lakefront suburb just north of Chicago, took a
different approach when its bus service was threatened.
Evanston, which had enjoyed "L" service for decades, agreed to
pay the CTA to take over local bus service in 1973 following a
prolonged strike at Evanston Motor Coach. The Evanston drivers
were hired by the CTA (at the CTA's higher wage rates), and
passengers benefited from the ability to use CTA transfers
between the elevated and the local bus routes. Although the CTA
5 This social stigma attached to riding trunk-line suburban
bus routes did not extend to rush-hour feeder routes serving local
commuter railroad stations. Apparently some of the high prestige
associated with commuter rail ridership also rubbed off on the
commuter shuttles.
6 See Young (1982) for more on Nortran's first decade.
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paid higher wages than Nortran did, the CTA takeover made it
possible for riders to transfer between Evanston bus routes and
the "L"--which may have made the additional cost of CTA
operations worth while from Evanston's perspective.'
Although other suburban bus companies may not have had such
extreme problems as Evanston or United Motor Coach, none of them
were doing well. Over the course of the 1970s, the Regional
Transportation Authority stabilized (and in many cases expanded)
their services with subsidies, before buying the companies
entirely. Although the relatively few suburban bus riders may
have been the greatest beneficiaries of the regionalization of
transit in the mid-1970s, the late 1960s and early 70s were
difficult years for suburban bus companies and their riders.
The ambivalent role of the CTA board
Theoretically, one of the reasons why the CTA had been set
up with substantial autonomy was to bypass politically motivated
regulation by the Illinois Commerce Commission. Presumably the
CTA board would set fares at more realistic levels than the ICC
had done. But as far as fare policy was concerned, by 1970 the
transit system had come full circle back to where it had started
in 1945. It seemed that the politically-appointed CTA board had
taken over where the state regulators had left off in preventing
management from adjusting fares and services in response to
rising costs and declining ridership.'
The CTA's management had also contributed to this state of
affairs. Management had given the unions an automatic cost of
7 This rationale disappeared in 1976, when the RTA instituted
transfers between the CTA and suburban bus lines such as Nortran.
8 This, of course, is not to say that if CTA's managers had
enjoyed commercial freedom to set fare and service levels, their
decisions necessarily would have been optimum either for the CTA or
its riders.
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living adjustment of indefinite duration in 1951, in return for
cooperating with the postwar modernization program. This made it
politically difficult to control labor costs.
There was little objection to reversing the physical
deterioration of CTA's elevated lines, bus garages, and rapid
transit car shops, even at taxpayer expense. With the help of a
state transportation bond issue (made possible under a new state
constitution) and federal funds, the CTA was replacing old buses
with new ones and rehabilitating old track and stations.
Yet at the same time the CTA's finances had never been in
worse shape. The CTA's fares were among the highest in the US.
Virtually all political actors agreed that the CTA was no longer
able to meet its costs from the farebox (as it was required to do
by law), but there was little agreement on what should be done,
as the city and state sought different resolutions while
attempting to fill the short-run gaps in the agency's budget.
In the final analysis, much of the ambivalence of the CTA
board can be attributed, however indirectly, to Mayor Daley, as
he appointed four of the seven members to the board (the governor
appointed the remaining three). Clearly, Daley wanted the CTA to
run smoothly in terms of day-to-day operations. A well-running
CTA was part of the image of Daley's Chicago as "the city that
works."
Yet Daley may not have wanted too much efficiency, either.
Most city departments and quasi-city agencies such as the CTA and
the Chicago Park District filled many entry-level positions
according to political criteria.' The CTA was no less efficient
9 This tradition of political criteria in the selection of
entry-level employees predates the CTA by many decades. Like many
other Chicago businesses, the franchised private transit companies
routinely filled their lower-level vacancies with applicants
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than comparable big-city transit systems (and on some indicators
was even more so), but neither the CTA nor its political masters
pursued technological innovations to make the CTA substantially
more efficient than its peers. Articulated or double-deck buses,
increased automation to replace agents at rapid transit stations,
and the conversion of rapid transit cars for one-person operation
would have all made the CTA more cost-effective. But these
measures would have required scarce money to implement, and would
also have reduced the number of jobs available for distribution
to the faithful through the machine's ward organizations.
Furthermore, even if it were to the machine's political
advantage to increase the use of labor-saving technologies, the
entrenched position of labor made any such moves risky. As with
the CTA's modernization program in the 1950s, the unions might
well demand even higher wages in return for their cooperation.
At worst, any unilateral attempt by management to adopt more
efficient operating practices might provoke a strike. The mayor
might also risk a strike if he were instruct his board members to
have management to take a harder line in wage negotiations. The
image of Chicago as "the city that works" would certainly survive
a CTA strike, but the machine's reputation for reliable city
services would be tarnished to some degree.
Most city agencies and special districts settled labor
issues through Chicago-style political bargaining rather than the
more confrontational styles of labor negotiation found in many
other cities. As a result, Chicago lagged behind other big
cities in the signing of collective agreements with public
employees, but wage rates were high nevertheless. In effect,
Daley used high wages as a guid pro quo to forestall unionization
of public services other than mass transit (which had inherited
its labor unions from the days of private enterprise).
recommended by their ward committeemen.
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Established labor leaders who were willing to conduct
business through Chicago-style negotiations were among Daley's
closest associates and strongest supporters. These proponents of
business unionism cooperated with the mayor's strategy of buying
labor peace before militant unionization had a chance to take
hold.1* Nevertheless, the growing independence and wage
militancy of the Chicago teachers' union may have suggested the
limitations of the handshake and the smoke-filled room as labor
relations techniques.
As a result of these various factors, Daley may have been
excessively vulnerable to the explicit or implicit demands of
labor. Had he been willing to take on a strike, as Mayor Jane
Byrne did in 1979, Daley might have been able shift the balance
of power from labor to management and thus bring the CTA's
finances under greater control. But particularly in the wake of
the April 1968 riots on the West Side and the disturbances
associated with the Democratic National Convention in August of
that year, Daley may well have been determined to minimize any
further disruption to the normal life of the city.
Mayor Daley and Michael Cafferty
Part of Daley's genius was his ability to embrace just
enough of the reform agenda to coopt his opposition. The mayor
had displayed a keen sense of political timing in the early
1960s, when he reacted to scandal in the police department by
appointing criminologist Orlando Wilson to run the department in
10 Public-spirited business executives were another crucial
part of Mayor Daley's coalition. On some issues business was at
odds with labor, but on others (including transit) they shared a
common interest. Downtown business groups did not express public
concern about the CTA's generous wage rates, especially since the
state was making good most of the CTA's losses starting in 1970.
If Mayor Daley were to take a harder line on wage increases,
resulting in a strike, downtown businesses would be immediately and
strongly hurt. Thus, downtown business groups would be unlikely to
urge wage restraint on the CTA.
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a professional manner. Now in the early 1970s, the CTA was too
visible for the mayor to neglect. Anthony Downs describes the
problem facing the leaders of ideologically outmoded
bureaucracies such as the CTA:
they can retain the obsolete ideology ... thereby
failing to serve the true interests of the bureau's
beneficiaries [in this case, transit riders]... [T]he
leaders risk being exposed later as inefficient and
obsolete (1967, p. 244).
An opportunity now presented itself for Daley to address the
CTA issue boldly. The death of CTA board chairman George DeMent
in 1970 forced the mayor to appoint a new chairman. DeMent was
appropriate as a defensive manager of an embattled agency, but he
was by no accounts an imaginative or visionary leader. Now the
mayor chose a dynamic figure with innovative ideas for the CTA.
The mayor's new appointee was Michael Cafferty, an attorney with
a background as a transportation planner at the federal level.
There was more to Cafferty's appointment, however, than
meets the eye. His widow, RTA board member and University of
Chicago professor Pastora Cafferty, offers some background on her
husband's appointment and events to which newspaper reporters
were not privy:
George DeMent was one of Daley's commissioners of
public works. The traditional thing in Chicago was if
you were commissioner of public works and did a good
job, the reward was going to the CTA. At that time
[the early 1970s], the CTA was the premier [public]
transportation system in the country, it ran in the
black, it was a posh job, and it was also the highest-
paying public job in the State of Illinois. You got
paid more than the governor and the mayor. The CTA was
a nice plum.
When George DeMent died, Milton Pikarsky was
commissioner of public works, and should have become
chairman of the CTA. Dick Ogilvie was governor. Dick
Ogilvie said to [Mayor] Richard Daley that he would not
confirm whoever was appointed as chairman of the CTA.
They were [temporarily] at war on a number of other
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things.
And Richard Daley ... found the one person in the
country that Dick Ogilvie would have to confirm,
because Michael was very respected nationally for his
work in public transportation. Michael Cafferty had
never met Richard Daley, but Dick Ogilvie knew Michael
Cafferty and respected him. Richard Daley thus
appointed a man that Dick Ogilvie confirmed within two
hours of his appointment.
Michael was also the second person who had been
brought in by Richard Daley from outside as a reform
appointment. The other one had been [police chief]
Orlando Wilson. So they came in on a wave of glory
because they were not seen as traditional city
servants."
It was incongruous that Michael Cafferty assumed the
leadership of the CTA as the agency slid into the greatest
financial difficulties in its history as the financial realities
affecting the entire transit industry forced themselves on
Chicago. Nevertheless, Cafferty's arrival was as welcome as a
breath of fresh air to many riders, and seemed to promise
straphangers a better future. For the first time in over a
decade, the agency was led by a energetic figure who saw the
CTA's clientele as customers rather than mere "fares". Cafferty
was able to articulate a vision for the CTA which the city and
state were able to translate into political support for a bond
issue to modernize the CTA.
Cafferty's unexpected death in 1973 cut short both a
promising career and a measure of hope for the CTA. Daley filled
the vacant CTA position with his public works commissioner,
Milton Pikarsky, who was more of a technocrat than a visionary.
Pikarsky was to become a major figure in the passage of the RTA
11 Interview, September 1995. Professor Cafferty, with her
extensive experience as an RTA board member, added that this was
the only instance of the governor refusing to approve a mayoral
appointment to any board concerned with public transportation.
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and would later serve as the agency's first chairman.
Changes in state government
At the state level, Governor Otto Kerner had been elected in
1960 with the backing of the Chicago machine. As the years went
on, however, Kerner apparently sought a broader audience and
distanced himself from the machine. Kerner brought himself to
the attention of the nation in chairing a presidential commission
on civil disturbances. The Kerner Report, which sought to
explain urban riots in politically liberal terms of reaction to
white racism, could hardly have pleased Mayor Daley. Whether
President Lyndon Johnson appreciated Kerner's conclusions or not,
he offered Kerner a federal judgeship in 1967, which the governor
accepted.
Kerner was replaced by Lieutenant Governor Sam Shapiro, who
served out the remainder of the term. In 1968 Illinois voters
elected Republican Richard B. Ogilvie as governor. Ogilvie had
been Cook County Sheriff until 1966, when he was elected Cook
County Board president. As a Chicago Republican who had held
elected county office, Ogilvie enjoyed a broad appeal across
partisan lines.
The Ogilvie administration in power
Ogilvie was very much of a downtown establishment figure,
but he projected enough of a good government ethos to enable his
administration to be on decent terms both with Chicago's
Democratic machine and reform elements in both parties. All the
same, he never allowed his.image as a good government Republican
to prevent him from making the compromises needed for transacting
political business. Ironically for a Republican, the state
government grew considerably in scope under his administration.
A principled leader, Ogilvie was willing to take risks for
what he believed needed to be done, like John Volpe, a popular
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Republican governor of Massachusetts in the early 1960s. Both
men were able to gain the support of a largely Democratic
electorate and work with lawmakers on both sides of the aisles of
their respective state legislatures.
Ogilvie's downfall, which made him a one-term governor, was
the state income tax, which was enacted under his administration
with his blessing. Ogilvie saw the income tax as necessary to
pay for the programs which the General Assembly was intent on
enacting (with the cooperation of his administration). To his
credit, Ogilvie did not evade or confuse the issue, but instead
did what he believed was appropriate and took the consequences
without complaint.
The new 1970 constitution
One of the major accomplishments of the Ogilvie
administration was the new state constitution of 1970. The 1870
state constitution had been adequate for the needs of its day,
but as the decades passed growing numbers of Illinoisans became
interested in constitutional reform. A proposed new constitution
went before the voters as early as 1922, but it was voted down in
a referendum." Without neglecting his other agendas, Ogilvie
helped set the tone for the Constitutional Convention's
deliberations, which began in December 1969. The results of the
Convention's work went before the state's voters in December
1970, who approved the new constitution in a special referendum.
The new Constitution of 1970 took effect on July 1, 1971.
The 1970 referendum on the constitution included a separate
ballot question on cumulative voting. It was thought that the
manner in which the House was elected was important enough to be
12 Dodd & Dodd (1924), p. 119. The constitution proposed in
1922 would have eliminated cumulative voting, presumably to avoid
the abuse of the system whereby the parties would only run as many
candidates as they expected would win.
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decided separately from the constitution itself. Voters approved
both the new constitution and the continuation of cumulative
voting."
The new Constitution of 1970 eliminated the limits on local
government spending of the old 1870 constitution." Cities,
villages, and special districts with taxing powers were now at
liberty to take on as much indebtedness as their political
masters (and ultimately the voters) would tolerate. The new
constitution also anticipated state action on mass transit
issues. One of its provisions specifically authorized the state
to spend money on mass transit (Illinois 1972, p. 106).
The CTA deficit: bailouts or regionalization?
Meanwhile, the CTA was entering a state of financial
imbalance. In January 1970 a confidential CTA memorandum warned
that
established revenues might not be sufficient to meet
debt service requirements of $8.1 million. The [state]
Bureau [of the Budget]'s fear, as reflected in the
memo, was that trustees of the CTA bonds might demand a
fare increase to ensure payment (Sudnik 1977, p. 21).
Governor Ogilvie, busy with the new constitution and perhaps
mindful of his suburban and downstate electoral bases, did not
act immediately on the CTA issue. Instead, he waited for
circumstances to force the General Assembly to react. In May of
13 There was one important change in the way in which
cumulative voting operated under the new constitution. Parties
were now required to run three candidates in all districts which
they contested, rather than estimate how many seats they could win
and run only that number of candidates.
14 Had the new 1970 constitution's provisions on local
government spending been in force in the early 20th century, the
history of transit in Chicago might have been very dif ferent. Under
the new constitution, Chicago's voters would have been free to
raise their local property taxes to pay for a municipal takeover of
the streetcar and "L" lines.
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1970, the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry issued a
report on the CTA's finances, echoing the CTA's own warnings.
The CTA faced the prospect of a fare increase from 400 to
45C if subsidies were not forthcoming. (For reasons noted above,
a policy of wage restraint was not considered.) Ogilvie called a
special session of the legislature in June 1970, and asked the
General Assembly to approve the use of part of the existing
gasoline tax for the CTA--a move which Mayor Daley supported.
But the legislature, influenced by highway interests, declined to
go along with Ogilvie's proposal. The special session ended
without a subsidy, and the CTA's fare went up to 450--one of the
highest basic transit fares in the US at the time.
As the CTA went before the state legislature seeking
bailouts starting in 1970, the Ogilvie administration dealt with
the problems as they arose. Apparently Ogilvie learned from the
June 1970 defeat of his gas tax proposal, as he obtained
subsequent funds for the CTA from general revenues. The state
provided the CTA with stopgap subsidies for six months or a year
at a time. Subsequently, the city and Cook County governments
also contributed towards the succession of short-term bailouts.
As each special subsidy expired, the agency invariably returned
to Springfield hat in hand, asking for more money. Neither the
state, county, or city demanded any financial controls on the CTA
in return for the rapidly habit-forming subsidies, and the
financial problems seemed to worsen each time.
But at the same time as Ogilvie was coping with recurring
demands for subsidies for the CTA, he was laying the groundwork
for a more lasting resolution of Chicago's transit problem.
Illinois' political leaders made a number of crucial decisions
during the early 1970s about how mass transit would be organized
and paid for. The choices they made, sometimes rapidly and under
intense political pressure, reshaped the institutional landscape
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of transit in Chicagoland. The basis for all subsequent
decision-making was established during the final year of Richard
Ogilvie's administration, under his aide George A. Ranney, Jr.
More than any other official, Ranney was responsible for the
direction Chicago's transit system would take.
George Ranney, Jr. and regional transit
Upon taking office in early 1969, Governor Ogilvie appointed
Ranney, then in the employ of Inland Steel's legal department, to
create and help run the Illinois Bureau of the Budget. This was
a new office, modeled on counterparts at the federal level, which
Ogilvie intended to professionalize the state's budget making and
fiscal oversight. (This new office was perhaps best known for
implementing Illinois' new income tax, a move which observers
generally credit as the largest factor behind Ogilvie's defeat
when seeking reelection in 1972.)
It was while Ranney was assistant director of the Bureau of
the Budget that he became involved in, and developed an interest
in, transportation issues. When the CTA started to lose money in
1970 and required a succession of emergency bailouts from the
state, city, and Cook County governments, Ranney became Ogilvie's
"point man" on the CTA issue. Thus, Ranney was a logical choice
to carry Ogilvie's regional transit initiative forward.
Ranney is a multifaceted figure who defies simple analysis.
He is descended from two of Chicago's leading business families,
the Ryersons (Inland Steel) and the Donnelleys (R.R. Donnelley &
Son printers), and is a trustee of the University of Chicago.
But rather than resting on his family laurels, he pursued high
levels -of personal accomplishment from the outset, both in
business and in politics.
Politically, Ranney is a liberal Republican, a loosely-
defined category whose members largely vanished from public view,
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when a more conservative orientation became predominant among
Republicans in the 1980s. In many ways, liberal Republicans such
as Ranney were the direct ideological heirs of the progressive
reformers of the early 20th century. Like their predecessors of
half a century earlier, liberal Republicans like Ranney are
concerned with "good government" issues. They have sought to
"modernize" and "professionalize" government, with the large
business organization as their implicit model. Yet at the same
time, Ranney and his contemporaries, in contrast to some of the
earlier reformers, were active in the expansion of government, in
keeping with the then-current fashion of the 1960s and early
1970s.
Ranney's legal skills, his family background, and his
liberal Republicanism made him an ideal choice for his role in
creating and promoting the RTA in the early 1970s. The
combination of his position and his views gave him not only an
entree but also credibility with almost all of the relevant
actors. He already had contacts in the Loop business community,
which he expanded even further while pressing for the RTA in the
campaign leading up to the March 1974 referendum. His standing
in the business community and his position in the Ogilvie
administration gave him ample influence within the upper reaches
of the Republican Party, even if he had limited success in
convincing rank and file Republican voters in the suburbs to
support the RTA.
Ranney's various affiliations also offered him ready access
to Democrats of differing persuasions. Thanks to the isolation
of the Republican Party within the city, Ranney was no threat to
the machine's interests. In fact, he was on good terms with the
Democratic machine, with which he shared a common interest in the
health of the Loop. Many respectable Chicago Republicans, or at
least those who did not oppose the machine's candidates for city
and county offices, shared Ranney's ability to get along well
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with the machine. Thanks to his--and Governor Ogilvie's--good
rapport with the machine, Ranney could readily negotiate and
reach agreements with Mayor Daley and the mayor's allies.
At the same time, Ranney's liberalism made it easy for him
to reach out to liberal Democrats. Judging from his ability to
mobilize various "good government" interest groups in the RTA
referendum campaign, it seems that few liberal Democrats held
Ranney's Republicanism against him." Normally it would be
unusual for a Republican legislative committee chairman to be
more liberal than his Democratic counterpart, but this raised few
eyebrows in Chicago in the early 1970s. It was probably in good
part thanks to Ranney that the RTA was among the very few issues
on which machine Democrats, Republican Loop business interests,
and reform Democrats were in agreement." To borrow an analogy
from art historian George Kubler, Ranney enjoyed "favorable
entry". He was in the right place at the right time to
accomplish what he did.
As one of the most pivotal figures in the creation of the
RTA, Ranney was probably unique in his role and his
15 Ranney was probably aided by the thin and sometimes
shifting line between liberal Democrats and Republicans. When
Daley first came to power in 1955, liberal Democratic alderman
Robert Merriam opposed him in the general election under the
Republican label. More recently, liberal Democrat Richard Friedman
ran against Daley in 1971 as a Republican. In his mayoral
campaign, Friedman gained the support of many liberal activists who
normally voted Democratic. Thus, the then-recent historical
accident of Friedman's candidacy may have helped increase the
credibility of such Republicans as Ranney in liberal Democratic
circles.
16 The three groups had varying reasons for supporting the
RTA. To Chicago's Democratic organization, the CTA was a public
service to be distributed to constituents (along with a number of
patronage jobs) . To downtown Republicans, the CTA brought
employees and customers into the heart of the city. And to liberal
reformers, the RTA was a classical "good government" issue.
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qualifications. He led the state government task force which
formulated the concept of the RTA in 1972, and helped persuade a
reluctant General Assembly to pass an RTA bill in 1973. Ranney
was also responsible in large part for the RTA's victory, narrow
though it was, in a referendum held in March 1974. For better or
worse, without him the RTA probably would not have been enacted
in its original form, or might have been delayed a few years."
1972: The Transportation Task Force
The RTA concept emerged from the work of the Ogilvie
administration's Transportation Task Force, which worked through
most of 1972 to recommend a specific resolution to regional mass
transit issues. Chaired by Ranney and staffed by Illinois
Department of Transportation and other high officials, the most
important of whom was Judson Lawrie, who, according to Ranney,
17 Ranney's role has precedents in Chicago politics. Edward
Banfield, in his book Political Influence, speaks of three types of
civic figures: the advisor to the political head, the negotiator,
and the publicist of policy. While Ranney did use negotiating
skills behind closed doors, he conformed very closely to Banfield's
"publicist of policy" as co-chairman of the Illinois Transportation
Study Committee during 1973, and even more so during the campaign
leading up to the March 1974 referendum. In these roles, Ranney
was a good example of
the "civic leader" who tries to create a public opinion
favorable to certain undertakings. Whereas the advisor
and the negotiators almost always work behind the scenes,
the publicist is in the limelight, making speeches before
civic associations, appearing on television, giving
interviews to the press, and publishing endorsements and
testimonials.
The publicist is likely to come from one of those
occupations--real estate, advertising, public relations,
or the law--in which smooth talking is at a premium. He
is not likely to be the active head of a very large
corporation. (...)
The publicist is of great value to the political
head when a "non-partisan" appeal must be made to the
voters for approval of a bond proposal or a
constitutional amendment (1961, p. 282).
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did much of the work." The Task Force also interviewed a
number of transportation professionals (one of whom, Leo Cusick,
subsequently became the RTA's chief of operations). The Task
Force issued its report, Crisis and Solution: Public
Transportation in Northeastern Illinois) in January 1973.
The study's findings came as little surprise to Illinois
legislators or the transportation community. Ogilvie had already
made his views on the transit issue clear in February 1971:
In my judgment, detailed implementation planning
and final grant allocations in an area as large and
complex as the six-county region of northeastern
Illinois can best be made on a limited geographical
basis by an agency specifically entrusted with these
responsibilities. I have no doubt that an agency with
powers to coordinate routes and fares for all private
and public carriers in the region would be able
substantially to improve service and reduce costs...
(Ogilvie 1971, p. 11)
With hindsight, Ogilvie's assessment of the proposed
agency's prospects was overly optimistic, but at least he made
himself clear from the outset. The Task Force worked for a year
and prepared several reports on various aspects of the transit
problem. The intention was to present a recommendation to the
General Assembly in early 1973, at which point Ogilvie hoped to
see a bill through to approval. His administration was not to
survive that long, however; a volatile electorate angered at
Ogilvie's state income tax turned him out of office in November
1972 and replaced him with Democrat Dan Walker.
The RTA Report
The Crisis and Solution report proposed a Regional
18 Interview with George A. Ranney, Jr., September 1993.
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Transportation Agency," which met the criteria the governor had
outlined in 1971. The proposed agency, the report recommended,
should be assigned a broad range of policy, management,
and functional responsibilities related to the region's
mass transportation programs. Further, these
responsibilities are likely to expand over time as the
agency proves its capabilities and as new areas of
required involvement are identified (Illinois 1973, p.
62).
To its opponents, the RTA which emerged from the 1973
legislative session and the March 1974 referendum was a money-
wasting bureaucratic monster. But such an outcome was probably
far from the minds of Ogilvie administration officials. The
1970s would bear out the subsequent suburban critiques of the
RTA, but these considerations were at best barely relevant to the
Transportation Task Force.
From the standpoint of Ranney, Lawrie, and others, the
crucial problem was a lack of administrative and funding capacity
for mass transportation. By creating an agency with a flexible,
loosely-defined mandate and broad powers, Ranney hoped to
overcome the institutional inertia of a CTA required to meet its
costs from the farebox, of private transit companies on the verge
of going out of business, and of state and local governments
whose hands had long been tied by the budgetary limitations of
the Constitution of 1870. If the state created another problem
by solving this one, surely the political process would deal with
it. Ranney and his colleagues were reacting to the pressing
issues of their time, rather than a very different set of issues
which would soon come to dominate the discussion.
The RTA report was vague on various issues, seeking to
define a range of possibilities rather than constrain the new
" When the RTA concept was translated into legislative
language in 1973, the RTA became the Regional Transportation
Authority.
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agency. The report spelled out goals for the agency to pursue,
while leaving the specific legal tools for the legislature to
select. One of the issues on which the report did attempt to
limit the RTA, however, was the agency's involvement with transit
operations. The report urged that the legislation should
Provide for contracting for services through
"purchase of service" agreements. It should not
mandate the purchase of private systems since each
purchase may not be in the best interest of the
Regional Transportation Agency, hence the public
(Illinois 1973, p. 83).
At the same time, the report stopped just short of saying
that private systems should not be purchased. The point was that
the RTA should not be required to purchase operators upon demand,
which could become a very expensive proposition. This was an
issue within the transportation community, as the commuter
railroads' CMATS proposal called for an automatic buyout of any
transit carrier requesting it. The question of administration
versus operations was not a problem at the time, although this
issue would become crucial ten years later when the state
reformed the RTA and created new operating agencies in charge of
commuter rail and suburban buses.
Ranney explained how the Task Force proceeded:
We basically figured out what we wanted to do and
worked with that, rather than bouncing off others... I
don't think we were working off existing models
particularly. We were giving a lot of thought to
whether we wanted to have an authority or not. (...)
But there was real concern about creating an
authority.2" We came to the conclusion, as I recall,
that because we had a balance (...) in terms of
population [i.e., between the city and the suburbs,
which were approximately equal in population at the
20 The Crisis and Solution report discusses the pros and cons
of different legal forms for an RTA to take (Illinois 1973, pp. 79-
81). The report recommended a special purpose district, the most
common form of government organization in Illinois. This option
was eventually embodied in the 1973 legislation.
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time], it made sense to go ahead with this...
(Interview, September 1993.)
The Task Force implicitly argued that the RTA represented a
compromise between three different legislative proposals before
the General Assembly in 1972.21 Unlike the RTA proposal, each
of these bills favored specific operators. First of all, one
bill called for the CTA to extend its services throughout the six
counties of northeastern Illinois. This was no solution, the
report argued, because the CTA's high wage rates and its
traditional technology of service provision would become the
standard for the entire region.
A reading of the Crisis and Solution report might lead the
innocent reader to think that the CTA and the city favored this
bill, but nothing could have been further from the case. In
fact, the bill's sponsor was Eugene Schlickman, a suburban
Republican concerned with "good government" issues of regional
cooperation. Indeed, as Schlickman recalled,
There was no anticipation on my part that the bill I
introduced would ever be passed. [The purposes were]
testing of the water in terms of reception to the
principle, and also to garner more attention to the
need for a regional- transportation system.22
Another bill before the General Assembly in 1972 would have
created a Suburban Area Transit System, basically a suburban
counterpart of the CTA. Although commuter railroads would
benefit from this proposal, the financially hard-pressed suburban
bus companies seem to have stood to gain the most. The RTA
21 See Illinois (1973), p. 82 for more about the three
legislative proposals offered in 1972.
22 Interview with Eugene Schlickman, September 1993. The
Crisis and Solution report treated Schlickman's bill as though it
might have had a following in the General Assembly, but in an
interview with this author two decades later Ranney himself
implicitly concurred in Schlickman's interpretation of this
proposal as a very unlikely candidate for passage.
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report rejected this alternative on account of the problems of
fare and service coordination between the CTA and the proposed
Suburban Area Transit System, overlooking the possibility that
two operators might agree to coordinate their fares and services.
Finally, the RTA report cited the commuter railroads' pet
CMATS proposal. The report noted several problems with the CMATS
plan, including its institutional inflexibility, the likelihood
that wage rates would rise to the highest level on a unified
system, and the requirement that the CMATS agency buy out any
transit carrier which wanted to sell its operations to the public
sector. Comparing the RTA with these different legislative
proposals and their flaws, the report implicitly painted the RTA
as the impartial choice of reason and compromise.
The report of the Transportation Task Force was released to
the public on January 15, 1973, literally the Ogilvie
administration's last day in office. Incoming governor Dan
Walker, who took office the next day, was not enthusiastic about
the RTA report being released." The content (if any) of
Walker's transit agenda was not clear from his campaign, which
contained few concrete policy proposals about transit (or other
issues, for that matter). The outgoing Ogilvie administration
apparently decided to force Walker's hand on the RTA issue. It
was now up to Walker, Mayor Daley, and the state's legislative
leaders to react to the report.
Other Task Force reports
In addition to Crisis.and Solution, the Task Force produced
a number of other documents, several of which are listed at the
end of the Crisis and Solution report. Apparently a number of
staff papers dealt with various demographic and institutional
considerations. Despite its very specific focus, one of these
23 Interview, George A. Ranney, Jr., September 1973.
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reports, the comprehensive Legal History of Mass Transit
Operations in Northeastern Illinois, 1900-1970, is one of the
best Chicago transit histories in existence.
The politically sensitive Cook report
A curious omission from the list of titles in the Crisis and
Solution report, however, was Cost and Revenue of Public
Transportation in Northeastern Illinois, 1960-1995, written by
Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) staff member John M.
Cook. Issued in December 1972 (after the Ogilvie administration
lost the election but before it left office), the Cook report
predicted that if the Chicago area's transit carriers were
subsidized at 50% of their operating costs, the RTA (assuming it
existed) would be paying nearly $230 million annually in
subsidies by 1980. In fact, the real figure for 1980 was an even
more drastic $368.5 million (Young 1981, p. 11). The
implications of the Cook report were not lost on IDOT staffers.
According to the Chicago Tribune's David Young,
At the time Cook prepared the report, the state
was spending about $15.5 million a year subsidizing the
CTA, and horrified officials suppressed the report.
"When we saw the dollars involved, we decided we could
never release the report," said one official involved
at the time. "It would have killed the RTA before it
got started" (Young, ibid.).
Whatever coverup may have taken place, however, seems to
have occurred below the top levels. When asked about the Cook
report, George Ranney, Jr. did not recall it even when shown a
copy." Knowledge of the Cook report only spread beyond
official transportation circles well after the RTA was an
established fact. But to those few RTA opponents who
subsequently learned about its existence, it must have confirmed
their worst suspicions about the RTA and its proponents.
" Interview, September 1993.
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Political realities and the Ogilvie administration
Defining the problem was one thing; resolving it through the
political process was another. However controversial the RTA
later became, the problems facing the Ogilvie administration had
little to do with the finer points of transit organization. Like
most politicians, Ogilvie dealt with current, practical
questions, not theoretical ones which might arise later on. The
CTA deficit was a reality which Ogilvie could not ignore. The
deficit was increasing; it was part of a national, indeed a
worldwide pattern; and there was little the governor could do to
make the deficit go away. Trying to force the CTA back towards a
balanced budget was not a realistic alternative, for a variety of
reasons.
First of all, Mayor Daley had appointed four of the CTA's
seven board members (the governor appointed the others). Thus,
even though Ogilvie, his predecessors, and his successors had
some input to the CTA, they were by law outvoted by the mayor's
appointees. Second, if the governor pressed for changes to which
Mayor Daley was opposed, he risked alienating the mayor--and
possibly the downtown business community as well. If the
governor were to be seen.as responsible for fare increases or
service reductions to which the mayor was publicly opposed, he
might face an unhappy Chicago electorate if he ran for
reelection.
Finally, even if the governor were able to force change at
the CTA, there was no guarantee that he could enforce his
position aside from affecting legislative appropriations. In the
final analysis, the governor would have little say over the CTA
other than his line-item veto powers over total state
appropriations for the CTA. These were not exactly fine-grained
instruments of control, especially if the mayor were able to pin
the blame for any CTA financial crisis on the governor.
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Daley, Republicans, and the RTA
Many observers seem to have assumed that Mayor Daley
benefited greatly from the creation of the RTA, and that Ogilvie
made a serious mistake in creating a situation so advantageous to
the mayor. Yet when we examine the situation from the standpoint
of the early 1970s, without the benefit of hindsight, it appears
that Ogilvie was balancing the interests of the city, the suburbs
and downstate Illinois as best he could, given the political
constraints under which he functioned.
Suburban opponents of the RTA sometimes brandished the
threat of Mayor Daley as an evil force seeking to extend the
tentacles of Chicago's machine into the suburbs, but this image
of the mayor was largely a product of political rhetoric and had
little basis in the real interests of the city, the machine, or
the Loop business community. Daley's vital interests lay in his
positions as mayor and party chairman. Thus, in terms of
transit, his main goal was keeping the CTA financially afloat.
Control of the commuter railroads through the RTA offered Mayor
Daley very few political benefits, and control of suburban buses
gave him even less. But if there was to be an RTA, it was in the
mayor's interests to ensure that the resulting legislation was as
favorable to the city as possible.
In fact, Mayor Daley's first preference was for steady
subsidies to the CTA, without the RTA as an intermediary. As
former representative Eugene Schlickman (R., Arlington Heights)
noted, "Daley was not interested in regional transportation. He
just wanted the money." Ogilvie and Ranney were determined to
have an RTA, and made it clear to the mayor that the RTA "was the
only way that the CTA was going to survive."2 As Dennis Byrne
of the Sun-Times noted,
To credit (or blame) Mayor Richard Daley for hatching
25 George Ranney, Jr., interview, September 1993.
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the RTA as some sort of Chicago plot to extend the
city's power over the suburbs simply ignores history.
Mayor Daley, in fact, initially opposed the RTA until
he realized that without it the CTA would be in big
trouble.2"
Daley, who dealt only in the realm of the politically
feasible, accepted the RTA as the cost of securing subsidies for
the CTA." As always, the mayor sought to optimize his position
within the constraints of political reality. From Daley's
standpoint, it was a significant concession to give the suburbs
power of any sort over what was essentially a city service."
The Ogilvie administration sought an institutionalized
resolution to the CTA's deficits in order to avoid an endless
succession of emergency bailouts. Ranney explained that
Republican leaders rejected tax powers for the CTA because
They didn't trust the city to raise and spend that sum
of money, and they were right. This was an effort on
the suburban Republican leadership's side to avoid what
had happened in the Chicago schools and such." The
26 "North Shore Line Battle Wasn't in Vain." Reprinted in
First & Fastest, Summer 1988.
27 Ogilvie may have enjoyed additional leverage over the mayor
on the RTA issue because the CTA needed the state's help in
financing overdue modernization of the transit system's aging
physical plant.
28 David Young, interview, June 1992.
29 Ranney was referring to financial problems at the Chicago
Board of Education. As Fuchs explains (1992, p. 258),
Initially Daley kept an informal role in [Chicago teachers'
union] contract negotiations and lobbied Springfield for the
funds to meet teacher wage demands. However, after a
teachers' strike in 1969, Daley decided to limit his role in
closing the budget gaps that resulted from generous contract
settlements. Once collective bargaining rights had been
achieved, the school board had little political capacity to
deal with a strong union that repeatedly went on strike (1971,
1973, and 1975) to increase its members' salaries and
benefits.
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theory here was that there would be controls, and
particularly fiscal controls imposed, that would make
the CTA more efficient without necessarily trying to
run it, but also fund it in concert with its needs.3
Donald Totten, a Republican state representative from the
suburbs who opposed the RTA, agreed with Ranney's analysis:
The issue of the creation of a regional transportation
authority came because the [General] Assembly was not
able to reconcile a subsidy to the CTA. Suburban
interests were saying, "We're just throwing money down
a rathole here," and the subsidy kept getting bigger
because of the financial problems of the CTA. It
became apparent that in the interests of Chicago,
something else had to be done."
Eugene Schlickman, another suburban Republican state
representative opposed to the RTA, argued that
there would not be regional transportation in the
Chicago metropolitan area if it was not for a
Republican governor and a Republican-led legislature.
[Dan] Walker [a Democrat who was elected governor in
1972] wouldn't have done it.
Schlickman argued that Ogilvie's principles played an
important role:
I don't think it was a matter of his [Ogilvie's] being
tired of Chicago's constantly seeking further aid for
the CTA. I think it was a conviction on Ogilvie's part
that sooner or later [there was a need for] a unified,
integrated [mass] transportation system for the Chicago
metropolitan area."
Another issue motivating proponents of the RTA was the wish
to make cross-subsidy possible from suburban motorists to Chicago
30 Interview, September 1993.
31 Interview, Donald Totten, September 1993.
32 Interview, September 1993. Schlickman's interpretation is
consistent with Ogilvie's readiness to implement a state income tax
which he believed was needed, even though doing so brought his own
political career to an end.
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transit riders. Those favoring cross-subsidies included not only
Chicago machine Democrats and liberal reformers, but Republicans
with roots in the downtown business community, such as Governor
Ogilvie and George Ranney, Jr. As Ranney explained, "the big
issue ... was not so much [coordination]. It was integration of
the revenue base. Another [issue] was to get control of the CTA
in a meaningful way.,""
Favorable circumstances for transit
From the standpoint of Chicago Republicans like Ogilvie and
Ranney, there was little to be gained and much to be risked from
forcing the CTA to spend no more revenue than it took in. For
one thing, transit enjoyed an unprecedented, if short-lived
legitimacy at the time. This process had started in the late
1960s, when the environmental movement made concern with
alternatives to the automobile politically acceptable, even
fashionable.
The respectability of transit intensified greatly in the
wake of the 1973 energy shortfall, which, although rarely voiced
in the RTA debate, was probably a strong latent factor helping
its legislative passage in late 1973 and again with the public in
the March 1974 referendum. It was not until the late 1970s that
it became clear that generous subsidies to transit were not
affecting people's travel choices as long as local governments
pursued land use policies which encouraged suburban sprawl. For
several years starting in the late 1960s, transit advocates had
more credibility than they did before or afterwards. In the
months following the Arab oil embargo in October 1973, it was
politically dangerous to be seen by urban constituents as
opposing mass transit.
Even aside from the anxiety surrounding the Arab oil embargo
" Interview, September 1993.
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and rapid increases in energy prices, supporting the RTA made
electoral sense for Governor Ogilvie. The symbolic value of
support for transit outweighed its budgetary costs in political
calculations, and provided Ogilvie and a number of other elected
officials at the time with a way of showing concern about
important issues without directly challenging the hegemony of the
automobile.
Finally, another consideration which probably restrained
Ogilvie's allies from taking a harder line on the CTA's deficits
was the importance of the downtown business community in
Republican fundraising circles. Simply put, Republican
candidates for state office who opposed the vital interests of
downtown business did so at the risk of their campaign finances.
This created a tension between the electoral and the financial
interests of Illinois Republicans, a tension which came to the
forefront in the 1973 legislative session and the 1974 RTA
referendum campaign.
Although downtown executives doubtless valued efficiency in
their own organizations, other priorities may have been foremost
in their minds as far as the CTA was concerned. In all
likelihood, to make the CTA more nearly self-sustaining in
accounting terms would not only require sacrifices on the part of
labor and management, but would also result in higher fares in
real terms--which would have hurt Loop businesses. Even if
Chicago Republicans such as Ranney spoke of the need for
efficient management (and by the early 1980s Ranney was in the
intellectual forefront of calls for reforming the RTA), they were
well aware that the CTA's 450 fare of the early 1970s was among
the highest in the US. One of the last things downtown business
leaders wanted in 1973 and 1974 was to see fares go any higher.
The RTA, its opponents, and the automobile
One of the RTA's greatest political problems outside the
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city limits was the cross-subsidy issue. Some suburbanites
contrasted the openly resource-redistributing RTA with the
supposedly self-financing highway system, and claimed that if
highway users paid their own way, they saw no reason why transit
users should not do likewise.
The self-sustaining argument, however, fails to stand up to
closer scrutiny. First, the distribution of Illinois gasoline
tax funds, earmarked exclusively for highway purposes,
transferred about 70% of the money raised in Chicago to other
parts of the state--a fact which was known to some participants
in the debate but was not widely publicized by RTA supporters."
Additionally, the allegedly self-financing nature of the
highway system is considerably exaggerated. In the early 1970s,
RTA proponents did not dispute the claim that the road system
paid its own way. Since the late 1980s, however, some
researchers have been challenging this traditional view. A
growing body of literature has been finding that even aside from
the social costs of driving, motorists shift a substantial
portion of the costs of the highway system onto society. States
pay for a variety of road-oriented public works projects from
general revenues. Local governments pay for a wide range of
street improvements, and for the policing of traffic in their
jurisdictions, largely through property taxes. For instance,
Lowe (1994, pp. 34-36) estimates that US motorists in fact pay
for less than two-thirds of the costs of building, maintaining,
" There was one instance of this issue coming up during
negotiations leading to the passage of the Regional Transportation
Authority in 1973:
As Daley explained that Chicago contributes more than$100 million a year in motor fuel taxes and receives only
$30 million in return, [House Speaker W. Robert] Blair
interrupted, "Yeah, I've heard that." But Daley placed
a hand on Blair's arm and said, "But maybe you ought to
hear it again" (Chicago Tribune, September 20, 1973).
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and operating the nation's highways, with the balance being
shifted onto state and local governments. Had researchers
published such conclusions as these by the early 1970s, the
debate might have been more informed. Advocates of conservative
economic policies could hardly oppose a more market-oriented,
cost-transparent approach to highway transportation."
The RTA and potential alternatives
There was no serious political discussion of sustaining
existing carriers without creating the RTA. Yet there were
alternatives to the RTA which were neither discussed in the
Crisis and Solution report nor drafted into legislative bills,
but might have provided more efficient and politically palatable
resolutions to the financial problems of mass transit in
northeastern Illinois.
Why not simply subsidize?
Why did Illinois not simply set up some sort of subsidy
program, and leave the CTA, the commuter railroads, and suburban
bus companies in place without creating an RTA? In the Toronto
area, the provincial government initiated a subsidy program which
left existing operators intact, and simply channeled money to the
transit carriers with no additional level of supervision.
Ontario's transit subsidy policy, articulated in the late
1970s, established target farebox recovery ratios for all transit
operators in the province, based on the population of their
service areas.36 The larger the city, the higher the proportion
35 How much difference this would have made is questionable.
Local governments anxious to secure such tax-producing land uses as
shopping centers might still have been willing to spend tax money
to upgrade roads to attract and accommodate businesses.
36 Ontario's transit policy, like most aspects of provincial
programs, came under severe budgetary stress following the 1995
election of Mike Harris, a premier who placed the elimination of
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of expenses the province expects the operator to meet from the
farebox. Under this policy (which was never enacted into law),
the province committed itself to meeting half of the deficit that
would result from a transit system meeting its fare recovery
target. Local governments became responsible for meeting the
remainder of the shortfall. This shared obligation gave local
officials a strong incentive to keep their transit operators'
finances under control."
For Governor Ogilvie and top administration official George
Ranney, Jr., such a minimal approach was out of the question for
Chicago. In contrast to the implicit confidence which the
government of Ontario placed in the Toronto Transit Commission
and its political master, the Municipality of Metropolitan
Toronto, the Ogilvie administration did not trust the CTA and
Chicago's Democratic machine with what they saw as a blank check.
The vastly different political cultures of Ontario and Illinois
precluded a Toronto solution for Chicago.
In New Jersey, transit subsidies started with partial
payments to commuter railroads in the late 1950s. Over the next
two decades, subsidies were expanded to cover most transit
carriers in the state. In 1979 the state created NJ Transit to
buy out the dominant bus operator, and subsidize others. Those
bus companies which continued to operate on a commercial basis
received state assistance for the purchase of new buses in order
to place commercial operators on a more equitable footing. NJ
Transit took over commuter rail operations in 1983.
the province's deficit at the top of his agenda. This discussion
of Ontario's transit finance focuses on the two decades prior to
the Harris government.
"7 For more about the Ontario "fare share" transit subsidy
program, see Toronto Transit Commission (1984), and.Girdhar (1985).
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Political geography suggests why New Jersey was able to
begin subsidies with less controversy more than a decade before
the RTA was created in Chicago.3" Almost all of New Jersey is
suburban or urban, with only a small share of the population
living outside the commutershed areas of New York City or
Philadelphia. New Jersey's suburbanites live in one of North
America's most densely populated areas, and are acutely aware of
their dependence on existing transportation links. New Jersey's
government is more securely in the hands of that state's suburban
majority than is the case in Illinois, where the suburbs are the
largest element in the political geography, but do not represent
a majority. Also, there is only one large city in Illinois, but
no single city dominates political attention in New Jersey.
Towards a Transit Federation?
One institution which was evolving under the pressures of
the common problems of the region's public transportation
providers was the Transit Carriers Coordinating Committee. The
Coordinating Committee originated with the Chicago Area
Transportation Study (CATS), which provided the group with seed
money and technical support .39 The CTA, which accounted for
about four-fifths of the region's transit ridership and enjoyed
economies of scale and organization, overshadowed the other
participants at times. Nevertheless, it was the first organized
forum for transit operators to articulate their joint interests
and work out their difficulties--and it included transit
38 The author thanks David Young of the Chicago Tribune
(interview, 1992) for his insights on Ontario and New Jersey.
3* Founded in the 1950s to carry out a study of future
transportation needs using computer simulation models, CATS assumed
more permanent functions once the initial study was completed. As
the Metropolitan Planning Organization (designated by the state),
CATS also acted as a clearing house for federal transportation
money for roads and transit alike and was responsible for ensuring
that the various transportation organizations in the public sector
maintained their eligibility for federal funding.
135
providers in Indiana as well as Illinois.
Over time, the transit operators' meetings became more
institutionalized, and their topics came to include planning and
operating issues as well as capital investment. In August 1971
the group changed its name to the Transit Carriers Coordinating
Committee. CATS continued to provide secretarial support, but
the transit providers themselves were increasingly setting their
own agenda.
The Coordinating Committee had not yet accomplished a great
deal by the time the RTA's victory in the March 1974 referendum
rendered it largely superfluous." Nevertheless, it did take
the first step of publishing a "Transit Directory". This small
folder, which the CTA published, contained a map showing the
whereabouts of the various transit operators, large and small,
and listed the telephone numbers at which potential passengers
might contact them for information. This was the first time that
a single publicity item attempted to portray the entire
Chicagoland transit system (including lines in northwestern
Indiana) as a comprehensive, interconnecting whole.
Given sufficient time (and, of course, enough subsidies to
sustain the region's carriers), the Coordinating Committee might
have theoretically taken on additional tasks and evolved into a
federation which would market transit throughout Chicagoland as a
single consumer service with one easily-understood fare
structure.' This happened in San Diego during the 1980s with
40 Not all observers believed that the Coordinating Committee
had promise; RTA proponent George Ranney, Jr. dismissed it as
ineffective (interview, September 1993).
41 Whether such a structure might have included transit
carriers serving northwestern Indiana was questionable; such an
outcome would have depended on the ability of financially troubled
transit operators to seek financial relief from the State of
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the Metropolitan Transportation Development Board, which arranged
full fare integration while preserving the separate identities of
seven operators. But in the Chicago area, downstate and suburban
distrust of the city and the CTA would still have worked against
the subsidies which would have been necessary to make this option
work. Furthermore, any federation would have been seen in some
quarters (rightly or wrongly) as dominated by the CTA.
Suburban Transit Districts
Nor was the Transit Carriers' Coordinating Council the only
alternative approach which was passed up as a result of the RTA
legislation. By 1973, several suburban transit districts were in
existence. One of them had even taken effective control of
transit in its areas before the RTA preempted its functions."
The Illinois General Assembly authorized the creation of
transit districts in the early summer of 1967. In the suburbs,
like-minded communities banded together to form these bodies,
which were empowered to raise money through taxation (although
they rarely did so), enter into agreements with other governments
for the funding of new equipment and other capital improvements,
and contract with private sector railroads for the operation of
the equipment thus acquired."' There were four of these
Indiana (a doubtful undertaking at best), and from local sources.
42 These districts, unlike the RTA, emerged with little
controversy. Under federal law, private transportation companies
could not put up matching funds directly for capital projects which
were partly paid for by the federal government. Instead, the
companies had to funnel the money through local government entities
authorized to receive federal grants. In northeastern Illinois,
this resulted in the suburban mass transit district.
" At the time, the formula for federal capital grants for
mass transit projects was two-thirds federal and one-third local
money. The typical arrangement was that the railroad for which new
equipment was being bought would put up the local match, with no
funding from the suburban transit district, which would simply act
as a conduit for the railroad's money. The transit district would
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districts in different parts of suburban Cook County by the mid-
1970s, each one associated with travel corridors of commuter
railroads." If the transit districts had been subsidized in
the absence of an RTA, the job of stabilizing transit in the
suburbs might well have fallen to them.
But would transit districts have worked?
The North Suburban Mass Transit District (Nortran) was
perhaps the best-known of the transit districts. Nortran served
as a conduit for capital funds for the Milwaukee Road's North
Line, but it was founded in 1972 to preserve the services of the
bankrupt United Motor Coach, which served many northern and
own the cars and locomotives, and lease them to the railroad for a
token amount, such as one dollar annually per car.
" These transit districts were:
A. Chicago South Suburban Mass Transit District, concentrated
along the Illinois Central line to the south.
B. North Suburban Mass Transit District, serving the Cook
County suburbs north of Chicago, from Lake Michigan to a distance
of about 15 miles west of the lake, with a territory including one
Milwaukee Road and two Chicago & North Western rail lines. A few
communities in adjacent portions of Lake County subsequently joined
Nortran during the 1970s.
C. North West Suburban Mass Transit District, focusing on the
"panhandle" area of far west-northwest Cook County served by the
Milwaukee Road.
D. West Suburban Mass Transit District, grouped along the
Burlington Northern line running west-southwest from Chicago. This
was the only transit district in the Chicago area to serve portions
of two counties (Cook and DuPage) from its inception.
In addition to the four districts in suburban Cook County,
there were at least two other districts in the "collar counties."
One was the Greater Lake County Mass Transit District, the only
district of its kind to encompass an entire county, which was
served by one line each of the Milwaukee Road and the Chicago &
North Western. The other was the Joliet Mass Transit District,
which operated a local bus system and showed little interest in the
Rock Island commuter rail line which linked Joliet with Chicago.
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northwestern suburbs. But Nortran was unusually fortunate in
serving some of Chicago's most affluent suburbs, which could
readily afford to acquire, modernize, and even expand a bus
system. Among the Nortran suburbs, only Evanston offered
anything comparable to the social variety found in the city.
The Chicago South Suburban Mass Transit District (CSSMTD)
illustrates some of the limits of the transit district. Made up
of eleven communities along the Illinois Central, CSSMTD's
constituencies shared a common interest in obtaining replacements
for the IC's old cars (which dated from the railroad's
electrification in 1926). CSSMTD's members were linked by
geography, but not much else."
In contrast to the almost uniformly upper-middle class
composition of Nortran's service area, the southern suburbs
offered a potentially more contentious set of agendas. Working-
class suburbs such as Harvey were interested in local bus service
as much as they were in improving the Illinois Central.
Maintaining high-quality rail service to downtown Chicago was at
the top of the agendas in the amenity-oriented upper-middle class
suburbs of Homewood, Flossmoor, and Olympia Fields. Finally,
such postwar suburbs as Park Forest, Matteson, and Richton Park
shared their neighbors' interest in efforts to improve IC
service, but their lower population densities might have led them
to focus more on demand-responsive paratransit service than
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conventional fixed-route bus service.
"5 If anything, the prospects for making the likes of the
CSSMTD into a smoothly-functioning organization have probably
decreased since 1967. Several south suburban communities underwent
racial change during the 1980s, a factor which might hinder any
intergovernmental special district in this area from arriving at
decisions agreeable to most of its constituencies.
"6 The author is indebted to David Young of the Chicago
Tribune (interview, June 1992) for placing the contrast between
Nortran's high-profile track record with CSSMTD's more limited
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The other suburban transit districts may not have been as
varied in their social composition. Nevertheless, comparable
issues of divergent agendas may have prevented them from
following Nortran's activist role. Futhermore, transit districts
were not formed along the C&NW's West Line, where the railroad
had already upgraded service with its own money prior to federal
assistance for transit capital projects, nor along the Rock
Island, where the railroad could not afford the local share for
new cars.
There was another reason why creating the RTA (as opposed to
making it work harmoniously) was the line of least resistance
compared to the suburban transit districts. Creating the RTA
required only a single, concentrated effort in the state
legislature. By contrast, increasing the number, extent, and
scope of suburban transit districts would have required a
multitude of highly diffuse lobbying efforts aimed at dozens of
village boards and their electorates. Although few suburbs
balked at the idea of a district created to help purchase new
commuter rail cars with the railroads' money, there was less
reason to expect different suburbs to join forces to preserve
suburban bus lines, which in the view of many suburbanites were
little more than charity services for those who did not have
access to an automobile.
The lack of alternatives to the RTA
The RTA was not necessarily a better option than the
suburban transit districts or other alternatives, but it was
easier to enact. Government officials may have had a built-in
preference for a single agency which would employ many people and
control the allocation of millions of dollars. Even aside from
this, though, the RTA was easier to bring about in political
activities in the context of the different social geographies of
the two districts.
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terms than a more modest, incremental approach. Making a New
Jersey or Ontario-style subsidy program work presupposed the
continued survival of the carriers it would benefit. Yet the
public sector would still have had to take further action, at
some level or another, if the carriers went bankrupt or otherwise
attempted to force a buyout.
Taken together, Ogilvie's unwillingness to provide operating
aid to all money-losing transit carriers outside the RTA
framework, the late development of the Transit Carriers'
Coordinating Committee, and the reluctance of most suburbs to
take responsibility for both commuter trains and suburban buses
(as Nortran did) effectively foreclosed other options which might
have proven less expensive than the RTA. As in a game of chess,
the moves that the suburbs had made--and even more, the moves
they had not made--now conditioned the outcome.
The RTA, by making transit a regional responsibility, may
have been preferable to direct state subsidies for the CTA. But
this was soon forgotten in the heat of the debate over the RTA.
The suburbs' failure to occupy the institutional terrain of mass
transportation was to leave the field wide open for the city and
Loop business interests to do so. Because there was no coherent
agenda for public transportation in the suburbs, many
suburbanites felt outmaneuvered by the city, whose political and
business leaders were united on the issue of mass transportation,
and knew what they wanted to accomplish.
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CHAPTER 5
THE 1973 LEGISLATIVE BATTLE
Nineteen-seventy-three was the year of decision for mass
transit in Chicago. In a legislative cliffhanger, the Illinois
General Assembly enacted a Regional Transportation Authority,
subject to ratification in a March 1974 referendum throughout the
six counties of northeastern Illinois.
At no point since the Traction Settlement Ordinances of 1907
or the creation of the CTA in 1945 did a legislative decision
have a more long-lasting impact on the future course of transit
institutions. The decisions being made in 1973 were all the more
important, as for the first time in Chicago's transit history,
the suburbs as well as the city were directly involved.
The bleak outlook for transit
The financial picture was not encouraging for the CTA as
1973 began. The new year had hardly opened when a Tribune
article warned that the CTA was "spending more money than it is
taking in... Without an immediate infusion of operating
subsidies ... the CTA is doomed to go broke by fall" (January 4,
1973). Offering readers a preview of the Transportation Task
Force report, the Tribune held out the hope two days later that a
"regional authority would handle the administration, planning,
and financing of all public transportation in the six-county ...
region."
Nor did the CTA make any effort to conceal its impending
cash flow crisis. As George Krambles, the CTA's respected
operating manager, told a downtown business group on January 31,
1973,
Embarrassing as it is to be in a bankrupt status, and
painful as it is to the morale of [CTA's] 12,500
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employees... we are grateful that this is the case,
because it clearly brings to public attention the
dilemma which has once again developed in public
transportation. Are we to have a bus, rapid transit
and suburban railroad network or are we going to opt
for complete dependence on autos?'
The CTA was able to stave off insolvency when the state
enacted yet another temporary bailout. This time, however,
legislative leaders made it clear that they wanted a more lasting
resolution than just another temporary subsidy when this money
ran out.
As if the CTA's problems were not enough, the much-
publicized "transit crisis" was spilling beyond the city limits
into the suburbs. Some of the area's commuter railroads,
particularly the Milwaukee Road, the Illinois Central, and
especially the financially hard-pressed Rock Island, were seeking
higher fares to cover their costs. This led to fears that these
fare increases, if granted, might have the same counterproductive
effect of turning away so many riders that the net result might
be at least as bad as before the higher fares, a prospect that
was widely discussed with reference to the CTA.
During the early 1970s, Chicagoland's suburban bus companies
were increasingly in tight financial straits. Two of them fell
by the wayside, and public authorities rescue their services. In
1972 United Motor Coach, serving the north and northwest suburbs,
went bankrupt. This led to the formation of the North Suburban
Transit District (Nortran), which started subsidizing United
until 1975, when the transit district bought out the bus company.
In Evanston, the first suburb to the north of Chicago, the local
Evanston Motor Coach Company suffered a prolonged strike in 1973.
The drivers went back to work (under conditions more advantageous
to themselves) when the suburb's government subsidized the CTA to
1 Krambles (1973), p. 1.
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take over the local bus line.
Meanwhile in Springfield...
Regional transit dominated the 1973 legislative session.
The RTA consumed the efforts of former Ogilvie administration
official George Ranney, Jr. and CTA chairman Milton Pikarsky, and
was a major priority for Mayor Daley. On the other side of the
issue, a small but dedicated group of suburban legislators fought
against the RTA as best they could. In between was Governor Dan
Walker, whose acquiescence, if not his support, was vital to any
outcome, although he exercised little decisive leadership on the
RTA issue.
For RTA supporters, the prospects of victory were uncertain
until the final vote was taken in a special legislative session
towards the end of the year. George Ranney Jr., Milton Pikarsky,
Mayor Daley, and other pro-RTA forces faced an increasingly
restless group of backbench legislators from the suburbs who,
with the help of many Downstate lawmakers, came close to
defeating the RTA bill.
In addition to the vote in the General Assembly, the RTA's
proponents were looking over their shoulders at the region's
voters. Governor Walker and some legislators had insisted on a
referendum, so that even if the legislature enacted the RTA,
suburban voters might still stop it.
The Walker administration
Governor Dan Walker, who lasted only one term in office, has
been described as the first governor of Illinois who was able to
use television to his advantage. Yet the highly telegenic Walker
seems to have been more style than substance. In contrast to his
outgoing predecessor Richard Ogilvie, Dan Walker was not a known
quantity. He had brought himself to the attention of the state
(and, indeed, the entire US) as the author of the Walker report
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on the civil disturbances surrounding the 1968 Democratic
National Convention. 2 His gubernatorial campaign, which
involved such publicity-attracting actions as walking the length
of Illinois, was characterized more by populist rhetoric than by
specific policy proposals.
In retrospect, Walker's election appears to have been a
fluke, made possible in large part by the state income tax
implemented under the Ogilvie administration. Walker tapped
voter resentment against Ogilvie's income tax, but he had few
ideas as to how the state might do away with the tax, which he
let stand once he was in office.
Walker also ran against the Daley machine, capitalizing on
his role as author of the definitive report on the 1968
Democratic convention violence. At one point during the
campaign, he charged that the mayor sought to install "Richard
Daley Junior" as president of the Illinois Senate. 3 Walker's
hostility to the machine may have helped him get elected, but it
hurt him once he became governor, as his anti-machine politics
prevented him from entering into the sorts of pragmatic
negotiations needed to put political deals together.
As governor, Walker followed the shifting winds of public
opinion almost as accurately as a weathervane. Yet if Walker
avoided giving offense, he also failed to build a strong base of
support for himself. For Walker, reaching office was to be much
2 Daniel Walker et al. 1968. Rights in Conflict. New York:
E.P. Dutton & Company.
3 This was apparently a reference to the mayor's eldest son,
Richard M. Daley, who was elected to the state senate in 1972;
there is no such person as Richard J. Daley, Jr. After serving in
the Senate, Richard M. Daley was Cook County State's Attorney from
1980 until 1989, when he followed his father to become mayor of
Chicago.
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easier than retaining it, as the one-term governor was to learn
the hard way in the 1976 primary. He was defeated in his bid for
reelection when an ally of Mayor Daley won the Democratic
nomination.
The Ogilvie and Walker styles
Ogilvie's administration was relatively low-key in public
relations terms, yet for better or worse he and his officials
could point to a number of milestones in many areas of state
government. Illinoisans best remember the Ogilvie administration
for a new constitution and a state income tax, but Ogilvie also
balanced numerous demands for action on a variety of issues with
good grace. If he was not particularly skilled at making
friends, neither did he make political enemies.
Walker, by contrast, was given to public posturing, which
may have limited the effectiveness of his administration behind
closed doors. Television helped put Walker into the governor's
mansion, but it did not help him stay there. Legislative leaders
and Chicago mayors were more accustomed to doing business behind
the scenes than through press conferences. For all of Walker's
self-conscious posing for the news cameras, he seemed to have
fewer principles than Ogilvie, and it is hard to point to any
major accomplishment for which his administration could take
credit. Although the RTA was enacted while Walker was governor,
he did not make it a major concern. There were few other
conspicuous changes in the state's political landscape which
happened while he was in power.
Transportation Study Committee co-chairmen George Ranney,
Jr. and Milton Pikarsky found themselves working with Walker as
well as with Daley and the State House leadership. Although
Ranney did not think very highly of Governor Walker as a
politician, this did not translate into a poor working
relationship. On the contrary, as Ranney recalls,
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He [Walker] asked me to be his secretary of
transportation, not once but five different times. He
asked me to do three or four other things for him. I
knew him quite well, and we spent a lot of time on the
weekend of Thanksgiving of 1973.' We were able to
work together.-
Nor was Walker's request to Ranney an exceptional instance.
"Although Walker tried to retain many Ogilvie men for his
administration, most left."6 In addition to the partisan change
of administration (accentuated by the fact that Walker had used
resentment of Ogilvie's income tax to help propel himself into
office), Walker's erratic style of management may have further
encouraged the exodus of Ogilvie officials.
Former state representative Eugene Schlickman, an opponent
of the RTA bill, assessed Walker in terms which were not exactly
positive. Schlickman noted, rather diplomatically, that "there
was no depth of thought and programming within the Walker
administration" with regard to metropolitan transportation.'
Walker's ambition did not stop with the governor's mansion.
He was widely viewed as using Illinois as a springboard for a
presidential bid in 1976. The populist niche he sought to
occupy, however, was taken by Jimmy Carter of Georgia (who was a
US Naval Academy classmate of Walker). To some degree this
reflects Carter's superior ability to obtain positive coverage
* This was a particularly busy time for those involved in
drafting and ensuring the enactment of the RTA legislation. The
bill was passed and signed into law before the end of December.
5 Interview, September 1993.
6 Sudnik (1977), p. 54.
Interview, September 1993. Schlickman might have well made
the same statement about the entire Walker administration, which
was rarely noted for the consistency or coherence of its policy
initiatives.
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from the news media, but Walker's failure to provide decisive
leadership and build up a strong following in Illinois appears to
have been a more important factor in the brevity of his political
career."
Mayor Daley's conversion to the RTA
Until the 1973 legislative session, Mayor Daley had been at
best cool towards proposals for regional transit, preferring
instead to seek funds from Springfield to cover the CTA's deficit
as the previous emergency bailout appropriations ran dry. But in
early 1973 the mayor made a quiet 180-degree turn on the RTA
issue, coming out in favor of regional transit and negotiating
hard with other political actors in favor of the RTA.
Clark Burrus, who was acting city comptroller at the time
(he would be appointed as permanent city comptroller in 1974)
recalled the mayor's conversion to the RTA cause in terms of
dollars, cents, and practical politics:
One of the reasons that changed the mayor's mind
is that when he looked at the flow of funds, and I did
this for him, by the way, there was no way that the CTA
could survive with the funding and financing scheme
that existed prior to the RTA. The reason why he
changed his mind and went over to support the RTA (...)
was that the RTA was to be the conduit for getting the
money from where it was to where it was needed. And
that was the only reason that he had to make some
concessions in terms of sharing control with the
suburbs. ... There was no way you could get it [subsidy
money for the CTA] any other way.'
8 Walker, interviewed in Rakove (1979), claims that Daley
offered him the 1976 Democratic presidential nomination in return
for the governor's support of the Crosstown Expressway, one of
Mayor Daley's pet projects. Walker declined the offer. Few
observers of Chicago politics would deny the implication that the
1976 Democratic presidential nomination was at least partly within
Mayor Daley's power to give.
* Interview with CTA chairman Clark Burrus, October 1995. At
the time Mr. Burrus showed the mayor his projections, he was the
city's acting comptroller. In January 1974, the mayor appointed
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George Ranney concurs with this analysis, arguing that the
Ogilvie administration
didn't trust the city to raise and spend that sum of
money, and they were right. This was an effort on the
suburban Republican leadership's side to avoid what had
happened in the Chicago schools and such."* The
theory here was that there would be controls, and
particularly fiscal controls imposed, that would make
the CTA more efficient without necessarily trying to
run it, but also fund it in concert with its needs."
Donald Totten, a Republican state representative from the
suburbs and an RTA opponent, agreed with Ranney's analysis:
The issue of the creation of a regional transportation
[authority] came because the [General] Assembly was not
able to reconcile a subsidy to the CTA. Suburban
interests were saying, "We're just throwing money down
a rathole here," and the subsidy kept getting bigger
because of the financial problems of the CTA. It
became apparent that in the interests of Chicago,
him to that position on a permanent basis (thus making him the
highest-ranking black official in the Daley administration), a
position he held until he stepped down in 1979 to take a position
in the private sector. Mr. Burrus continued his involvement in
transit issues, however. In 1983-84 he was a member of the RTA
Transition Board as an appointee of House Speaker Michael Madigan,
and was CTA chairman from 1988 until his retirement in October
1993.
10 Ranney was referring to financial problems at the Chicago
Board of Education. As Fuchs explains (1992, p. 258),
Initially Daley kept an informal role in [Chicago
teachers' union] contract negotiations and lobbied
Springfield for the funds to meet teacher wage demands.
However, after a teachers' strike in 1969, Daley decided
to limit his role in closing the budget gaps that
resulted from generous contract settlements. Once
collective bargaining rights had been achieved, the
school board had little political capacity to deal with
a strong union that repeatedly went on strike (1971,
1973, and 1975) to increase its members' salaries and
benefits.
11 Interview, September 1993.
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something else had to be done."
Eugene Schlickman, another suburban Republican state
representative who fought against the RTA, argued that
there would not be regional transportation in the
Chicago metropolitan area if it was not for a
Republican governor and a Republican-led legislature.
[Dan] Walker [a Democrat who was elected governor in
1972] wouldn't have done it.
Schlickman argued that Ogilvie's principles played an
important role:
I don't think it was a matter of his [Ogilvie's] being
tired of Chicago's constantly seeking further aid for
the CTA. I think it was a conviction on Ogilvie's part
that sooner or later [there was a need for] a unified,
integrated [mass] transportation system for the Chicago
metropolitan area."
Ogilvie, Ranney, and other Republicans were adamant: no more
subsidies without some regional oversight. Yet this alone might
not have changed the mayor's mind on the RTA. By trading support
for bills dear to the hearts of suburban and downstate lawmakers,
Mayor Daley might have obtained financial support for the CTA, at
least for a few more legislative sessions. But the election of
Dan Walker as governor introduced a new element of political risk
which the mayor could not afford.
Mayor Daley could always deal with Republicans on a
pragmatic basis, as their opposition to specific measures would
usually bend if enough of them were offered various political
inducements. However, reform Democrats such as Walker were
opposed to Mayor Daley's machine on an ideological basis. Thus,
12 Interview, Donald Totten, September 1993.
13 Interview, September 1993. Schlickman's interpretation is
consistent with Ogilvie's readiness to implement a state income tax
which he believed was needed, even though doing so brought his own
political career to an end.
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the mayor could not rely on being able to negotiate a
straightforward political deal with Walker, in which favors were
exchanged for votes. If Governor Walker wanted to raise the
stakes in his on-again, off-again hostilities against the Chicago
machine, he could use his line-item or amendatory veto powers to
hold transit subsidies hostage, and it would require a three-
fifths majority to override the governor's veto. At least with
the RTA, transit subsidies would be protected against the whims
of a governor whose dislike of Mayor Daley was well known. At
any rate, by March of 1973 the mayor had come out in favor of
regional transit and placed his political clout where his mouth
was.
The Transportation Study Committee
The mechanism for establishing the RTA was the Illinois
Transportation Study Committee. Ostensibly a creature of the
Illinois General Assembly, in practice it functioned as a
combined high-level political forum for top leaders of both
parties who favored the RTA, and an interest group seeking to
influence rank and file legislators. The Committee had two co-
chairmen, one Democratic and the other Republican. These co-
chairs were ostensibly chosen by the legislative leadership. In
practice, however, Pikarsky and Ranney were the hand-picked
choices of Mayor Daley and outgoing Governor Ogilvie, both
Chicagoans who shared an interest in the economic well-being of
the downtown area and agreed on the desirability of the RTA.
Mayor Daley's choice for Democratic co-chairman of the
Illinois Transportation Study Committee was CTA chairman Milton
Pikarsky. The choice was Daley's, not Walker's. Few Democrats
(Governor Walker included) were in a position to challenge Daley
on an issue like this of obvious importance to the city.
Pikarsky was widely seen in suburban circles as an agent of Mayor
Daley, a charge Pikarsky himself did little to dispel, although
he was above all a transportation professional who was loyal to
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the mayor who appointed him.
Pikarsky, who died in 1988, was a complex figure who often
elicited strong admiration or an equally intensive dislike among
those whom he met. He was by all accounts a capable
administrator whose rise in the Chicago government hierarchy
verified Mayor Daley's reputation for selecting highly qualified
managers to run the city's public services. Nevertheless, some
remember Pikarsky as lacking the political skills which might
have helped him get along with those who did not share his
perspective. He may well have found himself out of his depth in
the highly political RTA chairmanship from early 1975 until the
suburban board members forced his resignation in mid-1978.
On the Republican side, Governor Ogilvie (who was leaving
office) chose his cabinet member, aide, and chairman of the
Transportation Task Force, George A. Ranney, Jr. as Republican
co-chairman of the Transportation Study Committee. As with
Ranney's Democratic counterpart Milton Pikarsky, Ranney spoke for
the most powerful figure among the state's Republicans at the
time. It would be a few more years before James Thompson became
the dominant figure among the state's Republicans."
As Republican co-chairman of the Illinois Transportation
Study Committee, Ranney enjoyed a good working relationship with
his Democratic counterpart, CTA chairman Milton Pikarsky.
Ranney's legal training enabled him to translate political
bargains into legislative language. During the 1973 legislative
session, when time was often of the essence due to the fluid
political situation, this was an ability that served Ranney and
14 Following Ogilvie's defeat in 1972, House Speaker H. Robert
Blair (R, Park Forest) had gubernatorial ambitions which he did not
attempt to disguise. His failure to secure reelection in 1974 in
the wake of the RTA referendum, however, put an end to his
political career, and cleared the way for Thompson to emerge.
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the pro-RTA forces well.
The 1973 Session
The 1973 legislative session saw passage of the Regional
Transportation Agency in a special session at the end of the
year. During the year, the RTA went through several legislative
metamorphoses, and was the subject of convoluted negotiations and
countless proposed amendments. The RTA stimulated much debate,
inside the State House, in smoke-filled rooms, in front of
television cameras, and elsewhere.
The dramatis personae of the 1973 legislative session
included such political actors as Ranney, Pikarsky, and Mayor
Daley, who were not members of the Illinois General Assembly but
nevertheless carried considerable weight with legislators and
with Governor Walker. At times, the mayor and his allies seemed
to overshadow the established House and Senate leadership. On
the other hand, a group of suburban legislators unhappy with
their leaders' pro-RTA positions coalesced into a countervailing
force in both houses.
The established legislative leaders in both houses and on
both sides of the aisle were in favor of the RTA. One of the
more conspicuously self-interested actors during the 1973
legislative session was House Speaker W. Robert Blair, a
Republican from south suburban Park Forest. The defeat of
incumbent Republican governor Richard Ogilvie in November 1972
had created a power vacuum within the party, and Blair made
little effort to conceal his ambition to become the next governor
of Illinois.
However much Blair might have appealed to a broader
statewide constituency, he made several enemies among rank-and-
file lawmakers from his own party. He seems to have viewed
himself as a political power broker with the ability to deliver
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legislative votes on a wholesale basis like Mayor Daley. But the
mayor had a large, comprehensive organization which offered
rewards to its supporters, while Blair had little more than the
sometimes-intimidating force of his own personality to back him
up.
Blair's counterpart in the Senate, William C. Harris,a
Republican from downstate Pontiac, was more content with his
existing position and played a less conspicuous part in the
proceedings. Democratic House minority leader Clyde Choate (from
downstate Anna) and Senate minority leader Cecil Partee (a long-
standing and well-respected black lawmaker from Chicago) were
overshadowed in their roles by Daley and Walker.
Blair's efforts to push the RTA legislation through an often
recalcitrant House were widely seen as a prelude to the 1976
gubernatorial campaign. In his attempts to force the RTA bill
and others through the House, however, many of his fellow
Republicans resented what they saw as his domineering style.
Many backbench legislators doubtless breathed sighs of relief
when Blair went down to defeat in the November 1974 legislative
elections, thus ending his political career.
The Senate majority leader, Republican William Harris from
downstate Pontiac, had little direct stake in the outcome, but
nevertheless threw his weight behind the RTA legislation. In the
best Illinois tradition of mutually beneficial compromises, Mayor
Daley may well have had the foresight to instruct state
legislators loyal to the Chicago Democratic machine to cooperate
with Harris on matters of vital interest to him.
The shifting issues
The 1973 legislative session brought up many issues and
concerns which Ranney's Crisis and Solution report did not
anticipate. The issues which lawmakers debated were not ones of
155
administrative tools and financial needs. Instead, the most
articulate of them spoke eloquently of a power grab by urban
interests and the dangers of entrusting a large, faceless
bureaucracy with large budgets.
For such Republican advocates of the RTA as Ranney, it was a
total shift of the terms of debate. After considerable effort,
they had convinced Mayor Daley that he could no longer have the
unconstrained subsidies he sought, and that the Republican
leadership would require some measure of budgetary oversight in
the form of a regional agency in return for continued subsidies.
Now, suburban legislators (mostly but not exclusively
Republicans) were acting independently of such establishment
figures as Ogilvie and Ranney. These backbench lawmakers opposed
the RTA on the grounds that it was too generous to the city and
the CTA, and denied that the RTA could be trusted to do the job
for which it was being created. Ironically, suburban opponents
were fighting the RTA with the same arguments which Ranney used
in favor of the RTA, by warning against giving more power and
money to an agency which could not be trusted to manage itself
well.
Mutiny in the Suburbs
A group of suburban legislators emerged as leading figures
in opposition to the RTA during the 1973 legislative session.
Once the RTA bill was enacted, they campaigned actively for a
"no" vote in the March 1974 referendum, against the established
leadership of both parties.
One of the most articulate opponents was Representative Cal
Skinner, Jr. (R., Crystal Lake). Most of his constituents in
semi-rural McHenry County were opposed to the RTA, or more
specifically, to an RTA which included their areas. Skinner had
a genius for placing his views in the news media using such low-
budget techniques as legislative news conferences and letters to
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the editor. Putting his views across in clear, concise language
and marshalling his thoughts logically, he defended his core
constituents' legitimate wishes to be left alone by a big city
which few of them depended upon for their livelihoods.
Skinner's views on the RTA and other issues of the day
suggested a greater sympathy with libertarians who believed in a
minimum of any kind of government activity than with the more
dominant currents of thought among Illinois Republicans. Unlike
some of his colleagues who were willing to make compromises with
actors based in Chicago's Loop, Skinner was fiercely loyal to the
interests of his constituents as he saw them.
More typical opponents included such figures as
Representative Donald Totten (R, Hoffman Estates), who hosted
many of the kNOw RTA Committee's strategy sessions. Totten was
the Republican committeeman in Schaumburg Township, located in
the northwest suburban "panhandle" area of Cook County.
Minimally served by commuter rail, Schaumburg was home to
Woodfield Mall, the largest of its kind in the state, and much of
the area was physically laid out in a way that all but precluded
alternatives to the automobile. Some suburban legislators
representing large numbers of Chicago-bound railroad commuters
supported the RTA, but the parking lot culture which prevailed in
Totten's district ensured that he had little to lose by going
against downtown interests.
Other figures in the anti-RTA coalition included
Representatives Donald Deuster," George Sangmeister (who was a
". Eugene Schlickman had this to say about Mr. Deuster
(interview, September 1993):
Don had been an administrative assistant to a
congressman in Washington, DC... He also had worked for
the US Department of Transportation. So when Don came to
Springfield, he was very much for the regionalization of
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congressman by the early 1990s), Giddy Dyer, and Adeline Geo-
Karis. All of these lawmakers marshalled clear arguments
forcefully during the debates and later in the referendum
campaign. Sangmeister was the only Democrat from the suburbs to
join the anti-RTA forces. His presence doubtless gave the
coalition additional credibility, if only by helping to exclude
partisan issues from the debate. The RTA's opponents were
careful to make it clear that they were representing geographic
rather than partisan interests.
Good Government and Minimal Government
One of the more interesting, if less typical figures opposed
to the RTA, was Representative Eugene Schlickman (R., Arlington
Heights). Like Cal Skinner, he was outside the mainstream of the
anti-RTA forces, but from another standpoint. If Skinner
attacked the RTA from a perspective approaching that of a
minimal-government libertarian, Schlickman argued that good-
government reformers in the early 20th century Progressive
tradition could also oppose the RTA.
Among Schlickman's committee assignments was the Legislative
Advisory Committee to the Northeastern Illinois Planning
Commission, which he chaired until House Speaker W. Robert Blair
transportation. But he didn't approve of the
manipulation and the corruption of the measure over which
Blair presided. Now, when it came down to the eve of the
vote, Don said "Gene, my position all along is that there
has to be a regional transportation system. And as far
as I'm concerned, this is it. I'm going to have to vote
for it."
I talked him out of voting for it. I said, "You're
giving up principle". He finally voted against [the
RTA]. Later on, he said, "You know, if I had voted for
it, I wouldn't have been reelected".
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took Schlickman's chairmanship away from him." Schlickman
supported the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission (NIPC) in
its rivalry with the more technocratic Chicago Area
Transportation Study (CATS).
NIPC articulated traditional reform, good-government
arguments for cooperative regional planning (with little
success). CATS, by contrast, was a more technically-oriented
agency which gave both city and suburban governments what they
wanted, without offering normative views on what they should
want. It was no surprise, then, that CATS rather than NIPC was
the officially-designated Metropolitan Planning Organization,
serving as a clearing house for federal transportation money to
the region. NIPC and its supporters argued that NIPC was better
qualified to carry out the functions of the Metropolitan Planning
Organization, but there was little legislative support for their
position. Schlickman was fighting an uphill battle for NIPC,
which apparently was at least as high a priority for him as the
struggle against the RTA. Schlickman explained that proponents
of the RTA
would have gotten my vote, if necessary for passage, by
including a provision that long-range transportation
planning should be consistent with the Comprehensive
General Plan of the region as developed by NIPC."
Schlickman's position on NIPC was almost completely at odds
with that of his anti-RTA ally Cal Skinner, Jr. To Skinner, NIPC
was part and parcel of the same unwanted intrusion of government
as the RTA. As early as 1958, NIPC had earned Skinner's enmity
" This was in retaliation for Schlickman's having opposed
Blair for the House Speaker's office (Eugene Schlickman, interview
with the author, September 1993).
17 Interview, September 1993. Schlickman went on to add that
nothing of the sort happened (nor would have been likely to happen,
given the enmity between himself and Republican House Speaker
Blair).
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by arbitrarily including McHenry County (where Skinner's district
was located) in its definition of the Chicago metropolitan area
without consulting local officials. The presence of such
contrasting figures as Skinner and Schlickman suggests the
variety of political opinions among suburban opponents of the
RTA. The RTA battle produced alliances which made little
ideological sense but could be explained readily in terms of
geographic and economic self-interest.
The gas tax: hated in the suburbs even before it was enacted
A major source of suburban resentment from the outset was
the power given to the RTA to enact a 5% gasoline tax throughout
the six-county region by a three-fifths vote of its board.
Understandably, many suburbanites who relied on their automobiles
saw this as a blatant move by the city to take money away from
them and give it to CTA employees and riders. The CTA and the
commuter railroads were primarily oriented towards Loop-bound
travel, but most suburbanites drove from one suburb to another.
Thus, the suburban majority did not see themselves as benefiting
even indirectly by subsidizing transit. To their sensibilities,
the RTA's gas tax power was nothing short of outrageous.
There was in fact a strong rationale for funding the RTA
from gasoline taxes, but it was one which pro-RTA forces rarely
voiced, even among themselves. Motorists in Chicago paid the
same gas taxes as they did elsewhere in the state, but the
overwhelming majority--about four-fifths--of the gas tax funds
raised in Chicago were spent elsewhere. If there was an
injustice in an RTA gas tax imposed on the city and suburbs, it
was that only the suburbs would join the city in subsidizing the
CTA. To properly compensate for decades of massive city
subsidies to the downstate road system, it could be argued that
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downstate motorists should help subsidize transit in Chicago."
But Mayor Daley and other supporters of the RTA may not have
dared to articulate such an argument, because they needed all the
votes they could secure from suburban and downstate lawmakers in
the General Assembly to help pass the RTA bill.
It was ironic that many downstate legislators were opposed
to the RTA, as they were less vocal than suburban opponents were
on the State House floor. Paradoxically, downstate Illinois had
more to gain than the suburbs from the RTA. One of the
fundamental principles which the RTA established was that transit
in Chicagoland was a problem to be resolved within the
metropolitan area. This meant that except for small subsidies
from the state, almost all of the costs of building, upgrading,
and running transit would come from taxpayers within the six
counties of northeastern Illinois.
No longer would the CTA be coming to Springfield, hat in
hand, begging for another half-year or year's worth of operating
funds. Instead, downstaters would henceforth enjoy almost
complete freedom from subsidizing transit in Chicago and the
suburbs. Had downstate legislators only recognized this freedom
for what it was, they might have been among the RTA's strongest
supporters, rather than voting against it. Their opposition,
however irrational when analyzed at close range, was nonetheless
fundamentally sound in terms of the historical contours of
Illinois politics. The suburbs had only recently become a
significant political force independent of both the city and
downstate, and many downstaters were still accustomed to
18 Downstate residents, on the other hand, might argue that
there was nothing wrong having Chicagoans cross-subsidize their
highways, since Chicago draws much of its prosperity comes from its
large agricultural hinterland. In this logic, inadequate roads
downstate would make it more difficult for farmers to bring their
products to the market, and the resulting decrease in their buying
power would hurt businesses in Chicago.
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analyzing state politics in terms of "them" versus "us". If
Mayor Daley supported a measure such as the RTA, many downstaters
may have intuited that it could only be bad news for them. Thus,
downstate opposition to the RTA makes sense as a reflexive
instinct, rather than as a carefully-considered evaluation of
their long-term interests.
Other funding sources
Much of the negotiations surrounding the RTA revolved around
how much money would come from which sources; in other words, the
raw materials from which all legislative bargains are molded. In
addition to the gasoline tax, other readily available funding
sources included city, county, and state subsidies, a parking
tax, and a toll road tax. The details of each successive
proposal and counter-proposal are not vital to the story of what
happened, but the negotiations did allow city, suburban, and
downstate politicians on both sides of the aisle to seek maximum
benefits for themselves and their constituents.
The politics of transit became further embroiled in the
issue of a state lottery. As a reform Democrat running on a
populist platform, Walker was caught in a bind. On the one hand,
he had run against the state income tax enacted under the Ogilvie
administration. On the other hand, Walker had made campaign
promises and raised expectations which could not be satisfied
unless the state continued to spend large amounts of money. The
lottery was considered as a possible funding source for the RTA,
but was not included in the final funding arrangements, possibly
because it was also controversial and its enactment was
uncertain.
The negotiations
The RTA was the result of tenuous agreements reached through
nine long months of often frustrating negotiations. There were
multiple shifts of support and opposition involving Mayor Daley,
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Governor Walker, Democratic and Republican legislators who
supported the RTA under varying conditions, and a non-party (but
mostly Republican) bloc of suburban lawmakers who fought their
own party's leadership to oppose the RTA.
The business of political deal-making started in earnest
when Mayor Daley publicly came out for the RTA.1 9 Daley made a
major concession in coming aboard the RTA. For the first time,
the mayor gave his blessing to a set of arrangements which would
give the suburbs a major say in the provision of a city-oriented
public service. Mayor Daley put his previous opposition to
regional transit behind him, and was the first witness to testify
in favor of the RTA for the Transportation Study Committee.20
If the mayor was cooperative as to the overall concept of
the RTA, there were limits to his willingness to compromise.
Ranney and Republican legislative leaders seem to have backed
down on the issue of a Suburban Transportation Corporation, which
had been proposed as a suburban counterpart to the CTA. In a set
of handwritten notes from a meeting, Ranney records the mayor's
outright rejection of a Suburban Transportation Corporation.2'
As Ranney recalled, the mayor
had an interest in what was going on throughout the
state and the six county region. I don't have any
problem with that. My recollection is that he was
opposed to that, and adamantly. And I think the
reasoning was that they were concerned about
competition with the CTA (interview, September 1993).
"9 Chicago Tribune, March 30, 1973. As recently as the
January 31, 1973 Sun-Times, the mayor had been quoted as opposing
a single authority which would operate transit throughout the
region. Although the RTA was not intended to operate transit on a
regional basis, Daley's previous opposition to the RTA can be
inferred from his January statement.
20 Chicago Tribune, April 3, 1973.
21 George A. Ranney, Jr. RTA papers, University of Chicago
Department of Special Collections, Regenstein Library.
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Daley's rejection of a suburban equivalent of the CTA may
not have made much difference with RTA opponents such as
Representative Donald Totten, who noted that:
It [the Suburban Transportation Corporation] was a
matter that maybe concerned a few legislators. If you
look at the legislative history of this thing, there
were hundreds of amendments. [...] I don't think that
detail would have made much difference. It would have
been a hard sell convincing them that [the Suburban
Transportation Corporation] would be much good for the
suburbs."
By April, an RTA bill sponsored by House Speaker Blair had
crowded the CMATS proposal, favored by the commuter railroads,
off the legislative agenda. Later that month, Governor Walker
proposed that the RTA be put before the voters in a referendum.
Daley and Ranney were not enthusiastic about a referendum, but
since Walker's veto could derail any RTA bill, they had little
choice but to go along.
The plot thickened in May as Walker and Blair agreed that
there should not be operating subsidies from the state."
Shortly thereafter, six legislators from both parties and both
sides of the city line set forth their agenda for an authority to
be set up without a referendum and with the power to enact a
gasoline tax."'
Next, the politics of transit became caught up in the
volatile issue of tax relief--a campaign promise to which
Governor Walker devoted more rhetoric than action. Blair
proposed a MC reduction in the sales tax for downstate, while
22 Interview, September 1993.
23 Chicago Daily News, May 5-6, 1973.
24 Chicago Sun-Times, May 11, 1973. Within a few months, for
various reasons, two of the suburban lawmakers would be active RTA
opponents.
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holding the sales tax constant in the six northeastern counties
and earmarking the MC amount for transit subsidies." This
proposal passed the Transportation Study Committee's vote."
But then when Blair presented his bill to the House, the RTA
relied on sales and parking taxes, and proceeds from a not-yet-
existing state lottery."
A deal that wasn't
Ranney and legislative leaders thought they had a deal which
the General Assembly would pass in June of 1973 before adjourning
for the summer at the end of the month. But the carefully-
crafted agreement fell apart at the last minute, just before the
legislature adjourned its regular session at the end of June."
Machine Democrats tried to revive the package, but to no avail.
The Transportation Study Committee apparently sought to use
a carrot-and-stick approach with the governor in late June. A
memorandum remarkable for its candor spells out a strategy to be
used on Governor Walker in the waning days of the spring
legislative session.2" The governor, the memo said, should be
pressured to exert his influence on behalf of the compromise
package. If the package passed, Walker should be allowed to take
all the credit; but if the compromise collapsed, Walker should be
25 Chicago Today, May 18, 1973.
26 Chicago Tribune, May 23, 1973.
27 Chicago Sun-Times, May 23, 1973.
28 According to the July 1, 1973 Sun-Times, "negotiators had
come within an eyelash of reaching agreement on an RTA package, but
they said it blew up because of what they called a personal attack
on [House Speaker] Blair by Gov. Walker." For a more detailed
analysis of events leading up to the deal's collapse, see the July
5, 1973 Sun-Times.
29 George A. Ranney, Jr. RTA papers, University of Chicago
Department of Special Collections, Regenstein Library.
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given the blame. Perhaps mercifully, the memorandum was not
signed, but it appears to have emanated from the highest levels
of the Transportation Study Committee. Certainly Ranney,
Pikarsky, Ogilvie, Blair, and Daley all had ample reasons for
applying pressure on Governor Walker.
Rerailing the RTA
With the CTA on the verge of budgetary collapse and the
suburban carriers growing restless in anticipation of subsidies,
RTA proponents had the force of urgency on their side. Joseph
Tecson, an RTA board member from suburban Cook County at the
time, argues that
there would never have been an RTA except for the
financial crunches which were so carefully calculated
to take place in the summer of 1973. This calculation
was done by legislative leaders. The General Assembly
in 1973 was delicately balanced. There was only a one-
vote [Republican] margin in each chamber. This balance
induced negotiation and compromise. The governor, the
mayor of Chicago and the legislature all had to give a
little (1975 a, p. 335).
If Tecson's analysis is correct, it was a very shrewd move on the
part of RTA proponents. Certainly the unsigned memorandum of
late June calling for the careful orchestration of Governor
Walker speaks for this view.
In July, Mayor Daley reached an understanding on the RTA
with House Speaker Blair and Senate President William Harris at a
summit meeting at which the governor was conspicuously absent.3 *
The commuter railroads turned up the heat on the legislature by
threatening fare hikes and service cutbacks if the RTA was not
passed." Then in September the governor threw a monkey wrench
into the delicate negotiation process by using his amendatory
30 Chicago Daily News, July 20, 1973.
31 Chicago Daily News, August 9, 1973.
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veto to substitute his own tax relief plan for Blair's funding
package with an RTA-dedicated sales tax. The politics of
recrimination dragged on as Blair blamed the governor for the
legislative doldrums besetting the RTA, and warned that the
legislature would have to postpone consideration of the RTA until
early next year.
Meanwhile, an initial meeting between Daley and Walker, the
first of its kind on the transit issue, produced no agreement."
But then less than two weeks later, the two men announced they
had agreed on a compromise to use motor vehicle license fees to
help fund the RTA."' Walker may have felt the force of Daley's
legendary clout when he called a special legislative session in
October to vote on the RTA, the lottery, and other matters.34
The usual squabbling ensued, focusing largely on the rivalry
between Governor Walker and House Speaker Blair, who made no
secret of wanting Walker's job. On the other hand, factional
disputes among the Democrats receded somewhat as Walker and Daley
put aside enough of their differences to work together on
cultivating the support of downstate Democrats.
The Republican legislative leaders moved closer to Walker on
one issue in October, when they endorsed a referendum (which they
had previously opposed) . The governor, who had called for a
referendum back in April, promptly reversed himself and came out
against the referendum which Blair had just embraced." Blair,
32 Chicago Daily News, September 19, 1973.
" Chicago Tribune, September 27, 1973.
" Chicago Sun-Times, October 13, 1973.
" Chicago Daily News, October 23, 1973.
" Chicago Sun-Times, October 24, 1973. It was precisely this
sort of unreliable non-leadership which helped undermine Walker's
efforts to build a base of political support in furtherance of his
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not to be outdone in the one-upmanship derby, introduced a
revised proposal aimed at
tearing asunder Gov. Walker's alliance with Mayor
Daley. (...) Blair reasons that the Walker-Daley RTA
alliance is transitory and based on the mayor's
extraction of political concessions from Walker... The
speaker [i.e., Blair] is convinced that if Walker can
be denied the scattering of Republican votes he needs
to win passage of his RTA plan, Daley will be forced to
... throw his support to Blair in order to obtain an
RTA solution (Chicago Sun-Times, October 25, 1973).
Blair's job was not becoming any easier as several backbench
Republicans in the kNOw RTA group who were opposed to the
regional authority made their voices heard in legislative debates
and in the news media. However, downtown business groups
enlisted their allies in favor of the RTA, Walker gave way,
Blair's plan prevailed, and Mayor Daley (presumably aligned with
the governor, at least for the moment) tried to keep out of the
Blair-Walker feud."
The rival Blair and Walker proposals collided head-on in
November. Both plans came up for a vote in the State House
(Walker's in the House, Blair's in the Senate), and both went
down to defeat.3" Over the next few days, newspaper articles
carried obituaries for both plans.
The kitchen table compromise
Just as it seemed that legislative action on the RTA would
wait until the spring of 1974, "Gov. Walker and party leaders of
both houses agreed to negotiate ... after admitting that
political career.
" Chicago Tribune and Daily News, November 11, 1973.
38 Chicago Tribune, November 16 and November 17, 1973.
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confrontation politics ... had produced nothing"". Within less
than a week, Walker and legislative leaders had worked out a deal
which they felt they could sell to the bulk of their rank and
file."'
As lawmakers adjourned for the Thanksgiving holiday, Ranney,
Pikarsky, and other top officials worked hard to draft the
compromise in legal language. Much of the actual drafting and
redrafting of the RTA bill took place at George Ranney, Jr.'s
home in Hyde Park, around the kitchen table. Ranney spent the
long weekend with Milton Pikarsky and other leaders, rendering
ideas into legal form, to a large degree without direct input
from the leadership of either party. As Ranney explained, the
RTA bill was "a complicated piece of legislation. A lot of it
was worked out in this kitchen. Something that complicated, you
don't negotiate every deal among the legislators.""
One interesting sidelight to the negotiations was Ranney's
effort to put taxi service under the RTA's jurisdiction. The
Ranney papers at the University of Chicago contain several
articles about taxi service, including pieces criticizing the
Yellow Cab-Checker Cab oligopoly, which prior to changes made
during the late 1980s controlled 80% of the city's licensed taxis
under an informal arrangement with City Hall. Ranney had this to
say about the taxi issue:
One of the things that I fought for and lost at
the very last minute, in part because of Walker, was
the cabs. And the reason I wanted to do that was to
break up the monopoly of Yellow Cab and Checker, and
introduce competition. And [I also wanted to bring
"9. Chicago Daily News, November 19, 1973.
40 Chicago Tribune, November 25, 1973.
41 Interview, September 1993. Mr. Ranney conducted the
interview with this author at the historic kitchen table where the
legislation was drafted.
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competition] to the buses (interview, September 1993).
The kitchen table version of the RTA was the one which
finally prevailed. The RTA passed in the Senate at the end of
November, and in the House in early December.42 Not even a
last-minute disagreement about funding issues did more than delay
passage briefly. The next major challenge would be the
referendum in March, 1974.
The RTA package
The RTA legislation was passed as a package of several
bills, the most important of which was the one setting up the
agency itself, defining its administrative parameters, and
(perhaps most importantly) authorizing its funding sources. Also
in the package was more short-term bailout money to the CTA.
This bill, unlike its predecessors, also advanced money to the
suburban bus companies and the commuter railroads. Finally, a
companion bill, tied to the package as an added inducement to
downstate legislators, distributed highway funds to downstate
Illinois.
The RTA's finances were contentious from the beginning of
the 1973 legislative session right up through the agency's reform
in 1983. The RTA's funding sources, as enacted in 1973,
consisted of funds diverted from existing sources, and potential
sources of revenue. The RTA received money from three existing
sources (not counting farebox revenues, which each individual
carrier retained, or federal operating subsidies):
1. The state diverted 3/32 of the state sales tax raised in
the six-county RTA.
2. For every motor vehicle registered by the state in the
City of Chicago, the state earmarked $14.00 to the RTA.
42 Chicago Sun-Times, November 30, 1973, and Tribune, December
2, 1973.
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3. There would be a minimum contribution to the RTA of at
least $5 million a year from one or more units of government in
Cook County. Although these governmental units were left
unspecified, it was understood to mean some combination of the
City of Chicago and Cook County. Given the fact that the Cook
County Board was safely in the hands of Mayor Daley's ally George
Dunne, it was not anticipated that there would be arguments over
which governments were to contribute how much of the $5 million
minimum.
Then there were reserve powers for two new taxes, which
could be enacted by the RTA board subject to a three-fifths
supermajority vote:
1. A tax on off-street commercial parking facilities.
2. A tax of up to 5% on gasoline sales, to be applied at a
uniform rate throughout the region.
The provisions attaching themselves to the reserve taxation
powers were amended in 1974 by a General Assembly uneasy with the
large anti-RTA sentiment in the suburbs. The RTA bill, as passed
in 1973, provided that two-thirds of any taxes enacted by the RTA
board (as opposed to sources already included in the legislation)
would be spent on transit services and facilities in the area
where the money was raised. The 1974 revision kept 100% of the
money in the area where it was raised."
The RTA also received bonding authority from the state:
These instruments may pay interest of no more than
eight per cent annually. They must mature within 40
years... At any given time, the [RTA] may have no more
than $500 million of such bonds and notes outstanding
(CTA Quarterly, Spring 1975, p. 7).
The RTA's debt securities were not specifically given the
full faith and credit of the state (to mollify downstate
legislators), but bondholders were given first lien on the
4 Tecson (1975 a), p. 341. For the purposes of tax revenue
distribution, there were seven areas: Chicago, suburban Cook
County, and the five outer "collar counties".
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agency's income from all taxes the agency collected."
The legislative debate
The RTA debate was dominated by opponents, understandably so
since calling attention to their opposition was practically their
only weapon against the majorities that legislative leaders in
both parties and chambers had lined up in favor of the RTA.
Machine Democrats were generally silent during the debates,
perhaps preferring to place their trust in back room deals rather
than silvery speechmaking. Another factor may have been that
some of those who voted for the RTA were less than enthusiastic
about doing so, and did not wish to add to their unease by
speaking out.
Some of the amendments which the RTA's opponents offered
were more serious than others. The more substantive amendments
proposed by opponents included a number of issues of legitimate
concern to the suburbs. Several legislators sought to create a
two-track referendum process whereby Yes majorities would be
required both in Chicago and in the suburbs in order for the RTA
to be approved. Another issue was collar county representation
on the board. Many collar county lawmakers believed that having
five collar counties share two board seats was not enough to
ensure their constituents adequate representation. Finally, a
third major area of concern was a mechanism whereby counties or
parts of counties could opt out of the RTA.
The debates provided ample opportunities for lawmakers to
offer their different rationales for and against the RTA. What
follows is a sample of the variety of positions on the RTA,
starting with the most unequivocal positions in favor and
proceeding towards the strongest opposition.
" Tecson (1975 b), p. 11.
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Chicago needs the RTA!
It's essential now to prevent the total
disintegration of our mass transit system. (...) Some
of us have just voted for a bill which we did not fully
believe in, the downstate supplemental freeway bill.
That is the lifeline of downstate, its road system.
This is our lifeline. Please let us have it (Sen.
Netsch, November 29, 1973, p. 127).
There are some of us ... who are under some
compulsion to vote for almost any bill that will
provide for the continuance of the CTA upon which many
of our constituents rely for their livelihood (Sen.
Newhouse, November 16, 1973, p. 15).
In support of the RTA
If the CTA closes down, if our suburban commuter
railroads, such as the Rock Island, are forced to
close, if the bus companies go out of business, there
won't be enough gasoline for you to worry about that
5% tax. (...) We must go ahead this week with this
plan, including the referendum on the district-wide
basis (Rep. Pierce, November 30, 1973, p. 11).
An RTA, but not this one
I don't think there is anyone more committed to
the need for an RTA than myself, and I want us to do it
... And so I think this is a beautiful opportunity to
make this proposal a little bit more acceptable by the
voters in the region... (Rep. Deuster, November 30,
1973, pp. 53-54).
Okay for Chicago, but,-,
Gentlemen, I'd like to make it very clear that I
do not oppose the creation of an RTA. I recognize the
problems in Chicago and the suburbs, and I want to be
able to support ... an RTA, but I cannot support an RTA
which forces itself upon the people of my county...
(Sen. Schaffer, November 13, 1973, pp. 15-16).
We think we can make greater progress in this area
[mass transit] on our own. We prefer to spend our
money on our own projects... We recognize the need for
transportation in Chicago ... and the responsibility of
the outer counties that ... do send people into the
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city to pay their fair share (Sen. Schaffer, November
13, 1973, p. 22).
Leave us alone!
I represent ... a part of a county where less than
two percent of my constituents ever ride a bus or a
train. They could care less. I am forced to .. speak
out for the people of my constituency... (Rep.
Grotberg, November 30, 1973, p. 12).
The final vote
On Thursday, November 30, the Senate passed the RTA package
by a vote of 38 to 15. Under the supermajority rule governing
special legislative sessions such as this one, the bill needed 36
votes to pass.'" On Saturday, December 1, the House followed
suit, enacting the RTA by a 112 to 58 vote. For passage, the RTA
needed 107 votes in the House.' In both chambers, the vote was
narrow--a verdict which would be repeated three months later in
the referendum.
As the referendum would show, Chicagoans were strongly in
favor of the RTA, because the new authority would be a steady
source of subsidies for the Chicago Transit Authority.7
Representatives and senators from Chicago apparently understood
their constituents' preferences and voted accordingly--reform
Democrats and Republicans as well as machine Democrats." The
" Chicago Tribune, November 30, 1973.
46 Chicago Tribune, December 2, 1973.
" In the March 1974 RTA referendum, those Chicagoans who went
to the polls voted for the RTA by a margin of 71% to 29%--a margin
which not even Mayor Daley himself received in mayoral elections.
48 Under cumulative voting, most of the three-member House
districts in Chicago sent two Democrats and one Republican to the
State House Some districts elected reformers rather than machine
Democrats, but regardless of their factional affiliations,
Chicago's state legislators voted their constituents' travel needs
with remarkable consistency.
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legislative roll call for the RTA bill shows that all but two
legislators whose districts were partly or completely within
Chicago voted for the RTA.
Although on balance the suburbs were strongly opposed to the
RTA in the March 1974 referendum vote, suburban opinion was
divided, with the closer-in suburbs being more favorably inclined
towards the RTA than communities further away from Chicago.
Suburban legislators reflected this split to some degree. Votes
for the RTA package from suburban legislators, however, should
not be equated automatically with full support for the concept;
some lawmakers who voted in favor may have been ambivalent about
the RTA and hoped that their constituents would pass final
judgment in the referendum.
Legislators from suburban Cook County, where many
constituents depended on commuter trains to get to work, voted
for the RTA more than they voted against it. Opposition was
strongest among legislators from the collar counties, i.e., the
five suburban counties outside Cook County."
Of the senators from districts partly or wholly in Chicago,
all 20 were Democrats who voted for the RTA. Of the 60
representatives from these same districts, 58 members (40
Democrats and 18 Republicans) voted yes, one Republican voted no,
and one Democrat failed to vote. The member who voted against
the RTA was from a district that included several south suburban
communities as well as the far South Side of Chicago. He may
have drawn much of his electoral support from his suburban rather
than his Chicago constituents (easily imaginable in a three-
member district straddling the city line). In that case, he may
"9 No legislative district included areas both within and
beyond Cook County. In the collar counties, however, some of the
districts included areas outside the RTA area.
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have been voting the preferences of the bulk of his supporters.
All of the ten legislative districts located entirely in
suburban Cook County had Republican senators. Of these, 5 voted
for the RTA, two voted against, and three failed to cast a vote.
Of the 30 House members from suburban Cook County, 20 voted yes
(10 from each party), 9 voted no (all Republicans), and one
Democrat failed to vote.
In the 9 districts which included the collar counties, all
of the senators were Republicans. Three senators voted for the
RTA and the other 6 were opposed. Of the 27 House members from
these districts, 9 voted yes (3 Republicans and 6 Democrats), 17
voted no (15 Republicans and 2 Democrats), and one Democrat did
not vote.
In the Senate, the totals from the 39 districts partly or
completely in the Chicago metropolitan area were 28 senators yes,
8 senators no, and 3 not voting. Of the 117 representatives in
these districts, 87 voted yes, 27 voted no, and 3 cast no vote.
Although there was resistance to the RTA from several suburban
members, all in all it does not add up to a very strong
legislative opposition to the RTA from the six northeastern
Illinois counties included in the new authority.
Even under the three-fifths supermajority rule, the RTA
would have passed easily had it been up to the Chicago and
suburban delegations. Given the largely pro-RTA vote totals from
the city and suburbs, only downstaters could have impeded
passage. Why, then, were some of them wary of the RTA?
The suburban opponents were the most vocal in speaking out
against the RTA in the debates. In the best tradition of
Illinois politics, they defended what they saw as the interests
of their constituents. The downstate opponents were less
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forthcoming with their views in the legislative debates, so we
can only speculate as to their motives.
Judged objectively on its own merits, the RTA should have
been a subject of indifference to downstaters. In fact,
downstaters even had a small stake in the victory of the RTA.
Until the advent of the RTA, the state had been paying most of
the CTA's losses from general revenue collected throughout
Illinois, including downstate. With only a small exception, the
RTA provided a strictly regional funding base for Chicago area
transit carriers, thus largely relieving the state (including
downstate taxpayers) of most of this financial burden.
One possible explanation may be that some downstate
lawmakers failed to see that the RTA would lift a piece of the
state tax burden from their constituents. They may have opposed
the RTA on an instinctive basis, figuring that anything
Chicagoans wanted was bad for downstate Illinois, almost by
definition. Others may have been reluctant to force the RTA on
reluctant suburban lawmakers, lest they later force unwanted
legislation on downstate Illinois. Another, more pragmatic
factor may have been that lawmakers with close ties to highway
interests might have seen a threat in any state initiative having
to do with public transportation.
Another possibility may be that downstate lawmakers did see
the immediate (if marginal) benefit to their constituents, but
feared that the RTA would be the thin end of the wedge. They
might have anticipated that the RTA would fail to solve the CTA's
problems, and speculated that the RTA would eventually return to
Springfield seeking a direct subsidy from the state. Others may
have feared that the RTA's success might encourage the formation
of regional transit bodies to support financially shaky bus
systems in downstate cities.
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Finally, other legislators may have viewed the issue not on
its own merits either for Chicagoland or for downstate Illinois,
but rather as a bargaining counter to be used in political
logrolling. Thus, some downstaters may have withheld their
support for the RTA in response to the failure of metropolitan
lawmakers to support bills important to them.
By the end of 1973, the lawmakers had done all they could
with the RTA issue. The next step was the referendum, which was
scheduled to coincide with the primary elections in March 1974.
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CHAPTER 6
TRENCH WARFARE AT THE POLLS: THE 1974 RTA REFERENDUM
Once the RTA was signed into law in December 1973, there
remained barely six weeks until voters in the six-county region
of northeastern Illinois decided on the RTA in a referendum
coinciding with the March 1974 primary elections. The contending
forces battled one another strongly for the loyalties of the
electorate, particularly in suburban Cook County. 1 The campaign
left a legacy of mutual suspicion across the city line which was
to hinder the RTA once it had been approved in the referendum by
a hair's breadth vote. As RTA campaign chief George A. Ranney
noted,
The campaign was an extremely difficult one. It was
... run on negatives. I think it's almost impossible
to submit that kind of a program [such as the RTA] to
an electorate that would accept it.2
As it turned out, the electorate barely accepted the RTA,
according to the official vote count. The divisions of March
1974 were to haunt the RTA for the next decade.
The campaign for the RTA
Ranney's greatest contribution towards the creation of the
RTA may have been his ability to help patch together an otherwise
unlikely coalition of Chicago machine Democrats, city and
suburban liberals, and an easily-identifiable population of
suburban Republicans who would benefit from RTA subsidies to
Metra (commuter rail) board member and former RTA board
member Joseph Tecson argues that suburban Cook County should be
considered as a third political constituency, distinct both from
Chicago and from the outer "collar counties" where there is less
demand for mass transit than in the suburban portions of Cook
County (telephone interview, October 1995).
2 Interview, September 1973.
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commuter railroads.
It came as little surprise to Chicago area residents on
either side of the RTA issue that George A. Ranney, Jr., who
played such a crucial role in formulating and enacting the RTA,
became the chairman of the RTA Citizens Committee for Better
Transportation, the group which headed the referendum campaign
for the RTA. Newspaper accounts, interviews, and the George
Ranney, Jr. papers suggest that Ranney was a forceful, capable,
and very active leader.
The campaign was clearly Ranney's to manage, and few other
figures played roles of comparable prominence. Mayor Daley, of
course, spoke in favor of the RTA, but he had many other pressing
concerns and was probably also restrained by the knowledge that
his activism on the RTA's behalf might alienate many voters
outside the city. CTA chairman Milton Pikarsky certainly helped
with speeches and other publicity favorable to the RTA.3
Most of the efforts of the RTA Citizens Committee were
apparently aimed at generating support for the RTA from Loop
businesses and other interest groups, identifying and mobilizing
voters who might be inclined to support the RTA, and creating a
climate of public opinion favorable to the RTA.
The opposition: miracles on a shoestring budget
The nominal leader of kNOw RTA was state representative Cal
Skinner, Jr.. Other lawmakers who had led the rearguard action
against the RTA in the state house also came on board: Donald
Deuster, George Sangmeister, Donald Totten, Eugene Schlickman,
3 Suburban opponents of the RTA had claimed that if the RTA
were to come into existence, board members beholden to the Chicago
machine would cause Pikarsky to be selected as its chairman (which
was precisely what happened in 1975). Thus, they argued, Pikarsky
had a very direct stake in a "yes" vote in the referendum.
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and others who had battled the RTA in 1973.
In contrast to the pro-RTA side, the opponents were much
less professionally organized, a fact which probably spoke in
their favor with many voters. Whereas the pro-RTA voices,
machine Democrats and liberals alike, appear to have been reading
from a single basic "script," the kNOw RTA participants accepted
the variety within their ranks. Mainstream Republicans dominated
the kNOw RTA discourse through their numbers, but Republicans of
varying views and even a conservative Democrat such as George
Sangmeister were made to feel comfortable. Republican opponents
ranged from Cal Skinner with his articulate views on the need to
hold government to a minimum, to Eugene Schlickman, who shared a
good government orientation with pro-RTA suburban lawmakers.
The struggle for votes
In terms of political geography, the pro-RTA forces
implicitly conceded the collar counties to the kNOw RTA side,
although Ranney's organization went through the motions of
contesting the vote outside Cook County. The pro-RTA efforts
were concentrated in Chicago, where the crucial task was
mobilizing a strong pro-RTA vote to outweigh the suburban "no"
vote, and in suburban Cook County, where the problem was
motivating suburbanites with a stake in public transportation to
set aside their suspicion of the city's motives and vote to
protect their buses and commuter trains.
The kNOw RTA Committee knew its core constituency well.
There was no attempt to even bother trying to break the solid
mass of pro-RTA votes in the city. With limited time and money,
kNOw RTA forces wrote off the city as lost from the outset and
focused instead on the suburbs. Their political bedrock was the
heavy "no" vote outside Cook County. Thus, the kNOw RTA strategy
was a mirror image of that of the RTA Citizens Committee: keep up
the momentum in the collar counties, and urge as many voters in
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suburban Cook County to trust their instincts over their fears
and vote against the RTA.
Both sides had their own relatively strong areas of support,
where the opposing forces had little realistic hope of making an
impact. The only large area which neither side could afford to
take for granted was suburban Cook County. It became the great
battleground, where both sides understood that the referendum
would be won or lost.
Suburban Cook County was a swing constituency because it was
the most varied part of the metropolis in terms of attitudes
towards mass transit. On the one hand, there were hundreds of
thousands of voters, especially in the newer, postwar,
automobile-oriented suburbs, who had little need for commuter
trains because they rarely went to the city, nor for suburban
buses because they drove. Whatever might be the indirect impacts
of less and poorer transit in the suburbs, these voters did not
think they would suffer directly if transit services were
discontinued.
But there was also a substantial minority of suburbanites in
older communities which had grown up along the commuter railroads
and suburban streetcar lines. Many voters in these suburbs used
the railroads and the CTA, had other family members who did so,
or were otherwise attached to the idea of having transit service
available to them. This constituency, though in the minority,
was nevertheless large, and if mobilized, could help swing the
results towards the RTA.
The pro-RTA forces followed a dual strategy in the suburbs.
First, they reminded commuters and their dependents of their
stake in the RTA. At the same time, they tried to convince as
many other voters as possible that they should support the RTA
for any one of a number of reasons, ranging from normative
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arguments about civic responsibility (clearly aimed at the more
affluent and altruistic segments of the electorate), to promises
of considerably expanded service under the RTA (for the benefit
of voters who sought "something in it" for them).
The Rock Island Railroad raised the ante shortly before the
referendum when it announced that if the RTA failed to pass, the
railroad would immediately petition the Illinois Commerce
Commission for permission to discontinue all of its commuter
service. The Illinois Central, which did not even have the
excuse of being on the verge of bankruptcy, threatened to seek
either much higher fares or else the end of all service.
The railroads' threats were neither subtle nor admirable.
All the same, the Rock Island's statements reflected very real
financial problems which drove the railroad into bankruptcy in
1975 (and ultimately into liquidation in 1980). Whether this
pressure influenced the undecided in favor of the RTA or
backfired instead is not clear, although the referendum results
suggest that this sort of pressure did not win over many
suburbanites not already dependent on the trains.
Other opposition elements
Most of the arguments for and against the RTA fell into the
range of discourse which the RTA Citizens Committee and the kNOw
RTA Committee used in their campaigns. A few of the voices
opposing the RTA, however, fell outside the mainstream positions
on the issue. Although these forces had little impact either on
the outcome, their existence is worth noting in passing.
A small number of blacks in Chicago came out against the
* Chicago Tribune, March 14, 1974.
183
RTA. 5 Most of these opponents made arguments against the RTA
which were of a black nationalist character. Much of this
opposition seems to have been centered around the Chicago Metro
News, particularly that journal's editorials. Their argument was
that with black political control of the city increasingly likely
in the coming years, passage of the RTA would result in mass
transit, on which many blacks depended, falling into the hands of
the suburbs. The Metro News failed to suggest how the CTA should
otherwise close its deficit. Presumably the paper had few
problems with the state continuing to subsidize the CTA, a
position which even Mayor Daley had been forced to abandon.'
The minority of blacks in the city opposed to the RTA were
not the only people on the edges of the RTA debate. In the
suburbs, a small group at the right-wing end of the political
spectrum attempted to convince voters of its interpretation. SOS
(Save Our Suburbs) enjoyed an uncontested monopoly on that small
portion of the RTA referendum discourse emanating from the right-
wing cult-like, paranoid fringe of American politics. SOS
leaflets characterized the RTA as part of a plot by liberal
advocates of social engineering to replace the system of
democratically-elected government with a centralized dictatorial
system, and even included Mayor Daley in their demonology--an
accusation which suggested the degree to which SOS was out of
' One of the few black politicians who did not urge a yes
vote in the referendum was state senator Richard Newhouse. His
opposition, however, was idiosyncratic in nature. Since his South
Side district included the racially integrated Hyde Park
neighborhood, the specifically black content of his opposition is
less than immediately evident. Furthermore, the depth of Senator
Newhouse's opposition to the RTA was limited, as he voted for the
RTA bill in late 1973.
6 The Defender, Chicago's mainstream black newspaper, argued
strongly for a "yes" vote. The outcome of the referendum suggests
that most of the city's black voters agreed with the Defender
rather than the Metro News.
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touch with reality.7 SOS had no explanation for the
overwhelming support for the RTA by powerful Loop business
interests such as law firms, department stores, banks,
newspapers, and real estate firms--all of which had large and
visible stakes in the capitalist system.
When asked if there was any cooperation between the very
mainstream kNOw RTA Committee and SOS, former state
representative Eugene Schlickman expressed horror at the thought.
Schlickman also noted that SOS reproduced kNOw RTA material in
its own leaflets, neither asking permission nor giving credit.*
In so doing, SOS may have been trying to obtain additional
support for itself by riding on kNOw RTA's coattails.
Campaign publicity
Both sides used such traditional weapons as news conferences
and letters to the editor. The George A. Ranney, Jr. papers and
the Cal Skinner, Jr. collection both abound in printed material
from their respective sides, and also contain a smattering of
pieces issued by opposing forces.
The most obvious difference between the two sides' printed
publicity reflects the difference in their finances. The RTA
It was perfectly routine for suburban politicians, be they
liberals or conservatives, Republicans or Democrats, to include
anti-Daley rhetoric in their campaign statements. The mayor's
powerful position in Illinois politics had made him the object of
much resentment outside the city limits. But Mayor Daley was
hardly an appropriate target for right-wing conspiracy theorists.
His cautious, slow handling- of issues with racial implications (an
attitude which earned him much resentment among black Chicagoans at
various economic levels), and his no-nonsense approach to civil
unrest in 1968 made Daley a bulwark of stability for hundreds of
thousands of white voters of modest means. These voters had become
the core of electoral support for the machine by 1967, and their
objective social and economic interests were broadly similar to
those of much of SOS' intended audience.
8 Interview, September 1993.
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Citizens Committee issued leaflets, flyers, and stickers with a
standard, up-to-date typographical format. The kNOw RTA
material, by contrast, looked like the products of a modest,
come-from-behind campaign of the underdog. Reproduced from
typewritten or modest-looking, non-standardized typeset copy, the
kNOw RTA material had a homemade feel to it which contrasted
sharply with the more slick, corporate format of the RTA Citizens
Committee's output.
The kNOw RTA group simply did not have access to downtown
business money. Cal Skinner, Jr. charged during the campaign
that the pro-RTA side was funded largely by downtown business
interests: banks, department stores, real estate companies, and
the like. He accused the RTA Citizens Committee of being largely
bankrolled by these companies, and claimed that the pro-RTA side
dared not admit this for fear of the impact this intelligence
would have on the vote.'
Although RTA proponents issued the standard denials, a year
after the referendum, Skinner uncovered a list of contributors
and released it to the press. It showed the names of many of the
very downtown businesses he had intuitively figured were helping
to fund the RTA campaign."
Ranney claimed a different motive for having been silent on
the finance issue. Concealing the scope of his group's budget,
he said, was more important than hiding its sources. Although
Ranney stated that his side was operating on less money than
opponents thought, the proponents were able to issue
professionally-prepared leaflets and hire a public relations
* Interview, September 1993.
10 Press release, Rep. Cal Skinner, Jr., August 19, 1975. In
the Cal Skinner, Jr. collection, Regional Government Archives,
Northern Illinois University, DeKalb.
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firm. Nevertheless, in the search for other publicity
opportunities, the strategies of the two sides converged, as
Ranney explained:
We did a lot of the same thing. We had a lot of
press conferences. Press conferences don't cost money;
what costs money is advertising and print material, and
we had much more of that. We had a pretty good spread
of contributions, mostly from companies. They
understood their interests (interview, September 1993).
The press on both sides of the city line tended to side with
the bulk of their readers (or at least with their advertisers).
The four major Chicago newspapers followed an almost
indistinguishable editorial line in favor of the RTA--not
surprisingly, given their reliance on advertising revenue from
such transit-dependent businesses as department stores. Nigut
(1975) dissects the various contradictory arguments the four
Chicago newspapers made in favor of the RTA, but the downtown-
based newspapers were more concerned with winning the referendum
vote than with logical consistency." In the suburbs, the
Barrington Herald, the Daily Calumet, and the Southtown Economist
came out editorially against the RTA.
The campaign's final days
As the kNOw RTA group tapped into a rising groundswell of
suburban opposition, the pro-RTA forces made great efforts during
the last week or two of the campaign to put their message across.
As Ranney noted,
In a campaign, you never really try to change the
minds of the opposition if they were strongly opposed.
What you worry about is the group who are undecided.
It is interesting that the Chicago Journalism Review, an
"alternative" publication with a strongly left-of-center anti-
establishment orientation in almost all of its other articles,
would publish an article written from a middle-of-the-road suburban
perspective. Such must have been the magazine's eagerness to
expose the pro-establishment bias of the mass press that they would
print Mr. Nigut's analysis despite its lack of leftist ideological
content.
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Or people who are somewhat opposed, and you try to
bring them around without irritating them. And what
happened here--we did quite a lot of polling--what they
showed was that there was an absolute trajectory. This
strong opposition week by week got worse and worse from
our point of view (interview, September 1993).
During the last week of the campaign, former governor
Richard Ogilvie emerged from political retirement to spend
several days-campaigning for the RTA. Newspapers reported
Ogilvie as delivering speeches urging a "yes" vote in the
referendum, appearing at a commuter railroad station in the
morning, and walking through a train while urging commuters to
vote for the RTA. The newspaper accounts did not discuss the
reasons for Ogilvie's brief return to political activity, aside
from covering his statements about the extent to which the
passage of the RTA was important to him.
Apparently the former governor came into the campaign at
George Ranney's request. As Ranney recalled,
I came to him [Ogilvie] and I said, "Look, we're
going to lose this thing the way these [public opinion]
polls are going". And the interesting thing was that
with that jog from him, we turned it around for about a
week. It [the pro-RTA standing in the opinion polls]
went up just a little. I think if he hadn't done it
[i.e., campaigned for the RTA], we might have lost.
And probably if the [referendum] campaign had gone
another week after that, we would have lost."
Ranney's timing was fortuitous. The RTA's victory hung by
the smallest of margins: according to the official results, the
RTA won by just over 15,000 votes in a 1.3 million poll.
The results of the referendum
When the votes were counted, it seemed that the RTA had
carried by the narrowest of margins. The official results were
as follows:
12 Interview, September 1993.
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Entire region:
676,349 yes (50.6%)
660,614 no (49.4%)
1,336,963 total
City of Chicago:
422,162 yes (71.1%)
171,353 no (28.9%)
593,515 total
Suburbs:
254,187 yes (34.2%)
489,261 no (65.8%)
743,448 total
In the city, 48 out of the 50 wards produced majorities for
the RTA.13 Of those who bothered to vote in the city's poorest,
predominantly black wards, the overwhelming majority voted Yes,
showing that the small current of black nationalist opinion
against the RTA had more bark than bite to it. Nevertheless, in
the more prosperous wards, where more people went to vote, the
results were at least as satisfactory to the pro-RTA forces as
those in the poorest wards. More people did vote No outside the
poorest wards, but this was at least, if not more than
compensated for by a greater total Yes vote. The highest net Yes
totals were in the more affluent lakefront wards, where many
residents lived in apartments and commuted downtown by transit.
The only two wards to vote against the RTA were
predominantly white, working class wards near the outskirts of
the city. Two factors appear to have been at work here. One was
the fact that most blue-collar jobs were more easily reached by
car than by transit. Another was unease at the possibility that
better transit might make the neighborhoods in question more
accessible to blacks and Latinos. Similar considerations seem to
13 The following discussion of ward and township-level results
is based on unofficial results appearing in the Chicago Tribune for
March 20, 1974 (the day after the referendum).
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have been at work in a handful of other wards where the Yes
margins were relatively thin.
In suburban Cook County, the balance was relatively close
(41% yes, 59% no). However, the results varied widely among the
county's 30 suburban townships. Self-interest appears to have
been the primary determinant of the results. Oak Park and
Evanston were older, residential suburbs with variegated but
largely upper-middle class populations, many of whom relied on
"L" lines which served both suburbs. Overwhelming majorities of
voters supported the RTA in these communities.
Cicero and Berwyn, by contrast, were solidly white, working
class suburbs of modest bungalows similar to those found in many
city neighborhoods. As with the two city wards where there were
majorities against the RTA, the No vote in these suburbs seems to
be a result of commuting interests and racial fears." The
existence of "1L" service in Cicero and adjacent to Berwyn seems
to have made little difference.
Further away from Chicago, Cook County suburbanites seem to
have been influenced largely by their commuting habits. In plush
New Trier Township, home of some of the region's most affluent
North Shore suburbs traditionally favored by railroad commuters,
not even Mayor Daley's lieutenants could have done much better at
bringing forth an overwhelming Yes vote. In Niles Township a few
miles inland (served by the CTA's Skokie Swift rapid transit),
the Yes vote was not as preponderant, but it still carried the
day easily. The Yes vote also won in north suburban Northfield
Township and in River Forest, adjacent to Oak Park. Elsewhere,
the No vote won, generally reflecting lower levels of transit
use.
14 Interview, Eugene Schlickman, September 1993.
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In the five collar counties beyond Cook County, the No vote
was overwhelming. In DuPage and Lake, the two collar counties
with the largest Chicago-bound commuting populations, the RTA
gained only 25% of the vote. In Kane County, only 11% of the
vote was in favor of the RTA, and in semi-rural McHenry County,
the pro-RTA vote hit a low of 9%. As in the rest of the region,
collar county residents appear to have voted their immediate
interests as commuters. Only one suburban township outside Cook
County produced a majority in favor of the RTA. This was
Deerfield Township in Lake County, which included the older parts
of Highland Park, a well-off North Shore suburb known as a
desirable location for downtown-bound railroad commuters. Thus,
the one exception in the collar counties proved the rule.
What it meant
As with many electoral contests, the RTA referendum vote was
in large part a battle between opposing majorities among clearly-
defined constituencies. Clearly, the three to one vote in favor
of the RTA in the city reflected self-interest on the part of a
majority of Chicago's voters. Conservative adherents of public
choice theory might expect that this was due primarily to the
working poor who could not afford to drive and members of the
sub-proletariat who depended on income transfers. In fact, the
yes vote in the city was far from limited to those particular
strata of society. If the referendum results are any indication,
it appears that the affluent residents of such communities as
Chicago's Gold Coast and even the North Shore suburbs decided
that they shared a common interest in seeking transit subsidies
with residents of some of the city's poorest slums.
The turnout suggests that the more affluent transit riders
(i.e., the ones who could best afford to pay higher fares) seem
to have been the most organized in defense of their interests.
In visceral terms, welfare recipients in Chicago who voted to tax
motorists throughout the region to support low fares might have
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made an emotionally satisfying target for suburban resentments.
But suburban anger would have at least as well directed against
well-paid white collar Chicagoans who rode the CTA every day and
voted their interests. For that matter, they might also have
been furious at their suburban neighbors who rode the commuter
trains to the Loop and voted to maximize their utility by
supporting the RTA.
Would cheap fares have made a difference?
It is possible that RTA proponents might have had an easier
time of it at the polls had they seen fit to promise specific
benefits in terms of improved service and reduced fares. The
experiences of Atlanta and Cleveland, which had referenda on
regional transit during the early and mid-1970s, suggest that
popular votes on the creation of new transit authorities can be
influenced by promising lower fares for the next several years.
In Atlanta, transit advocates won a 1972 referendum vote to
create the regional agency MARTA by promising different benefits
to different constituencies. A largely black urban population
responded favorably to a promise of reduced bus fares, while a
largely white suburban electorate was wooed by the promise of new
rapid transit lines to carry commuters downtown. This followed a
1969 regional transit referendum which went down to a defeat.
Much of the explanation for the earlier defeat was that the
earlier version promised rapid transit but not lower fares.
Thus, there was little incentive for inner city constituencies to
support the earlier proposal.15
is For more on the formative years of regional transit in
Atlanta, see Timothy A. Almy et. al., Mass Transit Management:
Case Studies of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
(Washington: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1981). There are
certain important differences between Atlanta and Chicago, however.
Atlanta had no rail transit prior to MARTA, and the lines which
MARTA built are designed at least as much for the benefit of
Atlanta's closer-in suburbs as for the inner city.
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The Cleveland experience offers even closer parallels with
Chicago. Like Chicago, Cleveland is an older Great Lakes
industrial city with established rail transit lines. The city-
owned Cleveland Transit System started receiving limited city
subsidies in 1968, but all the same, much as in Chicago,
Cleveland was the last major city in the nation to
operate a transit system largely based on farebox
revenues. Because of this, service improvements were
not made, and maintenance of facilities and equipment
suffered."
The Cuyahoga County government and the City of Cleveland
acted to create the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
in December 1974, only a year after Chicago's RTA had been
brought into being."' An important difference, however, was
that Cleveland's new agency was not as plagued by city-suburban
conflict as its Chicago counterpart.
The Cleveland RTA promised lower fares, increased transfer
privileges, and improved service on new and existing lines. The
suburb of Shaker Heights, synonymous with the best in upper-
middle class living, was anxious to be rid of the deficits of its
municipally-owned light rail line to downtown Cleveland.
Presumably, the Cleveland RTA could have bargained hard with
Shaker Heights officials. Yet the agency practically courted
this comfortable suburb, promising a fleet of new cars and
service guarantees in return for the suburb's transfer of its
light rail operation to the new agency.
16 "An Introduction to RTA" (Cleveland: Greater Cleveland
Regional Transit Authority, 1995, p. 3) . The City of Cleveland had
been granting subsidies to the Cleveland Transit System, but these
subsidies were very limited in scope.
"7 The State of Ohio was not involved in the creation of the
Greater Cleveland RTA; state law permitted counties to create their
own transit authorities and give them the power to collect
dedicated taxes (ibid).
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Even before the Cleveland RTA had the money to enact any of
its plans, it negotiated the transfer of ownership and merger of
the Cleveland Transit System and Shaker Heights Rapid Transit,
the region's two biggest operators. The realization of these and
other plans was contingent on approval of a one-cent dedicated
sales tax throughout Cuyahoga County in a referendum in July
1975:
The [Cleveland transit referendum] campaign was
intensive. Voters were promised a dramatic reduction
in fares... They were also promised many new crosstown
bus lines where there had been no previous service ...
Besides the transportation incentives the RTA promised,
the campaign also capitalized on the renascent sense of
civic pride... Cuyahoga County voters were suitably
impressed; they approved the taxing authorization by a
70 percent majority. Shaker Heights voters were even
more positive; they voted 87 percent in favor of the
new tax."
The Cleveland results suggest that upper middle class
commuters are more than willing to tax themselves (and others) in
order to improved service. In all likelihood, the prosperous
voters of Shaker Heights and neighboring communities were
probably swayed much more by the promise of new trains than by
pledges of fare stabilization at reduced levels.
The implications for Chicago are clear. If the residents of
such comfortable Chicago bedroom suburbs as Winnetka, Highland
Park, Barrington, Lisle, and Olympia Fields were rational
maximizers of their well-being like their counterparts in
suburban Cleveland, they might have reacted with overwhelming
favor to specific promises of improved service.19 Similarly,
18 James Toman, The Shaker Heights Rapid Transit (Glendale,
CA: Interurban Press, 1990, p. 99).
19 In Chicagoland, promises of commuter rail service
improvements would have probably been less of a necessity for
securing passage of the RTA by a comfortable margin. With the
exception of the Rock Island's older cars and its then-deteriorated
track, few of Chicago's other commuter railroads needed major
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Atlanta's experience shows that inner city riders who depend on
transit are responsive to guarantees of low fares. The balance
of political forces in Illinois might have prevented low fare
guarantees from becoming part of the 1973 RTA negotiations, but
it might have been an advantageous avenue for transit proponents
to have pursued (particularly in conjunction with service
benefits for suburban commuters). Of course, this course of
action would have exacerbated the RTA's subsequent financial
problems, so it may be just as well that this approach was not
taken in Chicago.
The credibility of the referendum results
Opponents made last-ditch attempts to stop the RTA from
being implemented. Among various other lawsuits, which were soon
dismissed, Cal Skinner and Donald Deuster were active in efforts
to force a vote recount in Chicago. Their defeat was all but a
foregone conclusion from the start, however, given the Chicago
machine's well-known influence with the local judiciary.
Skinner's claims that the 60,000 spoiled referendum ballots in
Chicago represented machine politics at its worst, and that a
recount would show a victory for the kNOw RTA side, surprised few
observers of Chicago politics.2" Another lawsuit, based on less
solid premises, sought to have the referendum results thrown out
on the grounds that the ballot question was not sufficiently
clear. The Illinois Supreme Court threw out the lawsuit
instead.21
Even though it is common for the losing side to demand a
recount in elections involving Chicago voters and close totals,
the kNOw RTA suit does raise a legitimate question. Did the pro-
capital investments by the early 1970s.
20 Interview with the author, September 1993.
21 Tecson (1975 a), p. 339.
195
RTA forces actually win the referendum, or was a narrow suburban
victory in terms of the actual vote cast reversed by vote fraud
in the city? It is unlikely that the full facts will emerge.
The official referendum results were very close, there is little
likelihood of a thorough investigation, and any findings would be
moot in the first place. Although a definite answer is not
readily available, we can infer the degree to which irregular
electoral practices might have occurred.
The charges certainly ring true to many students of Chicago
politics. Although elections are much more above-board now than
they were in the heyday of machine governance, few observers
would deny that fraudulent electoral practices were an important
part of traditional Chicago politics. As Gosnell explained in
1937,
According to the parlance of the politicians, there are
some wards which are "dependable," meaning that the
wards can be depended upon to deliver the number of
votes which are needed to win regardless of how the
duly qualified voters may mark their ballots (p. 34).
In these terms, the predominantly black inner-city wards of
the South and West Sides would appear to have been the most
"dependable" for the machine in the RTA referendum. At the same
time, these wards also experienced lower-than-average voter
turnout. No matter how much these wards might (or might not)
support the RTA, mobilizing their residents on primary day was
more difficult than in more affluent parts of the city.
Ranney was not directly involved in voter mobilization or
the mechanics of the election itself. Nevertheless, after the
polls had closed on the day of the referendum, Ranney was up most
of the'night in close telephone communication with Mayor Daley
regarding the outcome of the vote.22 Some election judges,
22 Interview, September 1993
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precinct captains, and ward committeemen may well have
compromised the integrity of the voting process. In some wards,
lower-level machine personnel, if given to understand that
passage of the RTA referendum was very important to Mayor Daley,
might have taken such indications as permission, or even orders,
to ensure an outcome favorable to the machine. Yet however much
Daley may have sought to deliver the vote by fair means or
otherwise, it is difficult to imagine him issuing any
instructions that would link him to illegal intent.
The charges made by RTA opponents certainly do not strain
the bounds of credibility. On the other hand, no matter how high
the likelihood that the official results distorted the true
preferences of the voters, the magnitude of any possible fraud
must be kept in mind. It is easy enough to imagine that fraud
may have occurred, but it is unlikely that the machine invented
massive victories out of thin air. If fraud did take place--as
it may have--it probably took place at the margin. The
visibility of any possible fraud came largely from the close
nature of the referendum vote. Whatever manipulation of the
results may have taken place, the fact remains that there was an
enormous basis of honest electoral support for the RTA in the
city. George Ranney, Jr. was probably correct in saying "I
suspect that it [i.e., possible electoral fraud] was no better
and no worse than any other [Chicago] election.""
Although the machine's capacity for vote fraud is legendary
in anecdotal accounts of Chicago politics, the machine did lose
contests on issues of even more vital importance to its interests
23 Interview, September 1993. In the same interview, Ranney
stated that during the evening and night after the polls had
closed, "McHenry County was holding out votes". McHenry County has
little of Chicago's reputation for irregular electoral practices.
Nevertheless, Chicago may not have been the only jurisdiction to
have allowed less than complete propriety in the vote-counting
process.
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than the RTA. On issues of race and law enforcement--arguably of
greater interest to traditional machine politicians than mass
transit--the machine lost both a primary and a general election
for the office of Cook County state's attorney in 1972.
Additional evidence of the machine's willingness to lose an
election rather than resort to widespread fraud can be found in
the 1979 and 1983 mayoral primaries, when the winner was in
neither case the candidate endorsed by the Regular Democratic
Organization of Cook County. Admittedly, both of these instances
occurred after the death of Mayor Daley in 1976. Nevertheless,
the willingness of machine figures to accept the loss of hegemony
over the mayor's office indicates the extent to which Chicago
machine politicians adhered to the essentials of representative
democracy.
As kNOw RTA leader Cal Skinner recalled the RTA debate and
referendum two decades after the fact, he showed little of the
bitterness of one who had been outspent and outmaneuvered by
powerful forces. It would have been more than understandable had
he spoken bitterly of George Ranney, Jr. Instead, much to his
credit, he spoke of Ranney in matter-of-fact tones as a
negotiating agent for downtown business, as a legitimate
political actor against whom he fought a difficult legislative
and referendum campaign, and lost.
But it would take many years for the bitterness that
permeated much of suburbia to recede. Before city-suburban
relations regarding the RTA improved, they would first get even
worse--and by the late 1970s, the RTA experience would
confirm the worst fears of many suburbanites.
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CHAPTER 7
THE RTA: UNDER WAY, BUT WHERE? 1974-1978
Following the narrow victory of the pro-RTA forces in the
March 1974 referendum, the focus shifted from political debates
to the nuts-and-bolts business of subsidizing carriers and
expanding service. The lack of a solid city-suburban consensus
during the RTA's initial years helped set up the agency for the
financial crisis that was to overwhelm it by the early 1980s.
The death of Mayor Daley in 1976 contributed to the sense of
drift, as Chicago's Democratic organization began to lose some of
its legendary discipline and coherence. The first key political
figure to depart the scene, however, was a casualty of the RTA
which he had helped to enact.
The Short Career of Robert Blair
The anger of suburban voters opposed to the RTA reshaped the
future of Illinois politics in November 1974. House Speaker W.
Robert Blair, who was well known for his gubernatorial ambitions,
lost his seat as an angry electorate voted him out. Suburbanites
had been unable to stop the RTA in the referendum, but at least
they could hold its most vocal supporters responsible for their
actions at the polls. Blair learned the hard way that playing to
a statewide constituency does not necessarily help when running
in a local district.
Following the RTA referendum results, which were strongly
negative in his district, Blair did a flip-flop on the issue and
propose'd a bill allowing suburban counties to opt out of the RTA.
Even though many suburban lawmakers knew from the referendum
results that their constituents would favor such a bill on its
own merits, few were eager to support a bill which seemed to have
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as its main objective the preservation of Bob Blair's political
future. (The General Assembly did pass a bill, not linked with
Blair, which would keep the proceeds from any future RTA gas tax
within the individual counties where the money was raised.)
Blair's colleagues on both sides of the aisle had little
interest in saving his career. Democrats had partisan motives
for seeing a Republican House Speaker embarrassed, but Blair had
few friends on his own side of the aisle. Many Republican
legislators whose interests and egos Blair had bruised must have
been delighted to see Blair's constituents do what they
themselves could not, and were relieved that the oft-domineering
Blair would not become governor.
Starting Off With a Squabble
The first of many issues which were to set the city against
the suburbs was the choice of a chairman for the RTA. According
to the 1973 enabling legislation, the city was to choose four RTA
board members, the suburbs another four, and these eight members
were then to elect a ninth member from outside their ranks as
chairman. 1 Since the chairman's vote would be decisive in case
the city and suburban board members were in complete
disagreement, whoever was able to choose the chairman would have
de facto control of the RTA. Given the balance of forces between
the city and the suburbs, it was easy for political actors on
both sides of the city line to see the RTA chairmanship in terms
of winners and losers.
Milton Pikarsky, Daley's CTA chairman and the Democratic co-
The specific split between the city and suburbs (and among
suburban counties) was subject to future revision as subsequent
censuses documented changes in the proportions of people living in
different parts of the metropolitan area. Until 1983 (following
the results of the 1980 census), however, the city and suburbs each
appointed half of the regular members of the board. (This did not
include the chairman, who was chosen by the other members.)
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chairman of the Illinois Transportation Study Committee in 1973,
eventually became chairman of the RTA after much acrimony between
the city and suburbs. The selection of Pikarsky was one of the
more divisive issues that split the RTA board along city-suburban
lines from the outset, and hindered subsequent city-suburban
cooperation. It took the better part of a year before two
suburban members, whose supermajority votes were necessary to
elect a chairman, gave in and joined their Chicago counterparts
in endorsing Pikarsky for the position. Pikarsky became chairman
on January 31, 1975, fully nine months after the referendum.
Pikarsky: Daley's First Choice?
Many suburbanites resented Pikarsky as Mayor Daley's hand-
picked choice, a charge which Pikarsky, the mayor, and his
associates did little to deny. Yet putting Pikarsky in charge
may not have been the mayor's highest priority for the RTA,
according to George Ranney, Jr. Because the events which Ranney
described took place behind closed doors, Ranney's account is
worth quoting at length, despite his less than complimentary
assessment of one of Mayor Daley's appointees:
Daley asked Governor Ogilvie on the board and he
turned it down because of conflicts. He'd done legal
work [involving the CTA]. That would have been an
absolutely fantastic thing [having Ogilvie on the
board] because he would have been a Republican from the
city but who everybody knew would go his own way.
And then Daley asked me to go on the board, and I
told him no. Which professionally I sort of had to. I
was told by the head of my company [that] I had spent
an awful lot of time on these [government] activities.
So anyway, I told them no, and then they appointed a
guy named Nick Bosen. Nick's father was patronage
chief for the Democrats in the sixties. So ... they
went from a person like Ogilvie or me who would have
been independent... [to Mr. Bosen].
When Daley asked me to go on the board, I said
"I'm not sure you really want me". And he said "Why?"
And I said "Well, I don't think I'm going to agree with
everything you want me to do." And he said fine. And
what I had in mind was that I never would have voted
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for Pikarsky [as RTA chairman], and I don't think
Ogilvie would have, either. But they put Bosen [on the
board], he voted for Pikarsky, and that became a very
divisive thing. Although Pikarsky was close, a friend
of mine, I don't think he was a good choice. And he
was not a strong manager. If he'd been a stronger
manager, they [i.e., the RTA] might have been able to
do something about the issues.2
It is a tribute to the ability of both Ranney and Ogilvie
that Daley would have been willing to entrust them with decision-
making power over something so vital to the city as mass transit.
But Chicago Republicans with the qualifications of an Ogilvie or
a Ranney were in short supply. When both men removed themselves
from the running, the mayor may have simply wanted to put in a
nominee--any nominee--whom he could trust to defend the city's
interests.
Ogilvie was prudent to turn down a seat on the RTA board,
given the fact that his law firm had worked with the CTA in the
marketing of that agency's debt securities. Accepting the RTA
seat might have embroiled the former governor in a scandal.
Ranney, for his part, had his own career reasons for declining
further involvement in the RTA. Nevertheless, his refusal of
Mayor Daley's offer apparently foreclosed any possibility of an
RTA that might have bridged the divide between the city and the
suburbs. Ranney's refusal of the mayor's offer of an RTA board
seat may have been a missed opportunity for the entire
metropolis.
The suburbs knew that they did not want Milton Pikarsky as
RTA chairman, but they did not have an alternative candidate of
their own. Nor did suburban opponents of the RTA seem to grasp
2 Interview, September 1993.
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that their inaction handed the initiative over to the city.'
The kNOw RTA Committee, like its counterpart on the opposite
side, had broken up after the referendum, and there was thus no
coherent forum for RTA opponents to plan their strategy.
Furthermore, the varied nature of the kNOw RTA coalition made it
unclear who could in fact speak for the anti-RTA forces.
Although some indications of what was going on reached the
newspapers, much of the politicking which resulted in Pikarsky's
selection as chairman may have taken place outside the realm of
public scrutiny. Mayor Daley was very discreet in his conduct of
political business and left very few papers behind when he died.
As a result, the full extent of the mayor's preferences and
involvement in the formation of the RTA board may never be known.
Winners and Losers
To the city, and to a lesser degree those suburbs with many
commuter rail or CTA riders, the RTA was generally good news, or
at least relatively worthwhile on balance. No longer was the CTA
staggering from one financial crisis to the next; nor were the
railroads requesting large fare increases, let alone talking
about getting out of the-commuter rail business entirely. Even
with this shared interest between city and suburban mass transit
riders, there was still the question of which groups of commuters
would benefit from different magnitudes and distributions of the
RTA's budget.
From the standpoint of suburbanites who did not rely on mass
transit, the RTA was less of a solution to a problem than an
3 A leading figures in the kNOw RTA group, such as Donald
Deuster, might have been an appropriate candidate for the suburbs
to promote in preference to Pikarsky. Unfortunately, this was not
feasible in practical political terms, because the kNOw RTA
leadership was composed entirely of state legislators, few of whom
were likely to give up their political careers to lead a
controversial agency which they had opposed in the first place.
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expensive solution in search of a problem. For more and more
suburbanites, the main transportation problem was not reaching
downtown Chicago, but rather traveling from one suburb to
another--a market where transit was simply not equipped to
compete. An organization genuinely concerned with moving people,
rather than transit vehicles in the suburbs might have
experimented with the promotion of ridesharing. In all
likelihood, the RTA could have financed considerable efforts in
this direction using suburban gas tax revenues which would have
been made surplus by simply stabilizing suburban transit service,
rather than expanding it.
One Region, One Fare?
Like the entire mass transportation issue, the ideal of a
standard fare structure, which the CTA and its predecessors had
offered for decades, spilled across the city line into the
suburbs. The first step towards uniform fares came in 1974, when
the narrow passage of the RTA referendum guaranteed a more stable
financial future for the CTA. The CTA, then under the leadership
of Milton Pikarsky, eliminated additional zone charges for "L"
travel from the suburbs (which dated from the earliest days of
"L" travel in Chicago). Riders from the suburbs of Cicero,
Evanston, Oak Park, and Skokie were the most obvious
beneficiaries of this move.
In 1976, by which point Pikarsky had moved from the CTA to
the RTA, the RTA undertook two fare policy initiatives affecting
the fares which riders paid on transit carriers other than the
CTA. One was to standardize bus fares in the suburbs and
institute a city-suburban RTA Transfer. This meant that suburban
bus riders could pay the same basic fare and transfer charge as
their CTA counterparts, and receive a transfer which would be
valid on all CTA services as well as on other suburban buses.
Similarly, CTA riders could now use their transfers on suburban
buses. The early 20th century concept of "one city, one fare"
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had now come to the suburbs. Even though relatively few riders
took advantage of the RTA Transfer, the move seems to have been
well received in both the city and suburbs (at least to the
extent that it was noticed).
The other move was to set up a single zone fare system for
Chicago's commuter railroads. This time, there were clear losers
as well as winners. The new fares, based on five-mile zones from
each downtown commuter rail terminal, were somewhere in the
middle range of the previously-existing fares.' Thus, Chicago &
North Western riders enjoyed lower fares than before, but many
Burlington Northern and Illinois Central commuters found
themselves paying more under the new system. The RTA mollified
much of the potential discontent of riders whose fares had been
raised by upholding high standards of service on Chicago's
commuter trains.
Successe...
Whether or not the RTA did so in a cost-effective manner, it
did produce some tangible benefits for Chicago area commuters.
It helped channel much-needed money to the CTA for a variety of
capital improvements. In the suburbs, it shored up the sagging
finances of bus companies which might have otherwise gone out of
business. When several companies warned the RTA that they were
about to go out of business because they could no longer meet
their payrolls, the RTA board, "then still operating without
staff and in borrowed office space," acted quickly:
Within a matter of days, emergency grant checks were
issued which kept these failing bus companies in
business. In addition, similar emergency grants were
* See Metra (1987 a) for full details not only of
Chicagoland's standardized commuter railroad fares, but also the
individual railroads' fares at the time of the signing of purchase-
of-service contracts with the RTA in the mid-1970s.
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made to the CTA and to the commuter railroads.'
One of the few accomplishments of which the agency might be
unequivocally proud during the 1970s was its rehabilitation of
the Rock Island. The railroad, which declared bankruptcy in
1975, had neglected track maintenance, particularly on its
Beverly line on the city's far South Side. Derailments and other
delays were alarmingly common. Mercifully, the slow speeds at
which, for safety reasons, trains operated over much of the track
minimized the damage done by the various derailments.
The RTA rehabilitated the Rock Island's tracks during the
late 1970s, and by the early 1980s had replaced all of the
railroad's antiquated coaches dating from the 1920s with modern
cars, thus bringing the Rock Island up to the same high standards
prevailing on Chicago's other commuter railroads. Interestingly,
the city's appointees to the RTA board were initially skeptical
about rehabilitating the Rock Island. They changed their minds,
however, when transit officials pointed out to them that fully
half of the Rock Island's riders traveled within the city
limits.'
... And Failure
The RTA seemed determined to give the suburbs their money's
worth of bus service, whether the suburbs wanted it or not. If
the consumer response, lukewarm at best, was anything to go by,
they did not. In retrospect, the RTA missed a golden opportunity
to build support in the suburbs by promoting and facilitating van
pooling and other ride sharing alternatives to driving alone.
Even if the RTA had focused its suburban efforts largely on the
5 Tecson (1975 b), p. 23.
6 Young (1978 d), p. 17. Even by 1991, after a decade of
rapid growth in the suburbs along and near the Rock Island, the
city's share of the railroad's ridership still stood at 43% (Metra
1992, p. 2).
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commuter trains, and had merely stabilized existing suburban bus
services rather than start new ones as well, the agency might
have evoked less suburban antipathy. In retrospect,
conspicuously spending suburban tax money on inaugurating little-
used bus routes was not a wise move.
During the mid-1970s, especially during 1976-1978, it seemed
that several weeks hardly went by without a newspaper story
announcing a new bus route somewhere in the suburbs. Yet little
market research seems to have gone into the creation of these
routes, which expanded the reach of bus service well beyond the
five to ten mile range beyond the city limits which had
characterized most suburban bus companies by 1973. Occasional
journalistic accounts of trips taken on some of these routes over
the years consistently describe near-empty buses, an impression
which is confirmed by the low farebox cost recovery of the
suburban bus system as a whole.
As the 1980s opened (and the RTA ran out of money), the
agency seems to have recognized the need for more informed
decision-making in the interests of increasing the cost-
effectiveness of suburban bus service. By that point, James
Jarzab (now Chicagoland's chief suburban bus planner) and Charles
Metalitz of the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission
prepared a computer model which compared population density in
the suburbs to the provision of bus service.' The commission's
work, regrettably, came too late to forestall the creation of
many routes of doubtful wisdom, which seem to have taken on
considerable symbolic value to the suburbs they serve.
There was little negative reaction to the RTA's commuter
7 This author, a college student at the time, was an intern
who assisted Mr. Jarzab in preparing some of the data in early
1980.
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rail subsidies and other stabilization efforts. Nevertheless, it
was less than self-evident that the suburbs needed the RTA even
to carry out commuter rail functions. Suburban transit districts
had shown that locally-controlled institutions could carry out
specific, locally-agreed-on mandates with regard to commuter
trains and, in the case of Nortran, suburban buses.
The board structure of the RTA, it seemed to many
suburbanites, gave them little opportunity to resist the city's
efforts to subsidize the CTA at their expense. Following the
results of the 1970 census, the eight regular board seats were
evenly divided between Chicago and the suburbs. The suburbs had
already seen how the city members, who usually voted as a solid
bloc on major issues, were able to wear down suburban resistance
to the city's preference of Milton Pikarsky for RTA chairman.
Thus, the city enjoyed a virtually solid bloc of mayoral
appointees. This guaranteed that the city would have its way on
routine matters requiring only a simple majority vote (although
in practice the city members were often more than willing to
negotiate specific budget items with their suburban
counterparts). But even on issues which required a three-fifths
supermajority, such as the RTA's budget, the suburbs were still
uneasy, as it took only one of the four suburban members to break
ranks for the city's four appointees and the chairman to prevail.
Having been thwarted in the General Assembly in 1973, in the
referendum in 1974, and again in the choice of an RTA chairman,
suburban voters bided their time. Politicians in the suburbs
were anxious to avoid the fate of former Republican House leader
H. Robert Blair, whose entire political career (to say nothing of
his gubernatorial aspirations) was abruptly derailed when his
constituents unseated him in what observers saw as revenge for
Blair's leading role in passing the RTA legislation. Greg Snow,
an aspirant for public office in Lake County during the mid-
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1970s, adopted the campaign slogan "Tell the RTA where to go."
Snow's choice of words suggested the temper of the times.
The political demise of Dan Walker
One of Mayor Daley's last victories, occurring in the March
1976 gubernatorial primary, was to secure the defeat of Governor
Dan Walker by supporting Michael Howlett, a genial (and older)
machine loyalist. Four years earlier Walker had enjoyed the
luxury of running against Richard Ogilvie's state income tax, but
now he was running on the basis of his own record as governor.
He had won against Richard Ogilvie and the state income tax, but
when he ran on the basis of his own record, he lost. In 1972
many suburbanites and downstaters had support the telegenic,
flexible Walker against the stolid, principled Ogilvie. In 1976,
Walker found the Democratic faithful in Chicago rallying around
Michael Howlett, while the mantle of good government passed to
Republican James Thompson. After briefly considering a third-
party challenge for office, Walker prudently withdrew from the
political scene.
The rise of Jim Thompson
In 1976 Illinoisans elected a Chicago Republican, James R.
Thompson, as governor. He went on to become Illinois' longest-
serving governor (1976-1990). His four terms spanned a period of
uncharacteristic instability in Chicago politics, and provided a
stable counterpart to the rapidly-changing situation in Chicago.
In a state where Democrats outnumber Republicans, Thompson's long
survival in office demanded that he appeal to many Democrats, and
above all to the growing number of suburbanites who, in an era of
widespread education and all-encompassing mass communications,
prided themselves on splitting their tickets.
Thompson became a household name in Illinois starting in
1973, when he led the prosecution of former governor Otto Kerner
on corruption charges related to a racetrack. Thanks to
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Thompson, Kerner became the first incumbent federal appeals judge
to go to prison. Thompson was also well-known for his
prosecution of no fewer than four of Mayor Daley's top associates
in 1974. Thompson convicted Aldermen Tom Keane and Paul Wigoda,
County Clerk Edward Barrett, and the mayor's press secretary Earl
Bush on a variety of corruption charges.'
If Thompson considered running for the mayor's office in
1975, as some accounts suggest, he thought better of the idea,
and instead entered the gubernatorial contest (a field which Bob
Blair's constituents had cleared two years earlier by unseating
the incumbent House Speaker). Winning his own party's primary
with few difficulties, Thompson proceeded to wage a generally
friendly general election campaign against the machine's nominee
Michael Howlett. Mayor Daley seems to have accepted Howlett's
defeat with equanimity, satisfied that Walker had been removed in
the primary.
Chicago politics after Mayor Daley
All of Chicago, and much of the nation, was shaken by Mayor
Daley's death from a heart attack the day before Christmas, 1976.
Even his political opponents spoke respectfully of the master of
the political craft who had brought Chicago's machine through
challenging times. The identities of the man and the mayoralty
had become so tightly interwoven during his 21 years in office
that the name "Mayor Daley" tripped off the tongues of millions
of Chicagoans as though it were a single word.
* Chicago Republicans did their part during the early 1970s
to sustain the bipartisan nature of corruption as a tradition in
Illinois politics. In 1973, 13th Ward alderman Casey Staszcuk was
convicted of bribery, and his 23rd Ward counterpart Joseph Potempa
pleaded guilty to accepting bribes in return for changes in zoning(Fremon 1988, pp. 97 and 153). Both were Republicans, prompting
Thompson to comment that "there are three Republican aldermen in
the [city] council and now two-thirds of them have been indicted."
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Black machine loyalist Wilson Frost understood the rules of
succession to mean that he was acting mayor, but many white
aldermen were not ready for a black mayor under any circumstances
and bluntly maneuvered Frost aside.' The choice of a majority
of the aldermen was Michael Bilandic, the level-headed alderman
from Daley's own 11th Ward. When Daley died in December 1976, a
special mayoral primary was hastily scheduled for late February
1977, with the general election following in early April. This
short timing gave the party organization few realistic options
other than slating Bilandic, its consensus candidate.
At the time of his appointment as acting mayor, Bilandic
stated that he would not be a candidate in the special mayoral
election which would be held in 1977 to fill out the remainder of
Daley's term (which was scheduled to expire with the 1979 city
elections). Bilandic must have found the mayoralty to his
liking, however, as he had hardly taken office before he
succumbed to the well-choreographed entreaties of a "Draft
Bilandic" movement. The doubtful spontaneity of the "Draft
Bilandic" movement may have seemed melodramatic to sophisticated
lakefront residents, but the ritual doubtless pleased many voters
in some of Chicago's more modest neighborhoods.
Two challengers put up at least a token opposition to
Bilandic in the primary, if only to test the electoral waters.
Northwest side alderman Roman Pucinski ran as a loyal opposition
candidate in the primary. Harold Washington, a black state
representative from the South Side, also challenged Bilandic in
the primary, but failed to carry the vote against Bilandic even
in the city's black wards. No liberal reform candidate even
bothered to contest the mayoralty in 1977, either in the primary
9 Frost had frequently presided over City Council meetings in
Daley's last years, when the mayor, conserving his energy, would
excuse himself from the less essential parts of the proceedings.
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or the general election. It was the first mayoral election in
years, if not within living memory, with no candidate who enjoyed
solid support from the city's liberal voters.
Bilandic won the general election with a comfortable
majority, but on a low turnout (which may have been due in large
part to the lack of a meaningful electoral contest). His share
of the total -vote was smaller than that which Daley had enjoyed
at any point from 1959 onwards, but Bilandic's margin was
substantially greater than Daley's in 1955.
The campaign posters urged voters "Elect Bilandic Mayor--
Keep Chicago Strong," but Bilandic was not a strong leader. Like
former president Gerald Ford, Bilandic was a chief executive of
equable disposition who found himself catapulted, largely by
accident, into an office he had never sought. He had no strong
power base of his own, and whatever authority he enjoyed was on
loan from the ward bosses who had placed him in the mayor's
office in the first place.
Bilandic was a good choice for a caretaker role, but he
lacked the decisive leadership which Chicagoans had grown
accustomed to (happily or not) under Daley. The 1977 election
seemed at the time to be the low point of opposition to the
Democratic organization. In fact, it was the lull before the
storm, as the turbulent 1979 and 1983 campaigns would
demonstrate. But until January 1979, Bilandic was able to govern
effectively without being called upon to lead.
Governor Thompson and Transportation
It was half a year into Thompson's first term as governor
when he announced Chicagoan John Kramer as his choice for
Secretary of Transportation. Kramer was the state transportation
department's director of policy and planning, and had
distinguished himself by lobbying Congress to obtain additional
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highway money for Illinois. Partisanship was not Thompson's
foremost consideration in choosing Kramer; as the new secretary
described himself as
a registered Democrat; his most active political role
was to serve as coordinator of Carter's transportation
task force, a group that contributed ideas for the
President's campaign. "But my commitment to the
Thompson administration is as sincere a one as I have
ever made," he added.10
Thompson defended his choice in terms of Kramer's
professional record. In order to minimize political friction
with members of his own party, however, the governor delayed
announcing Kramer as his choice until the General Assembly had
adjourned for the summer.
The transportation secretary under the departing Walker
administration had been Langhorne Bond, who became head of the
Federal Aviation Administration under Jimmy Carter in Washington.
Kramer might have followed his former boss to Washington or
pursued any one of many public or private sector opportunities
when he accepted Thompson's offer to head the Illinois Department
of Transportation. Kramer remained in the background for several
years, but became a pivotal figure when the RTA was reformed in
the early 1980s.
The Gas Tax
The RTA changed to a new financial reporting system in 1978.
Although the RTA claimed that this was an improvement in
managerial and accounting terms, outside observers may be
forgiven for suspecting other motives which date back to the late
19th century.1 By leaving a highly confusing series of records
10 Chicago Tribune, July 7, 1977.
11 David Young of the Chicago Tribune described the accounting
change as having been made in large part to conceal the RTA's out-
of-control finances (interview, June 1992).
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behind him, Charles Yerkes had made it all but impossible for
researchers to figure out how he performed his various financial
manipulations. Similarly, some managers or other policy makers
may have sought to hide the extent of the agency's financial
problems.
But not even financial sleight of hand could change the fact
that the RTA was spending more money than it was taking in. The
Chicago delegation thought they had the answer: to activate the
agency's power to collect a 5% gasoline tax throughout the six-
county metropolitan area. Suburban board members disagreed,
reflecting the overwhelming mood of the constituents of the
officials who appointed them. But in the end, a crack in
suburban solidarity gave the city the opening it wanted.
To pass the tax, the RTA needed the votes of a supermajority
of six of the nine board members. All four city members and
chairman Milton Pikarsky were in favor of the tax, but they
needed a sixth vote for passage. Board member Daniel Baldino,
from the suburb of Evanston (which was served by CTA buses and an
"L" line as well as the Chicago & North Western commuter
railroad) cast the deciding vote for the gasoline tax on June 30,
1977. Baldino was widely criticized in the suburbs for his vote,
but he explained that he could not take the risk of forcing the
financially-overextended RTA into a budget crisis, for fear of
the effects on suburban transit riders.
Unlike city members, who sought to enact the tax on a
permanent basis, Baldino agreed to the gas tax only for the next
two years, thus ensuring that the tax issue would return in 1979.
Nevertheless, the gas tax became a heartily-detested symbol of
the RTA's unwanted intrusion into the pockets of suburbanites.
The Ouster of Milton Pikarsky
Rightly or wrongly, RTA chairman Milton Pikarsky was the
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target of much of the growing suburban resentment of the RTA,
even before he was appointed. By the summer of 1978, the city
could no longer afford to resist suburban demands for his ouster.
The suburban board members showed how serious they were by
delaying approval of the agency's budget until Pikarsky left.
Mayor Bilandic decided not to make an issue of the chairman's
office. When Pikarsky resigned for the good of the RTA, his
departure probably had the full approval of City Hall.
Unfortunately for the suburbs, their board members and
elected officials had little idea of who they wanted in
Pikarsky's place. As Clark Burrus, Chicago's city comptroller at
the time, described it,
There was no logic there. It wasn't that
[suburban board members were saying] "We get Milton
Pikarsky out ... and bring in this [other] guy who
supports us." It was just "Pikarsky's got to go; we
don't care who comes in to replace him." (...) They
had no plans after getting rid of Milton Pikarsky."
This lack of a planned strategy on the part of the suburbs
enabled the city to take the lead in picking Pikarsky's
successor. According to one account, Mayor Bilandic offered the
suburbs a choice between.Marshall Suloway, the city's public
works commissioner, and Lewis Hill, the city's chief urban
planner. The suburbs opted for Mr. Hill." RTA critic Cal
Skinner was among the few suburbanites prescient enough to
refrain from cheering. He described the change as "replacing one
Daley clone with another."14 Skinner was probably speaking in
political terms, as this analysis did not take personality
differences between the two men into account.
12 Interview, October 1995.
13 Chicago Tribune, August 7, 1978.
14 Chicago Tribune, August 4, 1977.
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The ouster of Pikarsky may have been emotionally satisfying
for the suburbs, but in the broad picture it may well have been a
serious mistake. Contrary to Representative Skinner's remark at
the time, there was a difference between Milton Pikarsky and
Lewis Hill. Pikarsky was a severe technocrat who often rubbed
people the wrong way, but he was a transportation professional
with an enormous knowledge of infrastructure systems. Hill, by
contrast, started off on the right foot. As the city's planning
chief, Hill may have been more palatable to the suburbs, if only
because the top transit job had traditionally gone to the city's
public works chief (Mr. Suloway at the time).
Hill had the added advantage, at least at first glance, of
displaying an ability to get along with people--an area in which
Pikarsky had not excelled. But over the next several years Hill
gained a reputation in newspaper accounts (and among some of this
author's interview informants) as a sociable political crony.
This may not have been what the suburbs had in mind when they
ousted Pikarsky.
The RTA's financial drift and leadership decline were not
immediately apparent to the casual observer. The RTA's outward
bustle of activity--new buses, new suburban bus routes, rail
rebuilding, and new fares--concealed the growing malaise which
would hit the agency in 1979 with all of the sickening thud of a
train derailing on a section of bad track.
After years of neglect, any transit system might expect a
spate of accidents. Similarly, the RTA's institutional problems
were about to overtake the agency with a vengeance in a series of
financial and political accidents starting in 1979, which was a
distinctly unlucky year for mass transit in Chicago.
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CHAPTER 8
1979: A BLIZZARD, A SALES TAX, AND A STRIKE
Public transit was a lively political issue in Chicago
throughout 1979. Even if it was not a decisive year for mass
transportation, it certainly was a controversial one. The
Chicago area's mass transportation system came under unusual
stress, both physical and institutional. Although it was not
clear for several more years, 1979 was the first of two turning
points for the RTA. It was the year that mass transit in the
Chicago area wore out whatever political good will it had. And
the events of 1979 led to and helped shape the 1983 reforms, the
second turning point.
The early part of the year saw the rapid transit system, the
backbone of public transportation in Chicago, buckle under the
strain of a series of heavy snowstorms which helped bring down an
incumbent mayor for the first time since Martin Kennelly lost the
1955 mayoral primary to Richard J. Daley. During the middle part
of the year, the Illinois General Assembly replaced the gasoline
tax with a sales tax, a move which was intended to ease the RTA's
financial problems but ended up exacerbating them. Finally,
Chicago endured a four-day strike in December 1979, which helped
shift the political balance away from the unions.
The Blizzard of 1979
In January 1979, a series of blizzards, which arrived during
a month of abnormal cold even by Chicago standards, demolished
the image of Chicago as the city that worked, and swept Michael
Bilandic out of the mayor's office. Driving and parking became
impossible in many neighborhoods as the city bungled its
traditionally effective snow removal efforts. Nor were all
Chicagoans able to turn to the CTA as an alternative. Large
numbers of rapid transit cars were sidelined during January and
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February of 1979 with burned-out motors, short-circuited by fine-
grained snow and salt.
The frustration of motorists and CTA riders alike with the
city's poor response to the snow was all the more annoying in
contrast to the city's handling of a record snowfall twelve years
earlier. In January 1967 the CTA was hit hard, yet recovered
quickly. In 1979 the snowfall was less spectacular, but the
cumulative damage was greater.
The 1967 Blizzard: General Daley's finest hour
The snowstorm of January 1967 merits consideration both as
an event itself, and as a yardstick against which (however
unfairly) many voters measured the city's snow removal in 1979.
The CTA and the commuter railroads had plenty of experience in
keeping service going through the worst of winter weather,
although nothing matched the January 1967 blizzard. A record
snowfall of 23 inches in 29 hours started in the morning of
Thursday, January 26 and came to an end the next day. Many
commuters spent Thursday night on stalled CTA buses or IC
commuter trains, and many more made it home only with great
difficulty.
Virtually all traffic in the region, including CTA buses,
ground to a halt until plows were able to clear a way and tow
trucks removed disabled vehicles. The CTA suspended service on
those portions of the "L" which operated at grade, but the above-
ground and subway portions of the "L" survived the blizzard with
few problems. On the commuter railroads to the west and north,
the Burlington, Chicago & North Western, and Milwaukee Road
experienced slight delays. The worst problems were on the
commuter lines to the south: a derailment on the approaches to
LaSalle Street Station caused long delays on the Rock Island. On
the Illinois Central, service was largely limited to the
railroad's grade-separated main line (even then, few trains made
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it beyond the city limits). The IC's South Chicago and Blue
Island branches ran entirely at street level, and the combination
of snowdrifts and automobiles stalled on grade crossings put them
out of service.'
Nor was the next day, Friday, January 27, 1967, easy for the
region's transit operators. The CTA reported that 700 to 800 of
their buses were stuck in the snow. The Howard, Englewood,
Jackson Park, and Lake Street elevated lines all ran relatively
smoothly, but a derailment in the yards on the Ravenswood line
disrupted service there for several hours. Similarly, on the
Congress line (located in the Eisenhower Expressway), snowdrifts
and a derailment put the outer end of the line out of service.2
Mayor Daley ordered a snow removal command set up at the
Streets and Sanitation Department headquarters downtown. The
mayor and Illinois Governor Otto Kerner announced that their top
priorities were clearing major roads and approaches to hospitals.
The mayor ordered abandoned cars to be towed to the sides of
streets, without being ticketed (as would normally be the case
with abandoned vehicles). Some 2,685 cars were towed to police
pounds, and a month after the snowstorm 639 of them remained
unclaimed.3 A subsequent newspaper article reviewing the
mayor's efforts was headlined "General Daley", likening the
mayor's role to that of a military commander leading his army
through a major battle--an analogy which rang true to many
Chicagoans who lived through the blizzard.
The city and suburbs started to dig out during the weekend;
1 Chicago Daily News, January 27, 1967.
2 Chicago Tribune, January 28, 1967.
3 Chicago Daily News, January 25, 1977 (in an article
recalling the storm ten years later).
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fortunately there were no further large snowstorms for the
remainder of the winter. Mayor Daley urged people to use mass
transit rather than attempt to drive. Crews were busy clearing
the major streets for several days, and on many side streets
residents simply waited for warmer weather to take away the
accumulated snow.
Things were improving by Monday, January 30, 1967. CTA
buses were operating where streets had been cleared. That
morning's Tribune, preparing readers for the worst, listed about
three dozen CTA bus routes which were partly or entirely out of
service as the paper went to press. In fact, as the next day's
Tribune reported, on Monday "the CTA had service on all but 10 of
its 126 surface routes, but in most areas buses moved slowly. In
some ... streets, only one lane was open to traffic."
Most rail service was more or less on schedule. Some "L"
trains, however, were so filled with riders boarding at outer
stations that they passed some closer-in stations where normally
they would have made station stops (a problem which would become
a volatile political issue twelve years later). The city's
public schools remained closed until Thursday, February 3, a week
after the big storm, thus mercifully taking some of the pressure
off the city's transportation system (if not off parents).'
The 1967 storm soon became a memorable part of the area's
history.' The city's response to the snow reinforced Mayor
Daley's proud claim that Chicago was "the city that works".
* Chicago Sun-Times, February 2, 1967.
5 A Daily News headline on January 22, 1977, nearly ten years
after the storm, asked readers a question which many Chicagoans who
lived through the blizzard asked one another, "Where were you
January 26, 1967?"
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The 1979 snowfall
But Chicago did not work nearly as well in January 1979.
The city's snow removal system collapsed, as officials urged
motorists to drive to lots which they claimed had been cleared of
snow but in fact had not. When motorists tried to drive back to
their initial parking spaces over unplowed side streets, the
result was chaos. Nor did the rapid transit system fare much
better. As rapid transit car failure reached critical
proportions, "L" trains on the through-routed Lake-Dan Ryan
service ran straight through closer-in stations in some of the
city's poorest black neighborhoods without stopping for
passengers, a move which may have contributed to Mayor Bilandic's
defeat in the February mayoral primary.
If the city had survived the 1967 blizzard so well, why was
1979 so much more troublesome? First of all, the 1979 storm was
qualitatively different. The 23-inch snowfall of January 26-27
of 1967 had come in one massive storm, giving citizens and their
governments ample opportunity afterwards to dig themselves out
from under. By contrast, in 1979 the snows came in several
smaller blizzards in rapid succession, which hindered snow
removal. The snow itself was more finely powdered in the 1979
blizzard than it had been twelve years earlier. As a result,
By the end of January there was an accumulation on
the ground of more than 47" and it was mostly solid
ice! Most of the time it was very cold, with a record
setting temperature of -19* F one day. During all of
January, the temperature went above freezing only on
three days, and then only for a few hours. February
began bitter cold and had no temperatures above
freezing until the 20th. Real thawing weather finally
arrived about March 18th [after the mayoral primary
election]! (Krambles & Peterson 1993, p. 93).
As Krambles & Peterson note,
Ice is an excellent electrical insulator and its
presence at contact surfaces will cause severe
[electrical] arcing and even total loss of traction
power. (...) Successful (snow) removal under such
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circumstances is dependant on thawing cycles between
storms, and such did not occur in the 1978-1979 winter!
(Op. cit., p. 92).
The "L" fleet and the storm
Second, changes in the composition of the rapid transit
fleet affected its ability to cope with the 1979 snowfall. In
1967, the CTA had a relatively small number of new "high
performance" cars (so called because of their rapid
acceleration). These cars amounted to less than a third of the
fleet. The vast majority of the CTA's "L" cars at the time had
been built during the 1950s, and could not be operated in the
same trains as the "high performance" cars because they did not
accelerate as quickly.
The "high performance" fleet had been considerably enlarged
by 1979, and accounted for about half of the total fleet by that
point. The CTA's maintenance personnel learned the hard way that
the new cars were particularly prone to breaking down when
subjected to fine-grained snow. On the newer cars, snow got into
the filters which fed air to the electric traction motors for
cooling purposes. When this happened, the traction motors
shorted out with alarming frequency.
Finally, the opening of the Dan Ryan line on the South Side
in 1969 and the extension of the Milwaukee Avenue "L" in the
median strip of the Kennedy Expressway on the Northwest Side had
added new mileage to the system which was neither elevated nor
underground, but instead was at grade. On the elevated lines,
much snowfall either blew off the tracks or fell through the
crossties to the streets and alleys below, and the subways ran
underneath whatever bad weather was affecting the streets. But
on the expressway medians, snow simply drifted over the low
concrete barriers and through the fences which separated the
roadway from the tracks. Not even the late Mayor Daley himself
would have been able to do much against all these circumstances.
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To make matters worse, the expressways were filled with salt
which Midwestern transportation departments rely on to help keep
their roads passable in the winter. As cars and trucks went
along on the expressways, they sprayed slush in all directions--
including onto the tracks and trains in the medians. Mixed in
with the slush was salt, some of which entered the rapid transit
cars' traction motors through the air filters and caused further
damage.
Yet the damage that the blizzard did to motorists, the CTA's
equipment, or its commuters would soon be overshadowed by the
political damage it did to Chicago's Democratic organization. As
a result of the February 1979 primary, the machine would lose
control of the mayor's office, which had been directly or
indirectly in its control since 1931.'
Black voters, remembering numerous past slights from City
Hall, assumed that they were being intentionally shortchanged
once again. Even Grimshaw (1993), in his otherwise superb
analysis of black politics in Chicago, makes this assumption. It
is certainly understandable in terms of the long history of white
machine leaders taking black voters for granted, but there is
another interpretation of what happened.
Who made the fateful decision?
The CTA's highly respected chief operating manager, George
Krambles, was at the pinnacle of his long and distinguished
career when the 1979 blizzard struck. He was faced with a number
of difficult decisions during those trying weeks. A decade and a
half later, this author introduced himself to George Krambles at
a professional meeting, and asked Mr. Krambles about the decision
6 The machine slated a reformer, Martin Kennelly, in 1947 and
1951. Kennelly won office in both of these elections, but because
he had no independent power base of his own, the machine considered
him "safe".
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to run the Lake-Dan Ryan trains nonstop through the closer-in
stations. Mr. Krambles replied unequivocally that he and other
top CTA personnel had made the decision without clearing it
through City Hall, and that under the circumstances he had no
other alternatives.7 As Krambles and his co-author Art Peterson
explain,
Each day the car casualty list increased more rapidly
than repairs could be made. In a futile attempt to
keep the Dan Ryan line going, more cars ... were
borrowed from the other routes but the salt and ice
problem there just would not be overcome. By Monday,
January 29th [1979], because of the daily decrease in
the number of ... cars available for service, more than
half of the 890 cars needed to provide a normal weekday
rush period service over the [entire "L"] system were
disabled...
With so little capacity available, there was
severe overcrowding. Trains were being stalled by
passengers trying to force their way in and out of
fully loaded cars. (...) On the Dan Ryan line,
northbound trains were receiving riders to crush
capacity right at the terminal at 95th Street [in a
black middle class area]. Stopping ... for more people
at intermediate stations only worsened the delay... It
was taking 30 to 40 minutes to make a run normally only
10 minutes long. ... somehow the passenger loading ...
had to be reduced to the level that could be handled...
... only as the lesser of unattractive
alternatives, it was decided to discontinue temporarily
... some intermediate stops during rush hours... The
stops chosen were those on the inner portions of the
Lake and Dan Ryan routes where there was the most
alternative paralleling ... service within walking
distance. (...) At no time were any areas denied
access to some service. Even in the worst of the
crisis all stations were open during off-peak hours
(1993, pp. 94-95).
The decision may have made sense in operating terms, but
politically it was a public relations disaster. Had all of the
circumstances and the technical background forcing the CTA's
Conversation with Mr. Krambles at the January 1994
Transportation Research Board meeting, Washington, DC.
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decision been fully understood in the areas affected (a tall
order in any neighborhood), it might have made some difference at
the margins of the 1979 mayoral primary. But whatever
explanation there was came too late to save Mayor Bilandic.
The 1979 mayoral primary
In 1979 Michael Bilandic became the first incumbent
Democratic mayor of Chicago to lose the primary despite being the
machine's officially-slated candidate. He was not to be the
last, as the same fate would overtake his successor, Jane Byrne,
in 1983.
Jane Byrne had been an official in Mayor Daley's
administration in charge of consumer affairs, and stayed on to
serve into the Bilandic interregnum. Byrne impressed herself on
the public consciousness starting in late 1977 when she asserted
that Bilandic had improperly met with representatives of the taxi
industry prior to approving an increase in the city-regulated
taxi fares.' After a brief dispute with the mayor, conducted
largely through newspaper headlines, Bilandic fired Byrne, after
which she faded into obscurity. Had it not been for the
snowstorm, Byrne would have probably become a historical
footnote, even had she entered the mayoral contest.
When Byrne challenged Bilandic in the mayoral primary, her
sole substantive issue was the incumbent's poor handling of the
blizzard. If January 1979 had seen milder weather, it is
doubtful that Byrne could have mounted a serious challenge to an
incumbent mayor who enjoyed the endorsement of the Regular
Democratic Organization of Cook County (an organization of which
she had been a co-chair).
8 See Chicago Tribune, November 17, 1977 for the text of
Byrne's July 19 memorandum to the mayor on the taxi fare increase.
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The Byrne administration
Byrne was elected on a protest basis, without the benefit of
a mass following built up through years of service to
constituents (although she did enjoy the support of the police
and firefighters' unions). The news media may have help Byrne
get elected, but when it came to governing, the new mayor soon
learned that there was no substitute for an organization at the
ward and precinct levels. The machine already had just such an
organization, and soon enough Byrne made her peace with her
ostensible enemies in order to gain its backing.
Like Argentina's Isabel Per6n, Byrne was dramatic,
unpredictable, and highly personalized in her style of
leadership. In contrast to all Democratic mayors since Anton
Cermak, Byrne sought personal publicity to a degree reminiscent
of "Big Bill" Thompson in the 1910s and 20s:
She hired ex-newspapermen as her top aides. By making
unexpected offhand announcements, she encouraged
reporters to trail behind her throughout every minute
of every day (...) Reminded of past inconsistencies on
the frequent occasions when she broke old promises, she
would say, "I've said this since Day One..." The line
became as characteristic as Richard Nixon's famous one,
"Let me make one thing perfectly clear" (Granger &
Granger 1987, p. 202).
Mayor Byrne made important political decisions based on
people's loyalty, service, and usefulness to herself, rather than
to the party. Thus, for party chairman she replaced the
experienced and gentlemanly George Dunne (who had backed Bilandic
in the February 1979 primary) with the younger, more ambitious,
and combative Ed Vrdolyak. 9 Perhaps the most fundamental and
wrenching of her various changes of mind came in the first year
* This was in spite of the fact that Dunne had made her co-
chairman of the party. In fairness to Mayor Byrne, however, she
needed the cooperation of Vrdolyak, then an important, up-and-
coming alderman, if she was to govern effectively in cooperation
with the City Council.
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of her administration, when she made her peace with Vrdolyak and
other members of the "cabal of evil men" whom she had denounced
in her campaign, and brought the early pseudo-reform phase of her
administration to an abrupt end:
She held long, serious meetings with reform leaders
like the scholarly Martin Oberman from the [North Side
lakefront] Forty-third Ward; these men rushed elatedly
out of her office to busy themselves setting up plans
for her takeover of the City Council in the name of
reform interests. And then, when they called back to
report on their progress, she would not speak to them
(Granger & Granger 1987, p. 201).
That the mayor would reconsider her alliance with reformers
was not surprising:
A large number of the votes that she had received in
the primary were not as much votes for her as they were
votes against Bilandic and the machine. Moreover, her
diverse electoral coalition of the discontented--
blacks, lakefront liberals, and Northwest Side ethnics-
-held sharply conflicting agendas. (...) Finally, the
elected representatives of her [original reform-minded]
coalition possessed little influence within the machine
or the city council (Grimshaw 1992, p. 146).
Another mistake, which was to bring her political career to
an abrupt end in 1983, was the degree to which she turned on the
city's black voters who had helped propel her into office. When
it became necessary to draw up a new ward map incorporating the
results of the 1980 census, Byrne invited former alderman Tom
Keane to be in charge of drawing up the new map of the city's
fifty wards. Keane had been one of the machine's most powerful
figures and one of Mayor Daley's most powerful allies prior to
his conviction in 1974. The result was a ward map which actually
reduced the number of black majority wards in the city, despite
the growth in the city's black population during the 1970s."*
10 The ward map eventually became the subject of a lawsuit,
resulting in a 1986 court decision ordering a remapping of four
wards, where special aldermanic elections took place.
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By the end of her term, Byrne had alienated most blacks who
had voted for her in 1979, and left many liberal voters with
serious doubts about the desirability of keeping her in office.
When she came up for reelection in 1983, the machine rallied
around her not out of any deep loyalty, but rather because the
committeemen saw in her the twin advantages of electoral strength
through incumbency and day-to-day weakness in government, which
latter characteristic they were determined to exploit to their
advantage.
During much of her administration, Byrne seemed to assume
that being visible was as good as being popular, that erratic
symbolism was as good as a consistent agenda, and that being on
the evening television news was as good as having her own
citywide organization at the precinct level. Yet despite her
unpredictable, short-lived, and contradictory initiatives, to her
credit she did offer decisive leadership from time to time. Mass
transportation was one policy area where she showed capable, even
courageous leadership during 1979.
Byrne, Thompson. and transit
The gasoline tax which the RTA board had voted to impose in
1977 was due to expire in mid-1979. There was no likelihood that
the suburbs would consent to any further renewal of the much-
hated gas tax. Clearly, some other source of funding had to be
found, since not even the suburbs were willing to force a
financial showdown with the city over transit (and risk having
their commuter trains suffer along with the CTA). This left few
other options than a sales.tax, which had been authorized in the
1973 RTA legislation.
As David Young explains,
In the spring of 1979 ... a series of mistakes
were made that in retrospect became critical. The
first was a plan hatched by the RTA board to increase
its revenues by seeking a sales tax. Realizing the
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agency could never get a sale tax on top of its
existing gas tax, the agency agreed to abolish the gas
tax in return for a one per cent sales tax in all six
counties of the Chicago area (1981, p. 22).
Unfortunately for the RTA board, the late 1970s were not
prosperous years for the industrial cities of the Great Lakes.
As people found their own spending power threatened by
unemployment and inflation, the voting public was in no mood to
hand over rising amounts of money to an unpopular transit
bureaucracy. The growing resistance to high taxes during hard
times made itself felt in the committee rooms of the State House,
where the RTA funding package was being drafted. Thus,
What finally emerged from the state legislature
... was a modified compromise leaving the RTA far short
of its goals. The legislature empowered the RTA to
levy a one-cent sales tax on Chicago and [the suburban
remainder of] Cook County but only a 0.25 per cent tax
on the five suburban counties [i.e., the so-called
"collar counties"]. In return for the new tax, the
gasoline tax and an existing state subsidy were
abolished (Ibid.).
Expressways and "Ls
The changes in the RTA's funding arrangements were largely
overshadowed by another issue which dominated discussions between
the governor and the mayor. This had to do with capital
financing for new downtown subways and urban expressways.
The late Mayor Daley had long sought to replace the Loop "L"
with subways, and as long as he was alive there seemed little
doubt that the Loop "L" would eventually be torn down. Indeed,
the developers of the Apparel Mart, one block west of the
Merchandise Mart just across the Chicago River north from the
Loop, went ahead with their project partly on the strength of
Mayor Daley's assurances that the proposed Franklin Street subway
would reach their site.
But Mayor Daley may have overreached himself in his efforts
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to build more transportation facilities. In addition to a subway
replacing the Loop "L", the mayor also sought to build a
circumferential Crosstown Expressway which would parallel Cicero
Avenue all the way from the junction of the Edens and Kennedy
expressways to the South Side, where the Crosstown would swing
southeast to join the Dan Ryan Expressway.
The Crosstown Expressway threatened to become an unpopular
political issue in the many neighborhoods it threatened to
disrupt, but Mayor Daley died before the issue came to the fore.
Not even Daley's legendary clout was enough to secure federal
money for either of these mega-projects, let alone both of them.
After Daley's death, the city scaled back its plans, both
for the subway and the Crosstown Expressway. Bilandic accepted
the continued existence of the Lake Street and Wabash Avenue legs
of the Loop "L", and only attempted to move forward with subway
replacements for the Wells and Van Buren Street legs. The
Crosstown Expressway took a higher profile in the press. In
early 1977, Governor Thompson voiced his opposition to the
Crosstown Expressway, and called for a compromise.
In March 1977, Bilandic dropped plans for the North Side
portion of the Crosstown, and focused his efforts on the South
Side segment." The mayor and the governor agreed to proceed
with the southern part of the Crosstown Expressway in May."
However, the project still had to compete with proposals from
other cities which were also seeking federal highway money.
"1 Chicago Tribune, March 6, 1977. According to the city's
calculations, cancellation of the northern leg of the Crosstown
Expressway would free up $475 million in transportation money for
use on other projects. However, this money along would not build
the proposed Loop subway, which carried a price tag of $621 to $767
million.
12 Schneider (1978), p. 9.
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Bilandic's defeat in early 1979 came before work on the
Crosstown had gotten underway. As a candidate, Byrne had
campaigned against both the Crosstown and the Loop subway. Once
in office, she sought to trade in the money which was earmarked
for the city towards these mega-projects for use on smaller, more
neighborhood-scale transportation improvements. The Crosstown
Expressway and Loop subway trade-in resulted in enough federal
and state money to pay for the rehabilitation of the Loop "L" and
the construction of the Midway rapid transit line (the first such
serving the Southwest Side), which opened in 1993. Much of the
trade-in money went to fund state highway projects, and thus
resulted in less money for mass transit."
The capital elements of the Byrne-Thompson deal are of
little importance to the history of transit organization in
Chicago. But the agreement to replace the RTA gas tax with a
sales tax was to have a serious impact on fares, service levels,
and ridership patterns within the next few years.
The RTA funding package
Had the General Assembly simply replaced the gasoline tax
with a 1% sales tax throughout the region, the RTA might well
have come out ahead. But that was not what the General Assembly
13 One interview informant who requested anonymity described
the outcome of the Byrne-Thompson deal as the result of
inexperience on the part of Mayor Byrne, along with a desire to
spite the previous administration by repudiating its transportation
plans immediately. According to this account, Byrne simply
accepted the state's first offer, failing to recognize the offer as
an unrealistic initial offer which she could have bargained to the
city's advantage. This anonymous source had this to say about the
net result for the city:
What she [Byrne] did was to trade in $2 billion that were
allocated ... for the Crosstown [Expressway] ... and what
she got out of it was essentially the Orange Line [rapid
transit to Midway Airport]. So Chicago traded in $2
billion for a couple of hundred million dollars.
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did. Instead, what emerged into law was a 1% sales tax in
Chicago and suburban Cook County, a 14% sales tax in the outer
five "collar counties", and the withdrawal of an existing state
subsidy of 3/32 of the sales tax revenues raised in the RTA's
six-county area. The result was bad news for the RTA and for
transit riders, but this did not become clear until after the
funding package had been put into law. As a result,
[The legislative] compromise ... cost the RTA $60
million a year--the difference between what the one-
cent tax would have realized in the five suburban
[collar] counties and what was actually brought in by
the 0.25 per cent tax (Young 1981, p. 22).
Interestingly, both supporters and opponents of the sales
tax seem to have shared the same miscalculation that the sales
tax would place the RTA on a more sound financial footing."
When asked about this, the Chicago Tribune's former
transportation editor David Young opined that this sort of
miscalculation was well within the normal range of forecasting
error for the prediction of tax yields by government
officials."
The full impact of the new tax arrangements on the RTA would
not become clear for another year. The Chicago transit news in
late 1979 was dominated by the CTA's negotiations with its
operating unions, which climaxed with a strike during the height
of the Christmas shopping season in December.
The December 1979 CTA Strike
14 This gave the debate on the issue a surrealistic quality.
Opponents were correct in their assumption that not enacting the
sales tax would punish the RTA for its spendthrift ways and force
a drastic readjustment of fares and services. Proponents of the
sales tax, on the other hand, argued that it would benefit the RTA,
when in fact the outcome was to force transit into a serious cash
flow crisis.
15 Interview, June 1992.
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Some of the CTA's woes, such as crime and traffic
congestion, were in large part outside its control. One thing,
however, which the CTA could not so readily blame on outside
factors was its labor cost, which was high even by the generous
standards of big city transit systems.
By 1979, the CTA's bus drivers and rapid transit crews were
the best-paid transit operating employees in the continental
United States." Unwilling to sense the shifting political
moods and leave well enough alone, the unions decided to test
Mayor Byrne's political resolve with a strike at the height of
the Christmas shopping season to press further wage demands."
To the surprise of many Chicagoans, Byrne took a tough line with
the unions, perhaps reflecting her lack of a power base among
organized labor (or, for that matter, among members of almost any
other interest group).
As the CTA's front line "sales" force who represented the
agency to its users, bus drivers, "L" station agents, conductors,
and motormen came under considerable stress from such factors as
traffic, crime, fare cheating, and rush-hour crowding. The fact
that some operating employees dealt with these stresses by being
less than courteous to their customers did nothing to raise the
16 Transit workers in Anchorage, AK were paid even more than
their counterparts at the CTA. Alaskan wage levels, however, were
not readily comparable with those in the continental US,
particularly during the 1970s when high energy prices brought rapid
job and population growth to Alaska. Thus, bus drivers in Chicago
(and other large cities) may well have enjoyed greater purchasing
power than their colleagues in Anchorage.
17 Granted, the US economy was experiencing record levels of
inflation in the late 1970s in the waning days of the Carter
administration. Nevertheless, the unions' political judgment may
be questioned on a solidaristic as well as a classical economic
point of view: the non-organized working poor, arguably the hardest
hit by the inflation of the late 1970s, made up a disproportionate
share of the CTA's ridership. It is hard to imagine that many of
these riders felt any deep fellowship with CTA workers.
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esteem in which the traveling public held unionized CTA
personnel. It was unavoidable that in the court of public
opinion, the CTA's better employees suffered along with the worse
ones.
Nor was there much sympathy for the economic demands of the
unions. In labor economics terms, employment with the CTA scored
high on all three dimensions of job quality cited in Beck and
Allen (1994). Unionized employment at the CTA was well-paying, a
legacy of the grab-share arrangements dating back to the days of
the Traction Settlement Ordinance for Chicago Surface Lines and
Samuel Insull's forward-looking management of Chicago Rapid
Transit. Although CTA operating personnel did not enjoy civil
service status, for all practical purposes their job security was
almost absolute, as there was little likelihood that a unionized
monopoly public sector provider of a vital service would seek to
reduce its payrolls through other methods than attrition.
Finally, unionized CTA jobs had high wage growth, a result of
aggressive wage bargaining combined with automatic cost of living
adjustments.
The changing economic climate surrounding the CTA had
parallels in private industry. At the same time that the wage
demands of CTA workers were meeting with a distinctly
unsympathetic reception, manufacturing jobs which met all of the
quality dimensions (high pay, high stability, and high wage
growth) were disappearing throughout the Northeast and the Great
Lakes as industries restructured to meet the challenges of an
increasingly integrated world economy. Thus, as private sector
firms were reexamining their pay practices in light of changing
conditions, Illinois and Chicago could no longer accept levels of
pay which had previously been tolerable as their governments came
under fiscal stress.
Service expansion. yes; wage parity, no
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Despite the RTA's expansion deeper into the suburbs, at
least the agency's board and management did not seek a unified
wage structure for transit workers in the city and suburbs. The
first sign of resistance to labor's demands was when suburban
operator Nortran rejected their drivers' demands for wage parity
with the CTA in 1978." This refusal made sense from both
suburban and city perspectives. The suburban case was
straightforward. If the wage costs of suburban bus operation
were to reach the levels prevailing in the city, fewer suburban
bus-miles could be provided for the same money.
The city also had good reason to be less than enthusiastic
about city-suburban wage parity, as the wage differential helped
the CTA to hire and retain qualified drivers. If the wages were
equal on both sides of the city line, drivers would logically
seek assignment to suburban rather than city routes. Union
contracts require preference be given to senior drivers in
picking their assignments. Thus, wage parity might have left the
CTA with only the youngest and least experienced drivers, who
would move out to suburban routes as soon as seniority permitted.
Alternatively (assuming barriers preventing drivers with
seniority from transferring out to the suburbs), city-suburban
wage parity might have fuelled increased wage demands from CTA
workers. CTA bus drivers would have been justifiably outraged to
find their suburban counterparts, who worked under safer and less
stressful conditions, being paid the same wages. There is a
world of difference between driving a crowded bus on a high-crime
route such as Western Avenue in Chicago, navigating in busy
traffic, and stopping frequently to let riders on and off, versus
" Chicago Tribune, August 16, 1978. At the time, the hourly
wage rates for bus drivers were $7.14 at Nortran versus $8.93 for
the CTA.
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driving a half-empty bus on free-flowing suburban streets, with
few stops other than for traffic signals. Mercifully, the north
suburban drivers did not win wage parity with the CTA.
What happened
The CTA strike of 1979 started and ended within a four-day
period from Monday, December 17 through Thursday, December 20.
At issue was a contested 240 an hour increase which the union
sought. The bus drivers and rapid transit crews walked off the
job at 3 AM on Monday, and ignored a court order directing them
back to work. Mayor Byrne announced that
she would "not put the [CTA] system in hock to keep
trains running.
She said she would not call in the opposing sides
for more talks in her office. The Mayor blasted the
leaders of Locals 241 and 308 of the Amalgamated
Transit Union (ATU) for the betrayal of a "commitment"
to continue negotiating she said wa made on Dec. 8.
At that time, Mrs. Byrne and union leaders announced
the central issue of a cost-of-living clause in the
proposed union contract had been settled. The strike
... has been described as illegal by ... national ATU
president...'
If the unions had expected that the city would be unable to
cope with a strike at the height of the Christmas shopping
season, they were mistaken. There was widespread inconvenience,
but many Chicagoans adapted for a few days. "As expected, taxi
drivers did a roaring trade."2"
For once, the RTA proved its worth in the crunch. The RTA
added additional commuter trains, and rerouting suburban buses to
feed the railroads rather than the "L" (the normal destination of
19 Chicago Tribune, December 18, 1979.
20 Chicago Tribune, December 18, 1979.
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most suburban bus routes entering the city)." These moves were
of little help to closer-in CTA riders, but they did facilitate
normal travel to and from the Loop on the part of Chicagoans
living in the outer portions of the city (and residents of nearby
suburbs who normally used the CTA).
CTA management took a hard line with the unions, both in
negotiations and in actions. Mayor Byrne rejected a union offer
to end the strike immediately in return for a raise of 240 an
hour. Meanwhile, CTA supervisors ran limited rush-hour service
on the Lake, Dan Ryan, Howard, and Ravenswood "L" routes starting
Tuesday evening. Chicago police helped provide security for
trains and riders. The CTA chose these routes because they
consisted of elevated or grade-separated surface alignments,
which were easier to protect against potential sabotage than were
subways. As all available CTA supervisors were involved in train
operations, there was no attempt to collect fares."
Union leaders kept up their bravado for several days, but
with the CTA using management personnel to run partial train
service, and the RTA adding extra commuter trains to help keep
the city moving, the unions clearly lacked the ability to disrupt
the normal life of the city as seriously as they had anticipated.
The [CTA] strategy for Thursday morning changed
only with the addition of the Evanston shuttle between
Linden Avenue and Howard Street during rush periods...
Commuting was slow and crowded Wednesday night for
CTA train riders, but officials said the operation
generally was smooth."
21 Chicago Tribune, December 17, 1979. The article noted that
"Riders will pay appropriate fares when traveling on the ...
trains. [Suburban] bus transfers will not be honored on commuter
railroads."
22 Chicago Tribune, December 19, 1979.
23 Chicago Tribune, December 20, 1979.
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The strike ended on Thursday when a court injunction gave
the strikers the raise they had been demanding.
With resumption of service [Friday morning] came the
threat of a fare increase, which [CTA chairman Eugene]
Barnes said "probably" would be required by the court-
ordered payment of a 24-cents-an hour cost-of-living
increase to motormen, drivers, and conductors."
What it meant
The unions had won their economic demands, but at the
political cost of losing much of their public support. As
commentators attempted to draw conclusions from the strike, the
fact that the unions had achieved their nominal aims was promptly
forgotten. Instead, Mayor Byrne and CTA management were widely
lauded for their consistent line taken during the strike.
Although the high inflation of the late 1970s was eroding
the incomes of most Americans, unionized CTA workers were largely
compensated for the effects of inflation by automatic cost of
living adjustments in their labor contract. This difference
between CTA workers and most of the riders they transported made
it difficult for the strikers to garner much support from the
general public.
Whether or not Mayor Byrne understood the significance of
what she had done, she had just presided over the first decisive
turning point in the hitherto-unbroken history of increasing
centralization and government power with regard to transit in
Chicago. A failure to follow through on the political weakening
of the unions, however, meant that another four years--
financially the most difficult of Chicago's transit history--
would pass before the overall balance of forces would tip away
from the unions and towards a cost-conscious agenda more
agreeable to the suburbs.
24 Chicago Tribune, December 21, 1979.
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CHAPTER 9
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE RTA, 1980-1982
In 1979 the state replaced the RTA's gasoline tax, which was
due to expire, with a sales tax (at a lower rate than the RTA
board had sought beyond Cook County), and also withdrew an
existing state subsidy. The result was to push transit in
Chicagoland to the brink of financial collapse as fares soared
and services were cut.
Ten years earlier when political leaders warned of the
impending collapse of the CTA and suburban carriers, the state
acted, however imperfectly, to resolve the problem. But now
after a decade of rising subsidies, the state was in no hurry to
help the unpopular RTA. As the state struggled through the worst
recession of its postwar history, many lawmakers and their
constituents had more urgent problems on their hands than the
entreaties of a large, inefficient bureaucracy. To many in the
suburbs it seemed as through transit advocates had been crying
wolf for years. If the cry was genuine this time, maybe it would
teach the city, the CTA and the RTA a lesson.
The once-dreaded transit crisis was less feared in the early
1980s when it actually struck than it had a decade earlier, when
it had merely loomed ominously over Chicago's commuters. As
matters now came to a head, Chicagoans and suburbanites coped
with the problems as best they could, and most adapted to the
higher fares and reduced service that 1981 brought.
The Transit Cash Crunch
The General Assembly, in replacing the RTA gasoline tax with
a sales tax, gave the RTA a 1% sales tax only in Cook County,
rather than throughout the region, as the agency had sought.
Instead, the lawmakers gave the RTA only a A% sales tax in the
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collar counties, and also revoked a previously-existing state
subsidy based on the sales tax.
That, coupled with the reduced sales tax revenues
because of the recession, actually gave the RTA less
money than it would have received under the old.
During the first four months of the 15-month fiscal
year that ended September 30, 1980, the RTA received an
average of $27.9 million a month in gas tax and state
subsidy revenues. During the last 11 months of the
year under the new sales tax formula, it got an average
of only $20.8 million a month...
Making matters worse was the fact that Congress
was late in passing the federal transportation budget
that year, causing a two-month delay in the payment of
more the $70 million in federal operating subsidies due
the RTA. The agency was also forced to wait for three
months after the abolition of the gas tax and state
subsidy before revenues from the new sales tax came
rolling in... The net effect was to put the RTA in an
acute cash position (Young 1981, p. 22).
The effect of the lower intake from the 1979 tax changes,
along with the political rigidities of wage and service demands,
produced impacts throughout the Chicago area's transit system.1
The CTA was the least seriously hit of the three main components
of the transit system, although the impact was serious enough to
most of its riders. During 1981, the basic CTA fare went up from
600, first to 750 and then to 900, for an increase of 50%.2
1 There is an alternative interpretation of the 1979 switch
from the gasoline tax to the sales tax. As former Chicago city
comptroller and CTA chairman Clark Burrus noted, "If we had a gas
tax today, I don't think we would have nearly as much subsidy
dollars available" (interview, October 1995) . Mr. Burrus was
referring to the sharp decline in real energy prices in the early
1980s. At best, retaining the gas tax might have delayed the RTA's
financial crisis for a couple of years, but continued reliance on
the gas tax would not have averted severe financial problems.
2 The first increase took place in January 1981. The second
increase took place that summer. Initially, the CTA board had held
off on the second fare increase (from 75C to 900) in anticipation
of a bailout from the state. When the legislature adjourned at the
end of June without enacting a bailout, the CTA quickly raised its
fares, seeing no other way of making ends meet.
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This increase was enough to cover the shortfall in subsidies from
the RTA, and restored some of the constant value of passenger
revenues which had been eroded by the de facto low-fare policy of
the high-inflation late 1970s.
The impact was greater on the commuter railroads. First,
effective March 1, 1981, the RTA cut about 19% of the previously-
existing trains from the schedules, affecting only mid-day,
evening, and weekend service. 3 Also, there were three fare
hikes during 1981, taking effect on January 1, July 6, and
October 1. The result was that by October 1981, commuter rail
fares had roughly doubled over the previous year's levels.'
Riders on the Milwaukee Road paid even more. The railroad had
entered bankruptcy in 1979, and its trustees tried to protect
themselves from further losses in case the RTA collapsed
altogether. They imposed an additional surcharge of about 10% on
top of the already-doubled fares.
Hardest hit of all were the suburban buses. For all the
increased service that had been lavished upon the suburban bus
during the 1970s, when it seemed that the RTA could hardly spend
suburban money rapidly enough, it remained the least important
element of Chicagoland's transit system--both in ridership and
political terms. Fare increases were the least of the problems
for the relatively few suburban bus riders. As the RTA fell
short on its subsidy payments to suburban bus companies, parts of
the system would simply shut down. The shutdowns occurred on a
rolling basis, with different parts of suburbia--north and
3 Chicago Sun-Times, December 23, 1980. Out of a total of
3,726 trains previously operated each week on the Burlington
Northern, Chicago & North Western, Illinois Central, Milwaukee
Road, and Rock Island, 719 trains were eliminated, for an aggregate
cutback of 19%.
* See Metra (1987 a) for details by fare zone and ticket
type.
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northwest, west, southwest, and south--temporarily losing and
then regaining service in turn.'
Although the suburbs were hit even harder than the city,
there was little complaint from suburbanites. Most of them paid
their increased fares or made alternative arrangements quietly.
But when large numbers of them shifted from commuter trains to
charter school buses to take them to and from downtown Chicago,
the rest of the region sat up and took notice.
A Transit Finance Authority?
Meanwhile, there were various proposals for legislative
action. In early 1981, Governor Thompson offered what he saw as
a constructive solution to the RTA's problems. He suggested a
Transportation Finance Agency, which would be funded by a 5% tax
on the gross receipts of the Illinois business transactions of
oil companies. Thompson envisioned that this agency would
replace the RTA and limit its mandate to funding and supervising
transit operators.
From a statewide equity perspective, the Transit Finance
Authority had much to recommend it. If it was legitimate for
downstate Illinois to absorb the bulk of the state gasoline tax
revenues generated in the city, then there should be few ethical
problems with having consumers of petroleum products throughout
the state help pay for transit in Chicago and its suburbs. The
Transit Finance Authority proposal seemed too good to be true,
and it was.
The governor backed away from the Transit Finance Authority
when his oil company tax proposal drew attacks from an unlikely
* It is symptomatic of the near-invisibility of the suburban
bus in political terms that the shutdowns received virtually no
coverage in the newspapers or even in the transportation press.
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combination of Chicago and downstate interests. Senator Charles
Chew, Jr. (D-Chicago), chairman of the Legislative Black Caucus,
attacked the plan for taxing gross receipts rather than profits.
This distinction appears to have been a semantic one, made for
the benefit of the electorate; surely Senator Chew did not really
think that a tax on profits rather than income would prevent the
oil companies from passing on the tax to consumers. A more
serious objection came from the president of the Illinois Farm
Bureau, who opposed the plan "because the proposed oil tax would
place 'a disproportionate share' of the tax burden on farmers."'
Rumblings From the Suburbs
Meanwhile, suburban discontent was building up in the State
House. The House approved a bill which would have reapportioned
RTA board seats immediately (a move which would benefit the
suburbs), rather than await the legally-required deadline of July
1, 1983. (The Senate held back, pending Thompson's efforts to
replace the RTA with his proposed Transit Finance Authority.)
Another bill sponsored by RTA critic George Sangmeister (by
then a Democratic state senator) would have given not only county
but also township boards the power to opt out of the RTA, subject
to approval by their voters in a referendum. 7 Although
Sangmeister's bill died, it was an indication of how many
suburbanites felt about the RTA.
Sound And Fury From City Hall
Mayor Byrne resorted to her accustomed style of governance
by news conference when she announced to members of the press
that Republican legislators had gone back on their side of a deal
6 Chicago Tribune, March 27, 1981.
Chicago Tribune, May 5, 1981.
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they had made with her administration." According to Byrne, she
had agreed to changes in the RTA board in return for more money
for the agency. The mayor claimed to be leaving the door open
for future talks, but by undercutting the process of legislative
give and take, her announcement had the effect of calling the
deal off.
The mayor's public denunciations of her negotiating
counterparts in the State House did little for the fiscal health
of transit in Chicagoland. The General Assembly passed a limited
bailout measure before adjourning for the summer in June 1981,
but its provisions were only enough to keep the agency barely
functional.
The Governor's Reaction
Thompson did not give up his efforts to reform the RTA. In
the fall of 1981, Governor Thompson proposed replacing the
existing 13-member RTA board
with a new nine-member board, controlled by the
suburbs. Four members from Chicago would be appointed
by Mayor Byrne. Three from suburban Cook County would
be chosen by the suburban members of the County Board.
One from DuPage County would be chosen by that county
board, and another member representing the remaining
four collar counties ... would be appointed jointly by
their boards (Chicago Sun-Times, October 16, 1981).
Thompson also proposed that farebox recovery standards be
set, so that "50 percent of operating expenses [would] come from
fares or local contributions beginning July 1, 1982, and 55
percent beginning July 1, 1983" (ibid.). A suburban Cook County
RTA board member called for making the authority a funding agency
only, with all responsibility for operations being turned over to
other organizations.'
8 Chicago Sun-Times and Chicago Tribune, June 14, 1981.
9 Chicago Tribune, October 6, 1981.
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Other efforts continued during 1981 and 1982. One of the
more bizarre and short-lived developments of the cash flow crisis
years was Mayor Byrne's tentative plan to take the CTA out of the
RTA. The mayor reasoned that if the RTA were on the verge of
bankruptcy, it would do the CTA little good to be dependant on
the RTA. To her credit, she confronted, however briefly, the
question of how the city would pay for an independent CTA.
Governor Thompson, however, urged Byrne to give the state a
chance to address the RTA issue. Wisely, the mayor listened, and
held off on further moves to detach the CTA from the RTA.
All of these moves at the political level helped forge a
consensus for the reform that would follow in 1983. But
meanwhile, commuters were busy adapting to the fare hikes and
service cuts in ways that took transit planners by surprise.
The Resurgence of Unofficial Transit
Until 1981, when fare increases led commuters to breach the
monopoly position of the RTA family of government-subsidized
transit, none of Chicago's transit operators had ever faced
widespread competition from non-franchised operators. The
official framework of franchises obtained and inherited through
the political process (in many cases, through corruption) had
strictly limited entry to the transit industry. This system
conferred oligopoly rights on the corporate descendants of firms
which had originally obtained operating rights.
Prior to 1981, the only long-standing example of unofficial
public transportation in Chicago was the jitney service along
Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive, one of the principal thoroughfares
of Chicago's South Side black community. Historically,
officially-franchised public transportation on South Park Avenue,
as King Drive was called before 1968, was provided by Chicago
Motor Coach, which was bought out by the CTA in 1952.
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Researchers seem to have overlooked the King Drive jitney
service, which, along with the King Drive buses, has formed a
stable de facto duopoly for decades."* The premium fare which
Chicago Motor Coach charged for years probably aided the
development of the jitneys, which catered to the more modest end
of the market. Ethnic solidarity in Chicago's black community
may have been another crucial factor."
In 1973, when the RTA was created, the CTA fare was 45 cents
(with another 10 cents for a transfer), while the jitney fare was
only 25 cents. Segmentation of the travel market probably
resulted in little direct competition for the same clientele
between the two modes. The jitneys catered exclusively to local
travel along King Drive, while the buses carried people to and
from the Loop, and, thanks to the CTA's transfer privileges, also
served people traveling to and from other parts of the city. As
King Drive is one of the busiest bus routes the CTA operates, the
authority has probably lost little in the way of business by
tolerating the jitneys, and has probably gained good will--a
vital intangible for the CTA which has often been in short
supply. 1
10 There is no evidence that the private transit companies
(particularly CMC) or the CTA sought a legal crackdown on the
jitneys. Circumstantial evidence would suggest that the jitneys
had reached their own informal understanding with the city,
independent of the transit carriers' views on the matter.
" Until the postwar period, Chicago's transit operating staff
was overwhelmingly Irish. (It was common for firms such as the
transit companies which needed the good will of the city government
to allocate various positions to ward committeemen for distribution
as they saw fit). The jitney drivers, of course, like most of
their customers, were black, and riding the jitneys may have taken
on a certain aspect of community self-help.
12 It speaks in favor of the King Drive jitneys that they
generally respect the orderly driving style of Chicago traffic.
This is in contrast to the unsafe driving habits of several
informal van operators in New York City, some of whom operate in
disregard of vehicle licensing and insurance requirements, or even
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There is a long, if inconspicuous history of unofficial
transit in the Chicago area. For decades it was a localized
phenomenon, limited to Chicago's longest-established black
neighborhoods. Then during the RTA's financial crisis in the
early 1980s, unofficial service broke out of its ghetto and
became highly visible in the city and suburbs alike.
The Railroad Commuters' Revolt and the School Bus Charters
Unofficial transit reached the suburbs during the early
1980s in the form of the school bus charter. At the time,
commuter rail services were pricing themselves out of the market
for many riders." Passengers were widely dissatisfied with
rising fares, all the more so as they were accompanied by service
cuts. Some responded by organizing themselves into groups which
chartered school buses to take them between their communities and
the Loop.
In contrast to the King Drive jitneys, which were all but
invisible for most white Chicagoans and suburbanites, the
charters were highly conspicuous because they served the Loop
every weekday. Furthermore, the bus charters enjoyed an aura of
respectability as a spontaneous, market-driven citizens' response
to an inefficient and arrogant public agency. If California's
Proposition 13 (limiting the rate at which property taxes in that
state could increase) was emblematic of a "taxpayer revolt," then
without a valid driver's license. For more on the problems of the
New York City vans, see Daniel K. Boyle, 1994, "Jitney Enforcement
Strategies in New York City, " presented at the 73rd Annual Meeting
of the Transportation Research Board, Washington.
"3 The school bus charter phenomenon was almost entirely
limited to the city-to-suburb travel market. One exception was in
the Chicago neighborhood of Hyde Park, located on the South Side
along the Illinois Central (Gitz 1982, pp. 2-3), which also saw
charter service. Substantial numbers of Hyde Park residents
commuted on the IC, so the example of south suburban IC commuters
forming bus charter groups may have inspired some Hyde Parkers to
do likewise.
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the charters symbolized a commuter revolt.
Commuters in many working-class suburbs were highly
sensitive to price, and more willing to endure a less comfortable
ride in return for cost savings than were their counterparts in
wealthier communities. The geographic distribution of the
charters reflected the spatial arrangement of social class in the
suburbs. The.bus charters were most prevalent to the south of
the city, reflecting the concentration of working class suburbs
in that part of the RTA service area. Several southwestern and
western suburban locations were also served, albeit to a lesser
degree. There was little or no charter service in the most
affluent suburbs to the north and northwest of the city,
suggesting that riders in upper income brackets were more
inclined to swallow the fare increases.
Schwieterman (1983, p. 10) states that almost 70% of the bus
charters originated in suburbs along the Illinois Central south
of the city." In a broader historical perspective, it was
'4 Schwieterman's study focuses on the Illinois Central,
because it was affected by the subscription bus charter phenomenon
more than any other Chicago railroad. To his credit, he is
virtually the only author who has attempted to translate the
comfort and convenience differential between the school bus charter
and the train into monetary terms by correlating changes in
ridership with changes in the constant dollar difference between
bus and train fares (1983, pp. 44-46).
Schwieterman's work is valuable as a starting point for
further research, but should not be taken as the final word on the
subject. For one thing, it is unlikely that the cost functions in
Schwieterman's model are indeed linear, as he suggests.
Furthermore, Schwieterman makes no attempt to compensate for
the effects of the recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s on
the total amount of travel to and from downtown Chicago by any mode
of transportation--admittedly a difficult factor to quantify. The
recession may have heightened the price sensitivity of commuters.
Thus, fare increases coming at a time of recession may have had a
different impact on travel patterns than if fare hikes of
comparable percentage magnitudes had taken place in more prosperous
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ironic that the charter phenomenon was most widespread along the
IC. When the Illinois Central was electrified in 1926, it was
Chicago's finest commuter railroad, both in terms of the
frequency and quality of its service." Now in the early 1980s,
the IC was once again in the forefront of innovation in public
transportation, and, by implication, showing the way for the rest
of the region. This time, however, it was the railroad's
commuters, not management, who had taken the initiative, and they
were seeking lower-cost alternatives to the train."
times. Schwieterman is making a contribution to the field by
trying to measure the diversion effect of the fare hikes, but some
of his assumptions may be debated.
Finally, the recession and the decentralization of employment
may make Illinois Central commuters seem more sensitive than they
really were to fare increases. Some people must have stopped
riding not because the fares became too high, but instead because
they lost their jobs, or their workplaces shifted to locations
outside downtown Chicago. Unfortunately, there is no ready way to
distinguish between the ridership loss caused by diversion to
subscription buses and the automobile on the one hand, and by
various shifts in the economy on the other hand.
"s When the other commuter railroads acquired diesel
locomotives and air-conditioned coaches in the 1950s, they became
the region's leaders in terms of riding comfort, a position the IC
did not regain until the arrival of new cars in the early 1970s.
Even after the service cutbacks in 1981, the IC remained the
Chicago area commuter railroad with the most intensive service,
although only by a small margin in some instances.
16 The formation of charters was not uniform within the IC
corridor. Instead, there was a market segmentation process at
work. According to Gitz (1982, maps following p. 40), most of the
municipalities along the IC were served by school bus charters in
1981, but Flossmoor and Olympia Fields did not have subscription
bus service. These two decidedly upper-middle class villages had
the highest median home prices in the IC corridor (data from Hayner
& McNamee 1991, pp. 332-394). This is contrast to most of their
less well-off counterparts elsewhere along and near the railroad,
almost all of which did see charter service. Overall, this
suggests that commuters in the most affluent south suburbs, like
their counterparts in the northwest and north suburbs, were more
inclined to pay higher fares than to save money by switching to the
less convenient and less comfortable bus charters.
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Several authors have studied the charters in more detail
(Gitz 1982, Schwieterman 1983, McKnight & Paaswell 1985) . Young
estimates that in 1981 the charters were carrying around 5,000
riders daily (1982, p. 26). Assuming each rider took one round
trip daily, 260 days a year (i.e., allowing for weekends,
holidays and vacations), this suggests around 2.6 million charter
bus rides annually. Schwieterman's estimated 70% share of total
charter ridership from the Illinois Central's catchment area
implies that about 1.8 million riders were diverted from the IC
to the bus charters, or about 15% of the IC's ridership prior to
the RTA's financial crisis.
The Bus Charters and the Law
The subscription bus charters seem to have fallen under a
gray area of Illinois law. The charters were not specifically
prohibited, but they were not exactly authorized, either. This
legal uncertainty made the school bus operators risk-averse in
their arrangements with commuters. For guidance, the bus
companies drew on a hitherto-obscure court decision from the
1950s which exempted them from common carrier regulations if they
dealt with riders through written contracts for transportation on
a monthly basis, and did not offer one-way fares (Schwieterman
1983, pp. 11-12) . To play it safe, the school bus companies
limited themselves to monthly ticketing."
Apparently the Illinois Commerce Commission agreed with the
companies' interpretation of the law. Rather than test the legal
waters and thus infuriate thousands of commuters who were trying
to stretch their modest finances by taking the school bus
"7 The school bus companies may have had good reason to be
careful. One unofficial transit operation was challenged in court
in 1962, shortly before the abandonment of the North Shore Line
interurban in 1963. The case was resolved when the informal
operator agreed to limit itself to monthly subscription travel
(Central Electric Railfans Association 1963, p. 86).
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charters, the commission prudently overlooked the common carrier
issue, and restricted itself to making sure that operators met
all safety and insurance regulations (Schwieterman 1983, p.11).
Riders signed up for a month at a time, on a specific bus,
as part of a specific group of commuters. Although subscription
bus riders were inconvenienced by being tied to specific
departure times, they enjoyed significant financial cost savings.
(Ibid., p. 9). Another intangible tradeoff was that the buses
were less comfortable than the train.18
The Economics of the School Buses
The low cost was the main attraction of the charters. A
typical charter bus monthly fare, assuming all 48 seats on board
were sold, might be $50.42 per passenger, while the comparable
commuter rail monthly ticket from the same fare zone was $99.90
(Gitz 1982, p. 10). To make the contrast even more vivid, the
18 The quality of commuter railroad seating in the Chicago
area cannot be quantified, but it varied among different railroads
in the area. Uniform standards for seating quality do not exist in
the transit industry, but experience with the various Chicagoland
commuter railroads at the time suggests that the Illinois Central
enjoyed the most comfortable seats, both in terms of ergonomic fit
and depth of upholstery.
The Burlington Northern's seats ranked along with or
marginally below the IC's for comfort, with much of this difference
probably due to the fact that seats on the BN, unlike those on the
IC, had reversible backs. Ranking below the Burlington Northern on
an informal comfort scale would be the Milwaukee Road and the Rock
Island. (The complete replacement of the Rock Island's own
commuter cars since the mid-1980s with new cars built to RTA
specifications has since given the Rock Island's seating comfort a
slight edge over the Milwaukee Road, owing to the continued
operation of the latter railroad's cars dating from the 1960s.)
Interestingly, the least comfortable seating (i.e., the
hardest and least contoured) of all Chicago commuter railroads was
on the Chicago & North Western. The North Western also served the
most affluent suburbs which were least affected by the charter bus
phenomenon.
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lower charter fare covered all of the operator's out-of-pocket
costs and still left a profit margin, but the higher rail fare
covered little more than half of the train's operating costs.'
The ability of the subscription bus to compete with the
train almost exclusively on the basis of price was largely due to
lower equipment and labor costs. In contrast to the IC, "in
which more than 50% of costs are attributable to labor, the input
[i.e., labor] accounts for only 27% of subscription bus costs"
(Schwieterman 1983, p. 26). The non-unionized nature of the
19 Some observers might conclude that the optimum public
policy choice would be to discontinue most or all commuter rail
service that cannot be made financially self-sustaining. This
would allow commuters and taxpayers to allocate the monetary
savings as they see fit, whether for commuting or other purposes.
A more sober analysis, however, would also take into account
such less visible expenses as the labor protection costs of laying
off commuter railroad workers (which would constitute a substantial
budgetary barrier to any rapid discontinuance of commuter rail
service and could only be avoided by eliminating jobs through
attrition), and the external costs of increased traffic congestion.
This latter amount would be measured in terms of total person-hours
of delay, multiplied by the monetary value of the lost time caused
by the additional automobiles and buses that would be necessary to
accommodate former railroad commuters. If preliminary calculations
by researchers studying the economics of congestion pricing are
accurate, this latter cost could easily be enormous, considering
the large aggregate numbers of business executives who gather en
masse in Chicago's Loop every day, and on whose time the market
places a high value.
Once ranges for these and other costs were established,
theoretically it would become possible to determine socially
optimal levels of peak period commuter rail service, and perhaps
encourage the formation of. an according number of bus charters,
possibly by pricing commuter rail service based on estimated demand
elasticities of commuters at different income levels. In practice,
of course, the issue would have to be resolved, if at all, through
the political process. Realistically, commuter rail patrons of
modest means would resent being priced off the train onto a less
comfortable and less flexible school bus, as many of them were in
the early 1980s. This resentment would be all the more intense as
long the travel of higher-income railroad commuters was still being
subsidized.
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school bus industry, in turn, gave the bus charters their
competitive edge with regard to labor costs:
First, because of the intense competition within
the industry, union-induced wage increases would put a
firm at a severe competitive disadvantage and be
counterproductive to both management and labor. No
unionized firm has yet to be successful in bidding for
subscription bus service. ( ... ) Competition from more
than 100 firms demands that firms minimize costs, and
it erodes the attractiveness of organized labor for
even the most profitable carriers.
Secondly, the high percentage of part-time labor
is an equally significant buffer against unionization
(Schwieterman 1983, p. 20).
Since most of the buses were used in school service,
commuter runs were planned around the requirements of school
service. Morning runs were usually scheduled early (starting
between 6:30 and 7:30 AM, with running times to the Loop of up to
an hour), and afternoon departures from downtown were rarely
scheduled for later than 5:00 or 5:15 PM (Gitz 1982, p. 4).
From the companies' point of view, carrying commuters was an
added bonus, but school service remained their bread and butter.
For whatever reasons, operators with more comfortable equipment
did not enter the subscription bus market, or perhaps groups of
commuters did not seek to charter these (presumably more
expensive) buses.
The bus companies did not deal with riders individually, but
rather with a coordinator who served as an intermediary, and in
many cases organized the charter. Typically, coordinators
collected payment from riders and in turn paid the bus company.
In some cases they recruited new riders to replace commuters lost
through attrition.2
20 In almost all cases, the coordinators offered their
services free of charge. Had the charters remained part of the
Chicago transit scene, it might have become necessary for customers
to offer their coordinators such incentives as reduced-price or
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Coordinators typically identified riders
by the simple and time-honored methods used to organize
community [groups] and advertise garage sales. Most of
the coordinators surveyed ... [said] the same things:
"I collected names, handed out flyers, put up signs,
put an ad in the local paper or in church bulletins,
held a meeting." (...) Apparently several of the
municipalities supported or actively helped these
efforts, as several coordinators mentioned having held
a meeting at the village hall, or having gone to a
meeting organized by the village. (Gitz 1982, pp 6-7).
The Rise and Fall of the School Bus Charters
Despite their rapid rise and seeming promise, the school bus
charter phenomenon was short-lived, which none of the authors who
studied them in depth anticipated. By the mid- to late 1980s,
the charters had faded into obscurity. There seem to be no
follow-up studies on the process by which they exited the scene
(not surprising, given the practical difficulties of locating
representative samples of former subscription bus riders to
interview). Economics and problems of information supply to
potential riders appear to have been decisive.
The normal turnover of ridership was probably the key factor
in the charters' demise.2' Although turnover was not
free transportation in order to maintain their continued services.
Of course, reimbursing coordinators for their efforts would have
eroded the cost advantage of the bus charters, at least at the
margin.
21 Middleton (1994, p. 62) cites an annual turnover rate of
at least one-fifth of Chicago area commuter rail riders in the
early 1990s. If we assume (perhaps generously) that IC riders ten
years previously were twice as likely to remain regular commuters,
this still works out to a turnover rate of about 10% annually.
Applying this 10% turnover rate to a 48-member charter bus group,
the normal attrition rate works out to almost five members per
year. Although it might have been easy to recruit five members a
year by word of mouth as long as the doubling of commuter train
fares remained fresh in the minds of the traveling public, by the
mid-1980s (when fares had been partly rolled back and were more
stable in real terms) this level of recruitment might have become
more difficult to sustain.
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necessarily fatal by itself, when combined with an inability to
recruit new riders it would have been enough to undermine the
charter groups sooner or later. Commuters without access to
word-of-mouth or other informal channels faced substantial
barriers to information if they wished to find out about bus
charters serving their areas. The school bus operators did not
advertise, nor did the groups of commuters which had chartered
the buses (except on a very informal basis) .22
The RTA, by contrast, enjoyed organizational economies of
scale in informing commuters about its services. Despite its
financial troubles, the RTA still maintained a telephone
information number, and issued maps and timetables showing where
and when its trains and buses operated.
After the initial wave of discontent caused by the doubling
22 It may be that both the school bus companies and the
charter group coordinators were reluctant to make any organized
efforts to provide information for fear of attracting the unwelcome
attention of the Illinois Commerce Commission. Since advertising
a transportation service is a characteristic activity of a common
carrier, the lack of a more systematic information outreach than
the occasional flyer taped to a supermarket bulletin board may have
helped ensure that the charters did not stray beyond the legal
"gray area" they occupied.
The school bus companies and the groups of commuters
chartering their buses might have been able to get around these
difficulties had they convinced a public agency other than the RTA
(e.g., the Chicago Area Transportation Study or the Northeastern
Illinois Planning Commission) to collect and provide information
about vacancies on charter buses. This, however, might have
required a certain amount Qf lobbying, with the problems that the
lobbying might not be successful, and that even if it were,
somebody would have to bear the cost. In what economists call the
collective action problem, the entire Chicagoland school bus
industry would enjoy the benefits of successful lobbying, but few
individual firms would be willing to bear the costs in the absence
of assurance that their competitors would also pay their share.
The collective action problem would also deter groups of bus riders
from advertising vacancies through channels which would involve
spending money.
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of fares had produced a large number of angry riders willing to
try the bus charters, the rail fares were rolled back somewhat in
1984 when the post-reform RTA's finances had been stabilized, and
then rose more or less in line with inflation. This meant that
there were no further waves of disgruntled commuters flocking to
the bus charters. Also, the reduced fares may have caused many
subscription bus riders to reconsider the train.
Another factor may have been that once the novelty of the
bus charters had worn off, some riders may have missed the more
frequent schedules, the comfortable seats, the more adequate
legroom, and the smooth ride of the train, or decided that the
convenience of the automobile was best for their purposes. The
prosperity of the mid-1980s may have also given school bus riders
enough additional wherewithal to afford one or another of these
more comfortable options more readily.
Urban Riders Adapt: The IC and the Jeffery Express Bus
The Illinois Central's ridership problems were not limited
to the suburbs. Among Chicago's various commuter railroads, the
IC carried the largest number of riders in the city.23 South
Siders had long been accustomed to paying higher fares on the IC
than on the CTA and its predecessors, but until 1976 the
differential had been fairly moderate. In 1974, at the time of
the RTA referendum, the 7-mile ride from Hyde Park to downtown
cost 450 on the CTA, versus 650 on the IC.
Then in 1976 the RTA standardized commuter railroad fares
into a uniform set of distance-based zone fares. At a time when
the basic CTA fare was 500, the IC fare suddenly jumped from 65C
23 The Rock Island carried a greater proportion of its riders
in the city (about one-half at the time, as opposed to one-third
for the IC). Nevertheless, the IC's total number of urban riders
was larger than the Rock Island's, due to the IC's larger overall
ridership basis.
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to $1.00. The widened fare differential hurt IC ridership in the
city, as customers switched from the IC to the CTA. By 1980, the
CTA fare was 600, and it cost $1.15 to ride the IC to Hyde Park
from downtown. (The fares to South Shore and other more distant
neighborhoods were even higher than those to Hyde Park.)
Then in 1981 the fare differential widened even further.
The CTA fare reached 90C by the end of the year, a 50% increase,
but the IC fare to Hyde Park had reached a staggering $2.15,
which was 87% above previous levels. For many commuters, the IC
had been worth the 40% premium above the CTA prevailing in 1973.
Even the 100% differential as of 1977 had not produced such a
massive shift. But to many commuters, the combination of the
drastic fare hikes of 1981 and the 139% difference now in effect
between the CTA and the IC fares to Hyde Park was simply too
much.
The greatest impact on the IC's urban ridership was felt in
Hyde Park-Kenwood on the main line, and in South Shore on the
South Chicago branch. Fortunately for these riders--if not for
the IC--there was a readily-available option in the form of CTA's
#6 Jeffery Express bus. The bus and the IC had been in a more or
less stable equilibrium until the standard zone fares which the
RTA put in place on the IC in November 1976 made the train
decidedly more expensive than the bus. But it was not until 1981
that large numbers of IC commuters concluded that the RTA no
longer wanted them to take the train.
If CTA's planners had wanted to design a bus route to take
over from the IC in Hyde Park and South Shore, they could hardly
have done a better job than with the Jeffery Express. The bus
ran nonstop along Chicago's Outer Drive from the south end of the
Loop to 47th Street, where the affluent Hyde Park-Kenwood
neighborhood begins. In South Shore, the bus followed Jeffery
Boulevard, which crossed the IC's South Chicago branch at 71st
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Street (the Bryn Mawr station), and was within a mile or less of
the remaining IC stations in South Shore.
The results were predictable. Large numbers of former IC
passengers now showed up at Jeffery Express bus stops, and
crowded aboard the bus. Despite its financial problems, the CTA
tried to add more buses to keep up with demand, but to little
avail. At times it seemed that additional buses only brought
more people onto the buses, as word spread that the CTA was
putting on extra capacity. Sheer physical throughput capacity
had replaced the now-overturned balance of the market as the
chief determinant of ridership on the Jeffery Express bus. As
long as the enormous fare differential remained in place, transit
planners had an insoluble problem on their hands.
Rebalancing a Travel Market
For thousands of commuters, the switch from the train to the
bus was a rational, if annoying, tradeoff of time and comfort for
money. But from the RTA's point of view, these changes disrupted
this segment of the travel market. It made little sense for the
RTA to pay the CTA to add more Jeffery Express buses with one
hand, and to pay the IC to run half-empty commuter trains with
the other.
What made these ridership changes particularly uneconomic
for taxpayers was that passengers were demanding more buses
during the rush hours. This is precisely when the incremental
costs of additional service are the highest. Meanwhile, existing
investment in the Illinois Central was going to waste. The
public sector was stuck not only with the short-term labor costs
of hiring engineers and conductors, but with its long-term
investment in rail cars as well. Because of their electric
propulsion and their high-platform doors, the IC cars could not
be reassigned to other RTA-subsidized commuter railroads, which
ran with diesel locomotives and stopped at low-level platforms.
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Fortunately, even the virtually bankrupt RTA did have the
sense to use prices to try to bring riders back to the IC and
take some of the pressure off the Jeffery bus. In an experiment
which started in March 1982, the RTA reduced fares from downtown
to 79th Street on the IC's main line and on the entire South
Chicago branch (including South Shore) ." The new $1.35 fare on
the IC was much more competitive with the 900 CTA fare. As an
added inducement for regular IC riders, the RTA allowed holders
of weekly and monthly tickets in the reduced-fare territory to
ride CTA buses to and from the IC for 60C, a one-third
discount."
The RTA must have been satisfied with the results, because
the experiment led to a broader and more permanent set of
arrangements in 1985. Lower fares for close-in commuter rail
trips were extended from the IC to all of Northeastern Illinois'
commuter railroads. At the same time, the discounted CTA fares
were replaced with a "Link-Up Passport" (in the form of a sticker
which monthly commuters could buy for their tickets), allowing
unlimited travel on the "L" and all regular city and suburban
buses ."
Transit and Illinois politics
Thus were the travel arrangements of thousands of commuters
disrupted by the fare hikes. There was no shortage of ideas in
24 As RTA chairman Lewis Hill pointed out to Bill Fahrenwald
of Railway Age, "this type of coordination has been possible only
since RTA was formed" (Railway Age, February 1983).
25 See Metra (1987 a) , Appendix B for details of the fare
changes during these years.
26 The Link-Up Passport lasted in this form until January
1995, when it became restricted to the suburbs only as the CTA, for
other reasons, withdrew its previously-existing passes. The CTA
began honoring the Link-Up Passport again in August of that year,
but for reasons best known to its own management, limited its
validity to Monday-Friday rush hours only.
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the State House or the governor's office as to what should be
done. But with both the governor and the mayor seeking
reelection, the political timetable made it almost impossible for
any controversial measures to be enacted any time soon. It was
only after the dust had settled on the November 1982
gubernatorial election and the spring 1983 mayoral election that
decisive action became possible.
Governor Thompson was returned to office, albeit by the
narrowest margin of his career. But Mayor Byrne was not so
fortunate, thanks to a series of political mistakes she made on
issues other than mass transit. Like her predecessor, Michael
Bilandic, Jane Byrne was about to become the second incumbent
mayor slated by the Regular Democratic Organization of Cook
County to be defeated in the Democratic mayoral primary.
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CHAPTER 10
THE 1983 RTA REFORMS: THE STATE STEPS IN AGAIN
Nineteen eighty-three was a decisive year for the suburbs in
their struggle to gain control over the RTA. The suburbs now had
a majority of the region's population, which entitled them to the
upper hand on the RTA board. The suburbs gained a majority on
the RTA board during the summer of 1983 as a routine matter of
reapportionment due to population shifts documented in the 1980
census. 1 But to many elected officials with their power base in
the suburbs, this was not enough. The 1983 reforms were, in
large measure, driven by suburban perceptions that the RTA was
out of control.
Yet the victory of the suburbs was far from complete. At
the moment when suburban political actors might have overhauled
not only the Chicago area transit institutions but also the
fundamental premises underlying them, the suburbs discovered that
they, too had vested interests which they wanted to safeguard.
Ironically, the suburbs' efforts to reform the RTA were
successful in large part because they were able to enlist the
cooperation of the mayor of Chicago in his dispute with a
majority of the city council.
Governor Thompson negotiated an RTA reform package with
Chicago's newly-elected Mayor Harold Washington, the city's first
black chief executive. Mayor Washington played a crucial role in
the RTA reform process, because his was the small voting bloc in
Springfield which Thompson courted in his efforts to pass the RTA
reforms over the concerted opposition of the Chicago machine.
The genesis of the 1983 reform
1 Chicago Tribune, July 12, 1983.
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The 1983 reforms did not spring from the Thompson
administration full-blown. Instead, it was the result of several
years of discussion towards a consensus. The Metropolitan
Planning Council (MPC), a nonprofit organization concerned with
good government issues and the economic well-being of Chicago's
central area, was the first to suggest a series of changes from
which the 1983 reforms evolved.
In a report issued in December 1980, just before the
dramatic fare increases and service cuts of 1981 took hold, the
Metropolitan Planning Council recommended that the RTA board
confine itself to administration, policy, and oversight of
transit operators. The report also called for a requirement that
a set proportion of operating expenses, from 40 to 45%, be
recouped from the farebox, with predictable, incremental fare
increases rather than infrequent, dramatic ones (Gitz 1980).
The MPC's Transportation Committee oversaw the preparation
of the report. George Ranney, Jr. chaired the committee. Its
members included Pastora Cafferty (widow of the late CTA general
manager Michael Cafferty, and a member of the RTA Board from 1974
until after the passage of the gasoline tax in 1978) and Milton
Pikarsky, the former RTA chairman. Apparently Pikarsky had
thought long and hard about the difficulties of making a large,
cumbersome organization like the RTA work, and had concluded that
a larger number of smaller, more responsive institutions could
meet the mobility needs of transit users more efficiently than
could a few big, centralized bodies.2
Shortly following on the heels of the MPC report came a
study for IDOT, the Illinois Department of Transportation. This
consultant's study was prepared for IDOT's internal use rather
2 See Pikarsky & Johnson (1983). The same authors outline
their arguments in a chapter in Lave (1985).
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than for publication (in contrast to the MPC report), and
therefore received little publicity even within the
transportation community. Prepared by Lazard Freres & Company,
the report, dated January 27, 1981, rejected both the status quo
and the extreme of doing away with the RTA altogether (an option
which might have pleased some suburbanites wishing to redress the
balance of the 1970s). Instead, the report suggested a middle
route, involving two basic changes to the institutional structure
which formed the core of the 1983 reforms.
The first was a regional transit organization responsible
for administrative and budgetary oversight, with no involvement
in transit operations. The other was the delineation of three
transit providers: the already-existing CTA, and two new
organizations which would take over transit in the suburbs from
the RTA: one for buses and the other for commuter trains.'
According to IDOT's Stephen Schindel, the consultant reached
these conclusions independently of the Metropolitan Planning
Council's report.'
The suburban mayors act
The 1983 reforms were presaged in large part by an
unsuccessful insurgency on the part of local suburban
governments. The MPC and Lazard Freres reports had helped frame
the terms of discussion, but they did not lead directly to
political action. This came in 1982 on the initiative of an
entrepreneurial group of suburban mayors working from an agency
little known outside Chicago transportation circles.
The Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS), as the
designated Metropolitan Planning Organization for the six
3 Lazard Freres (1981), p. 6.
* Interview, October 1995.
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counties of northeastern Illinois, acts as a clearing house for
federal transportation funds to the area, and is responsible for
ensuring that local authorities continue to remain eligible for
federal transportation money. CATS normally works on the fringes
of the political process, in the gray area where politics fades
into bureaucracy. It provides technical assistance to
transportation agencies and elected officials seeking to navigate
the bureaucratic shoals of federal requirements.
But briefly during 1981 and 1982, CATS helped make events,
rather than simply ratify them. For many years CATS has had a
council of suburban mayors, who meet under the agency's aegis to
discuss common transportation problems. The council was chaired
by Florence Boone, mayor of Glencoe, an affluent suburb on the
North Shore.- Boone and several other mayors took an interest
in suburban bus services, which were being temporarily shut down
across most of suburbia as the RTA simply ran out of money in
1981 and could not pay its usual subsidies.
A September 21, 1981 Executive Committee meeting of the
Council of Mayors suggested a regional board for oversight
purposes, and the following distribution of political
responsibilities by transit mode:
That the CTA be controlled by the City, the Suburban
Buses be controlled by the suburban mayors,, the
Commuter Railroads be controlled by the State and the
six county area; all three phases [i.e., the CTA,
suburban buses, and commuter railroads] shall be under
the umbrella of the Regional Board...
A similar resolution dated -October 26, 1981 called for an annual
process of fiscal review through which the "Umbrella Board" would
ensure that the three operators were operating with balanced
budgets.
5 Boone was to become the chair of the Suburban Bus Board,
which was created as part of the 1983 RTA reforms.
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These basic principles were embodied in a bill which
suburban proponents of transit reform introduced during the 1982
legislative session. The suburban mayors' bill failed by a
narrow margin in the House and failed to come up for a vote in
the Senate.'
The bill's timing may have been more of a factor in its
defeat than its legislative merits. The political uncertainty
surrounding the November 1982 gubernatorial election and the
mayoral election of early 1983 precluded decisive action until
all the results were in. Once Harold Washington had become mayor
in April of 1983, a development few white politicians had
anticipated, the practical business of political negotiation
could get under way.
Harold Washington and the Machine
Harold Washington became the candidate around whom dissident
forces rallied and handed the machine the most decisive setback
of its history. Yet until five years before his election he
remained a member of the machine. A figure of great depth and
complexity, his record suggests him as an improbable insurgent.
Washington may have won the mayor's office despite the best
efforts of the machine, but his image as a reformer dates only
from 1978. Prior to that point, Washington had been a machine
figure, albeit one with enough of a streak of restlessness to
preclude his rising rapidly within the machine's ranks.
As mayor, Washington would make the late Mayor Daley, along
with a variety of other elected officials, the subject of his
lively invective. However, he may have felt differently while
Daley was still alive. As Rakove (1975) describes, Washington
6 Interview with Sidney Weseman, September 1995. Now a
planner with the Regional Transportation Authority, Weseman was a
CATS staff member who worked with the suburban Council of Mayors on
their RTA reform initiative in the early 1980s.
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backed Mayor Daley against liberal challenger Bill Singer in the
1975 primary:
As black state representative Harold Washington of
Chicago's South Side declared on February 14, 1975, in
announcing that he supported Mayor Daley for re-
election, "it would set back black political
empowerment seven or eight or more years if Alderman
William Singer defeats Daley on February 25" (in the
mayoral primary election). According to Washington,
while he wanted changes made to the patronage system,
he did not want it abolished. "It helped other ethnic
groups," Washington told black Chicago Tribune
correspondent Vernon Jarrett. "Why should it be denied
use by my people?" (pp. 196-197).
What is most interesting about Washington's endorsement was
his call for Mayor Daley's reelection in terms of black
empowerment. This seemingly incongruent mixture spoke to
Washington's ability to bridge political divides, an ability that
would serve him well in his 1983 bid for the mayor's office.
Even allowing for the possibility that the Democratic
organization may have used some of its many incentives to induce
Washington to come out publicly for Mayor Daley, it seems
unlikely that Washington would have argued his case as
articulately had it run counter to his deepest beliefs.
Shortly after Mayor Daley's death, Washington tested the
electoral waters in the special 1977 mayoral primary, in which he
performed poorly. Although Washington posed little electoral
threat to Bilandic in the primary, Bilandic and the machine moved
against him a year later:
When Washington came up for election to the state
senate in 1978, he was reslated by a majority of the
five committeemen in the senate district. However,
Bilandic took the rare step of allowing the two
dissenting committeemen to openly oppose Washington by
running a candidate against him. Washington ...
managed to win the election, but by only a few hundred
votes.
Bilandic's extraordinary decision ... convinced
Washington that he had to get out of the machine.
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Thus, just as Daley had driven [Congressman Ralph]
Metcalfe out of the machine and transformed him into a
heroic figure in the black community, Bilandic's
treachery did the same thing for Washington (Grimshaw
1992, p. 153).
Following his minimal showing in 1977, Washington did not
even attempt to contest the 1979 mayoral primary, when Byrne
defeated Bilandic with the disproportionate help of the city's
black voters. Nor was he apparently eager to run again in 1983
until he had evidence that the city's black residents would
register and vote in large numbers. He allowed a "Draft
Washington" movement, with its basis among a mixture of black
activists and the black middle class, to recruit him only when
they had satisfied him that the numbers gave him a good chance of
becoming mayor.
The 1983 mayoral primary
In 1983, Jane Byrne became the second incumbent mayor slated
by the local Democratic party to be defeated since Cermak brought
the Democratic machine to power in 1931. As with Governor Dan
Walker's ill-fated reelection campaign in 1976, Byrne discovered
that being reelected on her own record was not nearly as easy as
running as an outsider against an unpopular incumbent.
Richard M. Daley, the son of the legendary mayor, siphoned
off just enough of the white vote to deprive Byrne of the
Democratic nomination. Any other candidate to have done the same
might have earned the enmity of many white voters for his role in
facilitating Washington's defeat of Byrne, but the younger
Daley's machine credentials were beyond question. Furthermore,
the mayor had made enemies within the machine camp in the course
of her quick rise to power. The bad blood between Byrne and
Daley was notorious, and in the absence of a strong black
candidate, might have dominated the primary.
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The 1983 mayoral election
For the first time since Anton Cermak's election in 1931,
the general election was more than a formality. Washington had
won the Democratic primary, but his election was far from
certain. The close nature of the 1983 mayoral general election
and the political divisions that followed introduced a new
element of volatility into the city's politics.
When Washington won the Democratic mayoral primary, he
assumed that the party organization would close ranks behind him
as it had around Jane Byrne four years earlier. But Washington
soon faced a massive defection among white machine Democrats who
bolted their party to support the Republican nominee, Bernard
Epton. To his credit, Cook County Board president George Dunne
was the only white politician in good standing with the Regular
Democratic Organization to support Washington in the general
election.
As the machine fragmented, it was an irony that its white
leadership backed the Republican Epton. Had Byrne or Daley won
the Democratic primary, Epton, a former state representative from
the University of Chicago area, might well have become a classic
"suicide" candidate, supported by good government advocates and
performing miserably at the polls. Instead, Epton found himself
as the candidate of white resistance to black demands for
increased participation in urban politics. Unfortunately, Epton
gave into the temptation which this situation presented. One of
his campaign slogans, "Before It's Too Late," was widely seen as
a crude racial appeal. Had Epton won, he might have found
himself in a position similar to that of Martin Kennelly (1947-
1955). - The machine tolerated Kennelly as long as he was useful,
but he had no power base of his own outside the machine, which
discarded him as soon as it had a viable candidate of its own.
The general election campaign, like the primary, was
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dominated by racial issues. But like Anton Cermak and Richard J.
Daley, Washington understood that elections were won by building
out from a core constituency to reach out to other groups of
voters who might be induced to support him.' As in the primary,
Washington's black core constituency and his Latino and liberal
reform allies barely carried the day, by the narrowest of
margins.
Polarization and Council Wars
No sooner had the dust settled on the 1983 general election
than Mayor Washington found himself at odds with a majority of
the aldermen. Council Wars, as the ongoing feud between Mayor
Washington and his aldermanic opponents became known, resulted in
a deadlock.' The mayor could not muster a majority to pass
bills supported by his allies, yet his opponents did not command
enough votes to override his veto. Even though the state rather
than the city would decide the future of the RTA, Council Wars
affected the outcome because the divisions in City Hall
reverberated in the chambers of the State House.
Governor Thompson was faced with a situation without
precedent in Illinois politics since Anton Cermak came to power.
For the first time since the Democrats won the mayoralty 1931,
7 Washington's election paralleled that of Anton Cermak five
decades earlier. They both combined an ample knowledge of the
operation of government with an instinctive rapport with their core
constituencies. Both men seized political opportunities which
their more complacent predecessors had overlooked. Their geniuses
lay in their ability to translate the process of ethnic succession
into political change. Washington and Cermak both came to power
through the efforts of long-ignored groups of voters who resented
their support being taken for granted by previous mayors.
a The expression "Council Wars" originated with comedian
Aaron Freeman. In a comedy skit of the same name, Freeman based a
satirized developments in Chicago politics, based on the plot and
characters of the movie "Star Wars". In Freeman's "Council Wars"
skit, Mayor Washington became "Harold Skytalker, " and his chief
rival, Alderman Edward Vrdolyak, became "Darth Vrdolyak".
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the city was governed by a mayor who did not enjoy a satisfactory
working arrangement with the Democratic organization. This
complicated relations between Springfield and City Hall, as there
were now rival political actors claiming to speak for the city.
The governor's agenda
The RTA was one of the first issues which required the
attention of the state government in 1983. Governor Thompson
used his political influence to bring about a resolution of the
RTA issue, but he left the details up to his transportation
secretary, John Kramer. The administration sought--and got--a
bill which included the following provisions:
1. There would be three service boards responsible for operating,
or contracting for the operation of transit in the six counties
of northeastern Illinois. One of these was the CTA, which would
be retained with no modification to its internal structure or its
board.
2. The suburban county governments would control a new Commuter
Rail Board (known as Metra since 1984). Suburban members of the
Cook County Board would make the Cook County appointments to the
Commuter Rail Board, although the City of Chicago would also
nominate one member.
3. The suburban mayors would receive control of a new Suburban
Bus Board (which has marketed itself as Pace since 1985). This
was basically the organization which they had sought through the
Chicago Area Transportation Study in their short-lived
legislative initiative of 1981-1982. The reform bill spelled out
in exhaustive detail the districts from which village mayors
would select their colleagues to sit on the Suburban Bus Board.
4. The RTA would be retained, but only as an administrative and
policy making agency. It would be given increased
responsibilities in the supervision of the three service boards'
budgets, and the power to disapprove of budgets which did not
balance.
5. The incumbent RTA board (including its chairman) would be
ousted in its entirety as soon as the reform legislation passed.
There would be a new Transition Board, with a one-year mandate.
It would be filled by nominees picked by political leaders, as
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specified in the bill.' After the Transition Board had done its
job, it would be replaced by a regular board whose members would
be nominated by the Mayor of Chicago and the suburban county
boards, as had been the case throughout most of the RTA's
history.
6. The entire transit system, taken as a whole, was to recover at
least 50% of its operating costs from internally-generated
revenues, i.e., from the farebox and other commercial sources,
such as the rental of advertising and concession space, and
reimbursements for carrying school children, senior citizens, and
riders with disabilities at reduced fares. However, there was
nothing to prevent the RTA from mandating different fare recovery
ratios for the three different operators, and that has in fact
happened. The CTA's cost recovery hovers around 52%, the
commuter trains recoup about 56% of their costs from fares, and
suburban buses recapture around one-third of their expenses.
7. The transit-dedicated sales tax surcharge, which had replaced
the gasoline tax in 1980, would continue to be the RTA's basic
funding mechanism. A smaller state subsidy which had been
revoked in 1979 was now restored. Throughout the six-county
area, the RTA would take 15% of the sales tax revenues for its
own needs, and to support capital programs. The remaining 85%
would be used for operating subsidies. All of the operating
subsidies raised in the city would go to the CTA, the subsidies
raised in the outer suburban "collar counties" would be divided
between the commuter trains and suburban buses, and in suburban
Cook County, all three transit operators would share the subsidy
monies.
8. Labor agreements between the three service boards and their
unions could not contain automatic cost of living adjustments.
The Thompson administration appears to presented parts of
the package to the legislature as non-negotiable, but other
aspects were settled through political give-and-take. The most
important sticking point was the vital issue of who would appoint
the RTA Transition Board's members. In order to understand why
this was resolved by making Mayor Washington an explicit
stakeholder in the reform process, we now examine the political
* The governor would choose the chairman of the RTA
Transition Board and the first chairman of the regular board
following the expiry of the Transition Board. Thompson picked John
Kramer as the chairman of the Transition Board, and in late 1984,
chose Samuel Skinner to head the regular RTA board.
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background the governor faced in 1983.
The Cutback Amendment
The 1983 legislative session was the first to take place
under the provisions of the 1980 "Cutback Amendment" to the
Illinois Constitution of 1970. In 1980 voters approved an
amendment to the constitution which reduced the size of the
legislature and also eliminated cumulative voting in the Illinois
House.1 4 (Patrick Quinn, a political entrepreneur who had been
Governor Dan Walker's chief of staff, was largely responsible for
the Cutback Amendment.)"
In 1973 and 1979, compromise across both city and partisan
lines had been difficult enough in the Illinois House. There
were, however, substantial minority contingents of city
Republicans and suburban Democrats, elected under the system of
three-member districts. Now the Cutback Amendment instituted
single-member districts in the House, with the result that
members of partisan minorities no longer enjoyed representation
in the State House. The suburban Democrats and city Republicans
whose votes had helped enact the RTA in 1973 were now gone.
Partisan and geographic interests became self-reinforcing, as
Republicans increasingly came to be identified with the suburbs
10 According to former State Representative Eugene Schlickman
(interview, September 1993), few voters understood or cared greatly
about the elimination of cumulative voting. The principal appeal
of the Cutback Amendment, he argued, was that it gave voters the
satisfaction of reducing the number of elected officials.
" Quinn inserted himself in the political process again in
1994 with well-publicized efforts to place a term limits referendum
on the ballot for that year's November election. The Illinois
Supreme Court threw the measure off the ballot in a controversial
decision, finding that Quinn's initiative had improperly sought to
bypass the state legislature under the amendatory process of the
Constitution of 1970. Quinn briefly returned to public attention
in early 1996 with an unsuccessful bid for the Democratic
nomination for the US Senate seat being vacated by Paul Simon.
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and Democrats with the city, making compromise even more
difficult than it had been before. (The Cutback Amendment did
not affect the method of representation in the Illinois Senate,
which has always used single-member districts.)
Thompson, Washington, and the RTA Board
Under the circumstances which had prevailed before the
February 1983 mayoral primary, the logical thing for Governor
Thompson to have done would be to negotiate with the leadership
of Chicago's machine and reach some sort of understanding which
would have gained the machine's support for (or at least reduced
opposition to) RTA reform. Two things precluded a deal with the
machine, though. One was the machine's concern for Lewis Hill,
the city's former planning director whom Mayor Bilandic had
offered to the suburbs in 1978 as a replacement for the ousted
Milton Pikarsky.
It was well known that Thompson wanted Hill out of office,
and widely suspected that the governor wanted to replace Hill
with his transportation secretary John Kramer (as indeed he did).
The machine's legislative allies in Springfield insisted that
some arrangements be made for finding Hill another position in
government before they would consider backing the reform bill."
Thompson, for whatever reasons, refused to address the machine's
concerns about Hill's future.
Some observers saw Hill as a cynical operative who was all
too comfortable in the gray area between Chicago politics and
bureaucracy. In their view, Hill was accustomed to having long
lunches with Chicago business leaders and riding in a comfortable
limousine, while commuters dug deeper in their pockets to ride
buses and trains which were the object of service cutbacks and
deferred maintenance.
2 Chicago Tribune, October 28, 1983.
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Certainly Hill paid more attention to getting along with top
civic leaders than he did to his own public image. This course
of action had its benefits and its costs. He had started his
chairmanship of the RTA in 1978 as a protege of Mayor Bilandic.
Then, like many mayoral appointees, he transferred his allegiance
to Jane Byrne following her upset victory in early 1979. Hill
was now identified with the city's aldermanic voting bloc opposed
to Mayor Washington led by the so-called "Two Eddies," Edward
Burke and Edward Vrdolyak. This endeared Hill to the mayor and
his allies even less than it recommended him to the governor.
To others, however, Hill was a capable manager who was in
the wrong place at the wrong time. Pastora Cafferty argues that
Hill was simply in the way of IDOT Secretary John Kramer's
ambitions to succeed Hill as RTA board chairman. Cafferty saw
both Hill and Kramer as capable administrators, and argues that
there were no personal hard feelings involved, just the normal
conflicts of rival political ambitions."
The other consideration facing the governor was his
relationship with the mayor, and by extension, with the mayor's
core constituency. Mayor Washington had every right to expect to
be treated as an important stakeholder in any matter having to do
with the CTA. Since 1947 the mayor of Chicago had appointed four
of the seven members of the CTA board (a proportion fixed by
law), and since 1974 the mayor had appointed members to the RTA
board in proportion to the city's population. Thus, any move
which bypassed Washington might undercut the city's position in
future decisions affecting mass transit. Turning over decision-
making power to the City Council was not the most realistic
option, since the Burke-Vrdolyak bloc could obstruct Washington
but could not govern on its own.
13 Interview, September 1995.
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Furthermore, many voters might view any reform package which
did not include the mayor's participation as a racially motivated
move to exclude the mayor from a realm of vital interest to the
city. Thompson had won a narrow victory over former US senator
Adlai Stevenson III in the 1982 gubernatorial election, a contest
which Thompson almost lost--largely as a result of increased
mobilization of black voters. If the governor wanted to be
reelected in 1986 (as in fact he was), he could not risk being
seen as snubbing Washington or his core constituency.
The Council Wars, as the politics of dispute and stalemate
in the City Council were colloquially known, persisted until
1986, when court-mandated redistricting and special elections in
a handful of largely Latino wards gave Washington a bare edge in
the City Council. With exactly half of the 50 aldermen allied
with the mayor following the special elections, he was able to
cast the tie-breaking votes in his favor. Until the special
elections, Council Wars made it impossible to rely on the
traditional formula whereby mayoral appointments had to be
cleared by the City Council before becoming official.
Before Washington's election in April 1983, the requirement
that the aldermen approve the mayor's appointments had been all
but a formality, especially under Mayor Daley. Thanks to the new
politics of division in the City Council, however, the Vrdolyak-
Burke bloc opposed to Washington now placed all mayoral
appointments requiring aldermanic approval on indefinite hold.
Therefore, to require the mayor's appointees to go through the
traditional confirmation process would be tantamount to denying
their nomination and excluding Mayor Washington from
participating in the RTA Transition Board.
The only way for Washington's appointments to bypass this
legislative roadblock was for the General Assembly to eliminate
the requirement that the mayor's appointees receive the approval
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of the council. Clearly, this was the only way for Governor
Thompson and IDOT Secretary Kramer to obtain the support of Mayor
Washington's legislative allies in Springfield. As Republicans,
Thompson and his allies had no intrinsic stake in enhancing the
power and standing of either particular Democratic faction in
Chicago. Since Washington was more prepared to cooperate than
were his opponents, the mayor became the governor's choice of a
political ally in Chicago for reforming the RTA.
From the standpoint of the Washington administration (and
for the city, for that matter), the reform package was a
tradeoff. The city lost an important measure of budgetary
control over the CTA, i.e., the power to run the CTA with no more
regard for business criteria than the city-appointed majority on
the CTA board saw fit. On the other hand, the outcome was
preferable to the post-1979 financial uncertainty which had led
to sudden and large fare increases. The reforms did put the CTA
on a more predictable financial footing.
There was another factor which no doubt made the final
version of the reform package relatively appealing to Washington.
The bill would throw out the entire board (including all Chicago
members appointed by previous administrations), and allow
Washington to appoint two of the eight nominees to the new board.
In particular, Chairman Hill would be forced out of office.
These incentives apparently helped convince Washington to throw
his support behind the reforms. Once the package became law,
Hill and the old board were removed, and the Transition Board,
with IDOT secretary John Kramer as chairman, took office.
The Reform Debate
In 1983 there was none of the confusion of the sales tax
debate four years earlier. Proponents and opponents alike had a
keen sense of what was at stake, and why they took their
respective positions. The mayor's legislative allies were in a
276
difficult position. Through their traditional links with
organized labor, and the fact that a majority of the CTA's work
force was black, they were not inclined to support the reform
bill, which they saw as anti-labor (because it outlawed automatic
cost-of-living adjustments). However, they also understood that
a majority of the CTA's customers was also black, and that large
numbers of angry straphangers could be more dangerous politically
than smaller numbers of angry transit workers. Reluctantly,
perhaps, they made the compromises necessary to protect the well-
being of their constituents, as best they could under the
circumstances.
The small Harold Washington bloc in the State House was
supporting the reform package reluctantly. Like Mayor Daley
before he was convinced to support the RTA in the early 1970s,
Mayor Washington would have preferred a CTA with greater access
to the public purse. But the mayor realized that he did not have
the support for open-ended subsidies, and he came on board when
there was an advantage in it for him. As Senator Emil Jones, a
Washington ally from the far South Side of Chicago, put it, this
was
The last train out of town. There are those who say
wait. ... if we wait until January [of 1984], the $75
million [subsidy being offered as part of the
legislative package] will dwindle down to maybe 15 or
20 [million dollars], and come after March, there will
be no subsidy. Service is going to be cut in Chicago
... the fare is going to be $1.50 [the CTA fare was 90
cents at the time] ... We're caught between a rock and
a hard place, and I don't like it (Senate Debates,
November 2, 1983, p. 119).
Much of the support from the bill from the Republican side
of the aisle was less than ecstatic. Senator Mahar, representing
a suburban constituency, summed up much of the mood of the
debate:
I've come to the conclusion that maybe we can't write a
bill that will solve our transportation problems in
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Cook County and the collar counties. Maybe we don't
want to write a bill that will solve our problems in
Cook County. Maybe we want to come awfully close but
just not close enough. Well ... it just seems to me
... that this is probably the last train out; and while
I'm ... very, very skeptical about some of these
provisions, I see no other choice at this point than to
vote Aye (Senate Debates, November 2, 1983, p. 111).
The Ouster
The House had already approved the reform package, but the
Senate did not act until late in the year. On November 2, the
Senate approved the reform package, and it became law. The
Transition Board took control almost immediately upon passage of
the reforms. On November 9, only a week after the reform bill
passed, Governor Thompson, in a move which surprised few
observers, chose John Kramer to head the RTA Transition Board.
The combination of a new board, a more secure funding position,
and a consensus that better fiscal control was a necessary
prerequisite for continued subsidies, all augured well for
transit riders throughout Chicagoland.
Time for a Breather?
The RTA's tumultuous first decade came to a close with the
ouster of the old board. Now there was the hope of greater
financial stability for transit in Chicagoland. For the first
time, there was a consensus that crossed the once-deep divide
between the city and the suburbs.
After years of lurching from one problem to the next,
Chicago's transit system was entering a new period of relative
equilibrium. Perhaps now, policy makers would be able to catch
their breath and take stock of what had happened.
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CHAPTER 11
BUSINESS AS USUAL, AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT: 1984-1996
A week after the passage of the RTA reform bill in November
1983, the old RTA board was ousted in its entirety, along with
its chairman Lewis Hill. Governor Thompson's nominee John Kramer
took over as chairman of the new Transition Board. For the first
time in the RTA's history, board members set aside the feuding
which had hobbled the old board. Under the leadership of Kramer
and his successors, there was a palpable sense of working
together for the shared goal of stabilizing the region's transit
system. The new service boards--the suburban analogues to the
CTA--were set up and staffed in 1984, during the RTA Transition
Board's tenure: Metra for the commuter trains and Pace for the
suburban buses.
Professor Pastora Cafferty, who served on the original RTA
board from 1974 through 1978, on the 1983-84 Transition Board,
and again on the regular board starting in 1986, describes how
the RTA board has changed its ways of making decisions:
We had these rooms [at the RTA's previous
headquarters during the 1970s and 80s]... When you
were having budget discussions or planning discussions,
there would be a suburban room and a city room. And
eventualy there was a Metra and a Pace and a city
[i.e., CTA] room. Sometimes they [the board members]
would go from one room to the other. I'd sit down with
the city people, and then I'd go broker with a couple
of suburban people. [...] Now in our new
headquarters, there are no rooms. We never caucus.
That doesn't mean that I don't talk with a city person
or a suburban person, or sit down and talk with the
chairman of the CTA, and say "what do you need"? But
we don't have these little caucus rooms. They don't
exist. That is a big cultural change...
The board moves on--and so do its chairmen
1 Interview, September 1995.
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In October 1984, with their work done, Kramer and the
Transition Board left office. They were replaced, at least in
part, by the regular 12-member RTA board, as constituted in the
1979 Byrne-Thompson legislative package. In suburban Cook County
and the five outlying "collar counties," the county boards were
able to appoint the members of their choice with no further ado.
In Chicago, things did not run quite as smoothly. There,
the RTA board selection process reverted to the old rules whereby
the City Council had to approve of the mayor's nominees. Since
the "Council Wars" were still under way, Mayor Harold
Washington's nominees were held hostage by the mayor's opponents
until 1986, when court-ordered special elections in four wards
gave the mayor the tiebreaking vote in a City Council divided
equally in half, and hundreds of appointments to various boards
were approved in short order. But the addition of the city's
board members made little difference to the suburban majority in
charge of the RTA.
One sign of the increased respectability of the reformed RTA
was what happened to its chairmen after they left office. Both
of the chairmen of the original RTA--Milton Pikarsky and Lewis
Hill--were forced out of office. Pikarsky went into academia,
and Hill retreated into retirement.
But since the November 1983 reforms, the RTA has been a
high-prestige political springboard, a political feather in its
chairmen's caps. John Kramer, the chairman of the transition
board, left in late 1984 to head the World's Fair Authority. At
the time it was imagined that Chicago might host a World's Fair
in 1993, commemorating the centennial of the World's Columbian
Exposition. However, the political deadlock of "Council Wars"
prevented the city from making the necessary decisions in time to
move ahead with planning for a World's Fair, and the idea fizzled
out. Had the World's Fair proceeded, Kramer might well have
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pursued a political career, but he faded from the public eye and
pursued a quiet but satisfying career as a transportation
consultant.
The next two RTA chairmen were more successful in turning
their RTA experience to their political advantage. Samuel
Skinner, who succeeded Kramer as RTA chairman (1984-1989), became
US Secretary of Transportation and subsequently White House Chief
of Staff in President George Bush's cabinet. After Bill Clinton
defeated Bush in 1992, Skinner moved on to assume the leadership
of Commonwealth Edison. This made him the first figure since
Samuel Insull whose career included running transit and electric
utilities in Chicagoland, although for Skinner these two
positions came sequentially, not simultaneously. Skinner's
successor Gayle Franzen moved on after several years at the RTA
to be elected president of the DuPage County Board in 1994.
The CTA melodrama
The differences in priorities and political culture between
the suburban-controlled RTA, Metra, and Pace, on the one hand,
and the city-controlled CTA on the other, showed themselves
clearly all through the 1980s. The RTA reviewed the three
service boards' budgets carefully, as it was required to do.
Metra and Pace managed to live within their budgetary means with
few complaints, but not the CTA.
Almost without fail every year, the CTA would star in a
three-act melodrama. First, there would be a budget crisis.
Next would come some combination of proposed fare hikes and
service cuts, which would bring forth a chorus of outrage from an
affronted citizenry. Finally, the CTA would backtrack, revise
its figures or otherwise come up with more money than it had
earlier claimed to have on hand, and the "crisis" would be
resolved with a smaller fare increase or fewer cutbacks than had
been feared. This carefully-choreographed ritual varied little
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from one year to the next.
New leaders in City Hall and Springfield
By the early 1990s, Chicago had a new mayor and Illinois had
a new governor. Mayor Harold Washington died of a heart attack
in November 1987, barely half a year after winning reelection.
The City Council chose Eugene Sawyer, a mild-mannered black
alderman from a middle-class ward on the South Side, as acting
mayor. Sawyer was challenged by his rival, Alderman Timothy
Evans, who enjoyed fervent support from many of the black
political activists who had helped elect Harold Washington, but
had few adherents from other social constituencies in the city.
In special mayoral elections held in early 1989 to fill the
remaining half of Washington's term, Sawyer and Evans divided the
black vote, and Cook County State's Attorney Richard M. Daley
attracted most of the non-black vote to become mayor.2
Although whites and blacks do not always agree as to whether
it was a good thing, Daley's arrival seemed to herald a new
period of quiescence in city politics. 3 There was a renewed
emphasis on getting the job done in a variety of public policy
areas in the Daley administration. The late Mayor Daley had
ruled as a boss, but his son managed the city by consensus.
2 The Evans forces had sought the special elections over the
objections of Sawyer and his allies, although it is hard to see why
in terms of their candidate's electoral support, which was largely
restricted to the city's black wards. Acting Mayor Sawyer lost to
Richard M. Daley in the Democratic mayoral primary, and Alderman
Evans lost against Daley in the general election as an independent.
3 See Grimshaw (1993) for a pessimistic view of the prospects
of Chicago's African American voters for regaining the political
power they had enjoyed during the Harold Washington years. By
contrast, several of the contributors to Green & Holli (1991) treat
Daley's rise to power as a positive development for the city, and
specifically for the white, Latino, and "lakefront liberal" voting
blocs which supported him.
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Meanwhile in Springfield, Governor Thompson declined to seek
reelection in 1990 after 14 years in office. His successor,
elected with Thompson's endorsement, was Republican Secretary of
State Jim Edgar. Although there was a broad policy continuity
between the two men, their styles differed. Thompson, as a
Chicago Republican, understood the concerns of the city's
Democrats, even if he did not share them. As his dealings with
Mayors Bilandic, Byrne and Washington showed, he was able to work
with whatever city administration was in power. By contrast,
Edgar came from a downstate background, and from time to time
played up to the anti-Chicago sentiment among his core
constituency. Edgar was able to work with Daley on some issues
(such as the short-lived third airport proposed for a Lake
Calumet site, which died in the state senate in 1992 despite the
best efforts of the governor and the mayor). On other issues
such as school finance and gambling casinos, however, Edgar was
more willing to oppose the mayor.
Rough Track in the Nineties
The sales tax was a productive source of subsidy revenue for
transit in Chicagoland during the prosperous 1980s, when new
buildings were sprouting in and around Chicago's Loop as well as
the suburbs, and transit ridership was growing hand in hand with
downtown employment. But, as the RTA and the three service
boards were to find out the hard way with the recession which
started in 1990, the sales tax is a volatile source of revenue.
It is a budgetary fair weather friend. It blossoms in good
times, but it droops when the economy sags. As the RTA and the
three service boards struggled to make do on less subsidies, it
was no longer business as usual.
It seemed as if crises in the politics and finance of
Chicago's transit system were fated to take place every decade.
The earlier financial shortfalls of the early 1970s and 80s had
been triggered largely by the failure to restrain the CTA's
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losses. The same failure was now exacerbating matters in the
early 1990s. The gap between the CTA's shrinking market and its
almost rigidly-fixed supply of service soon brought responses
from both sides of the city line.
The failure to respond to an overall economic recession
which reduced the resources available for mass transit meant that
unless somebody took decisive action, the system would eventually
run out of money and decisions would be made in a crisis
atmosphere. Heightening the urgency, a consultant warned the RTA
during the winter of 1991-92 that without meaningful change, the
RTA would run out of money by 1995.
The first indication that business might not be as usual
came in early 1992 with the ouster of Alfred Savage as the CTA's
general manager.' Savage had barely finished the paperwork
associated with his resignation when Mayor Daley announced his
choice of Robert Belcaster. A self-made real estate executive,
Belcaster announced that he viewed the CTA as a company, with its
riders as stockholders. Daley promised that Belcaster
would have a free hand in turning it [the CTA] around.
Robert Belcaster will have the power "to hire and fire
anyone," the mayor said. "He can clean anybody out,
politics or no politics."
Belcaster changed the CTA's upper-level managerial structure
to make it more like that of a private company. In addition to
4 The CTA hired Savage in 1990. Savage, a Canadian, had
started his US career in Buffalo, where New York's governor Mario
Cuomo had attracted him from the leadership of the Toronto Transit
Commission (arguably the most prestigious job in the North American
transit industry) . In Toronto, Savage had been accustomed to
working with elected officials who understood the value of good
mass transit. This was poor preparation for the politically
charged atmosphere in Chicago, although it says something less than
flattering about Chicago that the CTA was unable to use the talents
of the former general manager of the Toronto Transit Commission.
5 Chicago Tribune, February 4, 1992.
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streamlining the chain of command, he showed that he was serious
about personal accountability by posting the telephone numbers of
bus garage managers on board buses for the benefit of riders with
complaints.
A Return to Consolidation?
Chicago is normally not earthquake territory, but the entire
transportation community felt the ground shake in May of 1992.
RTA chairman Gayle Franzen suggested that Chicagoland's transit
finance problems could be alleviated by merging the three
operators with the RTA to create a new "Regional Transit
Service." 6 Presumably this would occur under his agency's
leadership, as he had certainly seized the initiative and taken
Chicagoland's transportation community by surprise. Franzen
claimed that the merger could eliminate 400 to 500 administrative
jobs, and save $40 million a year through economies of scale.
But Franzen's proposal found few takers outside his
organization. Some observers doubted his numbers, and others
questioned his political logic. Franzen united all three service
boards against him, and state legislators from the city and
suburbs alike came out against the idea, because they all had
more to lose than to gain from a merger. Mayor Daley did not
comment (although he was probably opposed), and Governor Edgar
spoke out against the plan. After several months trying to drum
up political and business support for a merger, Franzen quietly
dropped his merger proposal, and the idea sank into obscurity.
New lines or old?
Upon taking office, the CTA's Robert Belcaster broke a
longstanding taboo against discussion of changes in service
delivery, particularly on the Lake Street "L". As recently as
the late 1970s, the Lake Street "L" had been well-maintained, and
6 Chicago Tribune, May 21, 1992.
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its trains routinely ran at the system's top speed of 55 miles
per hour. Now, years of deferred maintenance had left large
areas where trains were forced to slow to a crawl for safety, and
Belcaster
said that sections of the ["L"] system could be shut
down in favor of less costly express bus operations,
and he cited the Lake Street elevated line, which runs
from the Loop to the western suburbs, as one on which
the change would make sense. (...)
If the expense of operating the elevated line
exceeds the benefits, Belcaster said, "I think that we
have to think about it. Is it cost-effective, or is
there something we can replace it with that would be
better [in the] long term?"7
It seemed that a new light rail line downtown might be a
higher priority for the city. Starting in 1987, when the
Metropolitan Planning Council, a private sector planning
organization, published a report proposing a light rail downtown
distributor line, the downtown business community had been
actively involved in planning for it. Property owners, worried
about the effects of increased traffic on downtown accessibility
and land values, had voted to tax themselves to help fund the
project. The proposed Central Area Circulator would link Union
and Northwestern Stations with the Loop and the Near North Side.
Such was the CTA's lack of prestige that before becoming the
CTA's chief executive officer, real estate executive Robert
Belcaster had been adamantly opposed to letting the CTA operate
the proposed Circulator.
The Circulator had Mayor Daley's support, but community
groups questioned the project's cost-effectiveness and its
underlying rationale. Neighborhood groups along the route of the
Lake Street "L" were particularly worried that their line would
be the first to go when the CTA found itself in financial
Chicago Tribune, February 12, 1992.
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difficulty. From their point of view, the proposed Circulator
downtown only added insult to injury.'
Meanwhile in the suburbs, the RTA was promoting a
demonstration personal rapid transit line using small vehicles
running on a specially-built guideway. Although most transit
experts agreed that this mode's high capital costs and modest
passenger throughput made it a poor performer in cost-benefit
terms, the RTA was inviting personal rapid transit proposals from
suburbs with office growth and traffic problems. It was against
this background that Mayor Daley made a surprise announcement.
The Center for Neighborhood Technologies, a sort of citywide
super-community organization, took the initiative in the summer
of 1993 by issuing a report calling for a strategy of aggressive
land development near stations on the Lake Street "L" and the
South Side "L", another line with poor ridership which was
rumored to be a likely target for abandonment. 9 Less than two
weeks later, Mayor Daley announced that the city was coming to
the rescue."' The Lake Street and South Side "L" lines would be
shut down for the next two years and completely rebuilt (in fact,
it took two and a half years). The CTA ran express bus service
along nearby streets during the rebuilding.
Interestingly, nobody doubted that the mayor would be able
to find federal money for the project, even on such short notice.
He seemed to have no difficulty convincing the Clinton
8 With downtown feeling the effects of the recession in the
1990s, the mayor made the Central Area Circulator a lower priority
starting in 1993. Following the Republicans' capture of the
Illinois House of Representatives in 1994 (on the heels of their
Senate majority two years earlier), the Edgar administration
suspended the state's plans for the Circulator.
Chicago Tribune, July 26, 1993.
10 Chicago Tribune, August 5, 1993.
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administration to advance an 80% share for a project estimated at
about a third of a billion dollars." Nor did the RTA board
object to the mayor's investment priorities; instead, they
approved both the rebuilding of the "L" and the construction of a
personal rapid transit line in the suburb of Rosemont adjacent to
O'Hare Airport. Both projects were of questionable cost-
effectiveness, but each had its political constituency on the RTA
board. The Illinois tradition of logrolling was obviously alive
and well.
The only financial benefits to the CTA from the temporary
closing of its two weakest "L" lines were that the system would
save some money in its operating budget while the lines were
closed, and that when the lines reopened, trains would be
operated by just a motorman. (The trains had been operated with
a motorman and a guard prior to rebuilding.) The political
benefits to the Daley administration, on the other hand, were
substantial. The mayor was able to shore up his position in some
of the city's poorest black wards, where he had not received a
large share of votes in 1991. (In 1995 the mayor was reelected
by a margin even more comfortable than his 1991 showing. Fully
30% of the city's black voters supported Daley, even though a
black opponent, Roland Burris, a highly regarded and personable
campaigner, ran as an independent in the general election.)
Business as usual .. .but for how much longer?
Nineteen ninety-three was a year of retreat to the
accustomed comfort of business as usual. At least for the
moment, the city, the CTA, and the RTA had staved off some hard
" The "L" rebuilding may have been a political favor which
the Clinton Administration owed the city. The mayor's brother,
William Daley, had been instrumental in convincing Democratic
members of Congress to vote for the North American Free Trade
Agreement with Mexico. Furthermore, prior to his indictment in the
summer of 1994, Chicago's influential congressman Dan Rostenkowski
was chairman of the powerful House Ways and Means Committee.
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decisions, and had made some easy decisions instead.
But the 1994 election of Republican majorities in both
houses of the US Congress committed to phasing out the federal
deficit sent shock waves throughout the nation's transportation
community. The impending elimination of federal operating aid to
transit, combined with Governor Jim Edgar's reluctance to approve
new taxes may soon force the hands of transit board members--and
of Illinois lawmakers." No financial sleight of hand will
produce the sort of money that the CTA (and to a lesser degree
Pace and Metra) will need to make up the shortfall, especially if
the sales tax remains a lukewarm producer of revenues.
The funding formula written into the 1983 reforms, which
severely limits the amount of sales tax revenues which can be
transferred between counties or between the city and suburbs,
promises to be a contentious issue. Retail sales have been
stronger in the suburbs than in the city. As a result, city
officials and the downtown business community are worried that
the suburban buses and trains will survive relatively well, but
that any upcoming budget crunch will leave the CTA high and dry.
Which Way From Here?
Outsourcing, both for support services and transit
operations, may be the only way to help cushion the dual blows of
fare increases and service reductions which budget cuts threaten
to bring. It is no panacea, but every little bit helps--and
contracting might help create more political good will for
transit by showing that the system is trying its level best to
12 A small breach in the governor's "no new taxes" stance came
in the spring of 1996, when he proposed revisions in the state's
school financing setup. However, judging from the response of
legislative leaders, Edgar had not convinced his own Republicans of
the merits of his proposal. Nor does Edgar's softening position on
the schools issue guarantee that he would be equally sympathetic to
Chicago's transit.
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serve the city and suburbs economically. Experiences in Buenos
Aires, London, Stockholm, and Denver show that contracting can
reduce costs while serving commuters' travel needs, if it is
implemented in such a way as to screen out unreliable transit
providers. Fortunately, this approach fits in well with both
Mayor Daley's interest in privatization and with the cost-
conscious suburban approach to public service delivery.
Another helpful change would be to supplement or replace the
existing geographic-based funding formula with trip-based
subsidies, so that the money will go where it is most needed. In
economic terms, this would encourage all three service boards to
revise their service patterns in keeping with consumer demand,
without the loss of local control which a single merged system
would imply. This way, the region's transit carriers would be
rewarded for moving people rather than buses and trains."
Perhaps elected officials will rediscover the great Illinois
tradition of political compromise and put together a deal which
will safeguard the fundamental interests of taxpayers and transit
customers in the city and suburbs alike. For the hundreds of
thousands of Chicagoland- residents who rely on mass transit, from
affluent suburban commuters to the city's working poor, it would
not come a moment too soon.
13 For example, trip-based subsidies might encourage Metra to
seek more riders by running more trains on the Metra Electric line
to Hyde Park, South Shore, and South Chicago. This, in turn, would
enable the CTA to reduce service on its #6 Jeffery Express and #14
South Lake Shore Express bus routes, which parallel the train for
much of their length, and shift the surplus bus-miles to other busy
routes where there is no alternative service available.
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CHAPTER 12
LEARNING FROM CHICAGO
Chicago has had a long, rich history of political
controversy about public transportation. Although this history
is still very much in progress, we can learn a lot from what has
happened in Chicago so far.
The most important lessons center around the shift from
centralization towards decentralization, and conflicts between
the city and suburbs. Others have to do with the extent and
importance of the 1983 reforms, and the political pressures
affecting mass transit. These lessons are informed by, and
discussed in terms of what has happened over the past century of
transit controversy in Chicago. Nevertheless, much of what
Chicago teaches us can be readily generalized to other,
comparable large US cities. To some extent, many of these
findings apply to any democracy where mass transit is a political
issue.
A few of these conclusions are specific to events in
Chicago, and may not have much broader application. Most of
these findings, however, discuss dynamics which are readily
observable not only in Chicago, but in a variety of cities in the
US and elsewhere. Where appropriate in the discussion, we draw
on these cities for their experiences, as they offer numerous
parallels, and even their differences from Chicago can help
highlight some of the principles involved. Readers familiar with
public transportation in other cities will recognize many of the
same institutional woes and political problems which make
Chicago's transit system fascinating to observe and frustrating
to administer. We start by examining the crucial dynamics of
centralization versus decentralization and of city versus
suburban interests in mass transit.
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Pendulum swings in transit organization
1. Historically, there has been a tendency for smaller
transit operations to be merged into larger ones over time, in
Chicago and elsewhere, and for large systems based in the city to
extend into the suburbs. What happened in Chicago in 1983 is
important because this traditional movement towards consolidation
reached a turnaround point--and since then several other cities
have followed suit,
Until the early 1980s, it was generally accepted wisdom in
the transit industry that bigger organization was better
organization--and the history of Chicago's transit reflects this
view.' New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Los Angeles, Melbourne,
and London are among the other cities whose transit histories
I There were the following consolidations of mass transit in
Chicago during the 20th century:
A. The creation of Chicago Surface Lines in 1914.
B. Samuel Insull's de facto takeover of the entire elevated system
in 1914, whereupon he instituted free transfers between lines
(although they were not formally merged into Chicago Rapid Transit
until 1924).
C. The Illinois Commerce Commission's 1935 decision to require
Chicago's transit companies to offer free transfers between one
another's services (although full intercompany transfers did not
become available until 1943).
D. The Chicago Transit Authority's takeover of Chicago Surface
Lines and Chicago Rapid Transit in 1947.
E. The CTA's acquisition of Chicago Motor Coach in 1952, bringing
all of Chicago's local transit providers into one system.
F. The coming of the Regional Transportation Authority. The RTA
was created in 1973 and narrowly approved in a referendum in 1974.
In 1976 the RTA introduced transfer privileges among Chicagoland's
various suburban bus companies, and between suburban buses and the
CTA.
Since the 1983 reforms, the CTA and Pace have continued to
honor each other's transfers, even though they are not under any
obligation to do so. Pace is well aware of the large proportion of
its riders who transfer to and from the CTA, so simple self-
interest is likely to ensure that these arrangements are preserved.
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echo this tendency. Transit managers and political officials
have long assumed that there were economies of scale to be
obtained through mergers, and that large, unified systems were
better equipped to offer comprehensive, well-integrated service
than smaller ones. Coordination of transit services
appealingly connotes clockwork efficiency, something
everyone is for. So, in the name of coordination,
public transportation in [many] urban areas has evolved
into a single publicly owned, publicly financed, and
publicly operated system.2
Vukan Vuchic, an articulate proponent of high-quality
transit, elaborates on this view:
With respect to integration and regulation of
transit services, considerable progress has been
achieved. In most large cities, formerly independent
transit services have been united into regional transit
authorities... This trend still has some opponents,
particularly among academic economists... They claim
that "free enterprise" transit systems without service
coordination would provide better service than
integrated transit agencies, quoting examples from
cities with substandard transit services. (...) Their
serious deficiencies have been overcome only by
integration and coordination of all transit systems in
a city or region (1981, pp. 53-54).
As an expert on, and a proponent of federations among
different operators as a way of improving service to the public,
Professor Vuchic is well aware of the difference between
consolidation and coordination. 3 Indeed, coordination offers a
middle way between the confusion of a fragmented system (common
in many developing countries) and the diseconomies of scale which
often accompany consolidation. But many transit officials and
their political masters have all but automatically equated
consolidation with coordination. Some unified systems, such as
Philadelphia's SEPTA, have in fact brought about more coordinated
2 Johnson & Pikarsky (in Lave 1985), p. 49.
3 See Homburger & Vuchic (1972).
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service. Yet mergers do not always result in fare and service
integration, as city transit users in Boston and New York who pay
multiple fares know all too well. Conversely, Hamburg, San
Diego, and Toronto have well-linked service as the result of
voluntary agreements among different transit providers.
A coordinated transit system runs more smoothly and is
better equipped to attract riders on a basis of choice than a
disjointed one. However, most US cities with good service
coordination also have an inflexible, unresponsive bureaucracy
overseeing the area's transit system, rather than a more flexible
transit federation.' A lot is at stake when regions choose how
to organize transit. Unpopular transit authorities act as bad-
will ambassadors, discouraging riders and alienating voters.
There. is no denying that it takes large capital investment and a
reliable flow of subsidies to have well-run, well-coordinated
transit--and the political discipline is often harder to find
than the money. Yet if more people choose to drive because
transit is unattractive, society incurs indirect costs of
potentially horrendous magnitude as overflows of traffic clog the
roads and low-density development spills out in all directions,
lengthening travel and rendering transit even less competitive
with the car.
It may be that historical tendencies towards consolidation
hold only as long as the metropolis itself enjoys continued
affluence. When fewer resources are available, governments must
make hard choices about the provision of public services such as
mass transit. Usually, transit properties try to resolve their
financial problems by raising fares and trimming services.
* Possible explanations for this include 1.) that transit
authorities seek to grow in size and power, and 2). that it is
difficult for smaller operators and their political masters to
reach voluntary agreements to link their services and offer joint
fares.
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Occasionally, the inefficiency of the system itself becomes a
political issue, and legislators may try to control its costs on
a more lasting basis. When this happens, as it did in Chicago in
1983, there may be changes in the overall institutional setup of
mass transit.
Nineteen-eighty-three represents an important moment when
the historic tendency towards consolidation not only stopped, but
turned around and retreated. There was a broad consensus that
for the RTA to operate parts of the regional system while at the
same time overseeing the rest of it was simply too big a job for
the agency to handle. For the first time in the annals of the
North American transit industry, an authority's creators took a
critical look at what they had done, and consciously reallocated
operations and policy into separate agencies." Since then,
lawmakers elsewhere in the US and in Western Europe have mandated
similar separations of service provision from policy making.
Examples include London (1984), the Twin Cities (1984), Dublin
(1987), Detroit (1989), and Stockholm (1991).'
' In 1976, the California legislature created the Los Angeles
County Transportation Commission (LACTC) and gave it exclusive
responsibility for planning a rail transit system for Los Angeles.
This had hitherto been one of the functions of the Southern
California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD), which despite its name
was primarily concerned with running the region's bus system. By
the early 1980s, the LACTC had assumed many of the same
administrative oversight functions which Chicago's RTA has
performed since 1983. However, this appears to have happened more
through the LACTC's own initiative than by legislative intent.
During the late 1980s, there were frequent disagreements
between the LACTC and the SCRTD over funding and jurisdictional
"turf". In 1992-93, the LACTC and SCRTD were merged into the new
Metropolitan Transportation Authority by order of the California
legislature. The state's lawmakers decided on consolidation in
order to resolve the contentious relationship between the two
agencies.
6 There is little evidence that these various reforms are
modeled on Chicago and London, the US and European pioneers for
this kind of organizational change. Rather, each different set of
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Nor is this sort of reform the only form that
decentralization has taken. An extreme option is deregulation.
The controversial British experience with bus deregulation
outside Greater London since 1986 is the best-known example, and
was followed by the deregulation of all forms of transportation
throughout New Zealand in the early 1990s. Deregulation is
unlikely to work in the US context, however, because lower urban
densities preclude the ridership levels which would make
commercially-viable transit possible on a widespread basis.
Suburban "breakaways" are a more American form of
institutional change. In Chicagoland during the 1970s, some
suburbanites dreamed of breaking away from the RTA and tending to
their transit needs (if any) independently. This remained only a
fantasy in Chicago, but in other regions, some unhappy suburbs
have withdrawn, at least partially, from large unified transit
systems rather than try to reform these agencies. In the
Washington and Kansas City areas, suburban counties dissatisfied
with the cost structure and service quality of the regional
system have taken over operation of bus routes in their own local
areas, as has a group of suburbs in Southern California's San
Gabriel Valley.
We now turn from the centralization - decentralization issue
to the related question of city versus suburban interests. The
issues are related because, as we have seen from Chicago, the
city tends to support centralization while the suburbs generally
seek autonomy for their transit institutions.
United city, divided suburbs
As we look back at the long sweep of Chicago's public
transportation history, we see that
lawmakers appears to have come to broadly parallel conclusions in
response to comparable financial and political pressures.
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2. Since the late 1890s, the City of Chicago has had a clear
agenda for transit and has pursued it with determination. The
suburbs, by contrast, are newcomers to the transit debate.
Furthermore, most of the suburbs have different stakes in mass
transit--different from the city and different from each other.
As a result, the suburbs lack the city's strong. unified voice.
Although the suburbs now have the power to outvote the city, they
rarely have the will to do so in a coherent, constructive way.
Many aspects of life in Chicago have changed out of
recognition since the end of the 19th century. But one thing has
remained ever constant since the 1890s, when Governor John
Altgeld vetoed the "Eternal Monopoly Bill" and Mayor Carter
Harrison II addressed angry rallies denouncing the robber baron
Charles Yerkes. This unchanging verity is that the city seeks
plentiful transit for its citizens--preferably at low fares. The
politics of transit in such cities as Boston and New York show a
similar determination to provide extensive service at low fares,
even at the cost of deficits more daunting than Chicago's.
Chicago's basic objective has remained unchanged across a
wide range of mayoral administrations: William H. Thompson when
he cooperated with Samuel Insull in the late 1920s, Edward Kelly
with the formation of the CTA in 1945, the legendary Richard J.
Daley when he sought subsidies for the CTA as early as 1957 and
later when he helped enact the RTA in the early 1970s, Jane Byrne
when she agreed to replace the gas tax with a sales tax, and
Harold Washington when he cooperated with the RTA reforms in
1983. There is no reason to believe that the city's fundamental
interests with regard to transit will change under Mayor Richard
M. Daley or any of his successors in the decades ahead. Any
Chicago politician who is seen as opposing the interests of
straphangers can expect a very brief career.
The suburbs, by contrast, have been at a disadvantage
because they rarely pursue (or have) a coherent agenda of their
own for transit. As far as public transportation is concerned,
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different suburbs want different things. Chicago's suburbs
encompass no fewer than six distinct agendas for transit:
A.) A few suburbs adjoining the city--especially Oak
Park and Evanston--depend on the CTA almost as much as
the city does. These communities share the city's
interests as far as transit policy is concerned.
B.) Other nearby suburbs with largely working-class and
lower middle class populations (e.g., Franklin Park,
Cicero, Burbank, Harvey) are more ambivalent about
transit. Their residents do not want additional taxes
and fear the encroachment of the city (even though
their communities resemble some city neighborhoods in
sociological terms). Their blue-collar jobs usually
take them to locations other than downtown, and they
often have to drive to get to work. Yet these
communities have also had local transit for decades
from suburban bus companies (and in a few cases the CTA
as well), and they do not wish to lose these services.
C.) Several high-amenity suburbs all along the North
Shore and in other affluent enclaves such as Hinsdale,
Lisle, and Flossmoor grew up in the early 20th century
along the commuter railroads. These communities rarely
worry about suburb-to-suburb bus service or the CTA.'
But they definitely want good train service, and
perhaps feeder buses to bring residents to and from
their local stations. To a lesser degree, newer
suburbs with good rail service (e.g., Northbrook,
Arlington Heights) share this outlook, although they
also show elements of:
D.) The newer automobile-oriented suburbs such as
Schaumburg and Naperville may want enough transit to
bring service workers from the city to staff their
industrial parks, offices, and shopping centers. But
aside from this service "for the other guy", they have
little use for transit.
E.) The small industrial cities of Joliet, Aurora,
Elgin, and Waukegan are concerned about their local bus
service. Even though they have commuter rail service,
it is a relatively low priority for them, as few of
their residents commute to downtown Chicago.
Wilmette is an exception to the general lack of interest of
these suburbs in the CTA's well-being. The Evanston "L" terminates
in Wilmette, with the result that the village seeks to maximize the
quality of service on this line.
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F.) Finally, a few of the smaller communities not yet
part of the metropolitan commutershed (e.g. western
Kane County, and much of McHenry County) simply want to
be left alone. Their relationship to the metropolis is
still tenuous, but as growth comes to these areas, they
can be expected to take on more of the attitudes of the
new, low-density suburbs.
If anything, the Chicago suburbs offer a more supportive
market for transit than their counterparts in most American
cities. For reasons of size, density, and historical development
patterns, only New York's suburbs provide circumstances even more
fortuitous for transit. The only other areas in the US with
remotely comparable conditions are Philadelphia, Boston, and San
Francisco.' To some degree, Chicago-like conditions prevail in
a handful of suburbs around such older industrial cities as
Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and St. Louis.
But in most metropolitan areas, the dominant orientation in
the suburbs is that of the newer, automobile-oriented community--
not a setting where transit prospers. There seems to be more of
a suburban consensus on transit in these regions, and this
consensus is usually one of benign indifference. It may be that
the greater suburban constituency for transit in areas such as
Chicagoland helps fuel the controversy.
Urban riders and suburban taxpayers
To the degree that there exists any suburban outlook on
transit in a region like Chicagoland, it is a lowest common
denominator which provides enough flexibility for most
communities to achieve their main objectives. With the variety
of agendas competing for attention, it is no wonder that the
suburbs have rarely been able to speak as firmly or clearly on
transit issues as the city. In Chicago, New York, Philadelphia,
* On account of their greater densities, metropolitan areas
in Canada, Western Europe, and especially Japan provide more
substantial ridership bases for suburban transit.
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Boston, and a variety of smaller cities, a vitally important
reason that many suburbanites are wary of the city's agenda for
transit is that
3. The city wants the suburbs to help pay for transit, but
seeks to retain as much control over the system as possible. The
city is merely trying to hold onto the power it has traditionally
enjoyed, but to some suburbanites it seems that the city is
trying to shift the costs of transit operations beyond the city
limits without giving the suburbs a comparable say in how the
system is run.
To its credit, Chicago kept its mass transit system
financially self-sustaining for longer than any of its
counterparts in the US. But when the city finally turned to the
state (and the suburbs) for help starting in 1970, there was a
deep vein of mistrust running throughout the political bedrock of
much of the suburbs. Both in 1973 and again in 1983, issues of
control and accountability pervaded the political debates--and
these same concerns are likely to dominate any further changes in
the way transit is bought and paid for in Chicagoland.
The suburbs are largely concerned with making sure that they
get back most of what they put into the system, while the city's
concerns revolve around political control. The city has
historically been in command of its own, urban-based transit
operations. Chicago's voters hold their mayors and aldermen
accountable for the quality of transit service, as Mayor Michael
Bilandic discovered the hard way when a series of blizzards all
but brought the Chicago Transit Authority to its knees. Because
the quality of city services can affect the political careers of
elected officials, no city in Chicago's position is about to
surrender control of urban transit without a fight.
From the suburban perspective, however, the city has held on
tightly to urban transit while getting the suburbs to pay for a
service which they rarely use. It made little difference to many
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suburbanites that back in the 1970s their own members on the RTA
board were busy covering their own jurisdictions with bus routes
which few riders actually used. Nor did many suburbanites notice
that the city's board members were perfectly willing to support
various pet projects for the suburbs as long as the city's needs
were met. To the suburbs, it all seemed like a power grab. The
suburbs responded angrily at first, with the emotionally
satisfying but pointless ouster of RTA chairman Milton Pikarsky
in 1978, and then more rationally with their support for the RTA
reforms in 1983.
Rather than a lasting resolution, the best we may be able to
expect is an armed truce between the city and suburbs. In the
1983 reforms, the city and the suburbs each staked out an element
of control which they considered part of their fundamental
interests. The suburbs got the upper hand in the budget process
through their majority on the RTA, which now enjoys review and
veto powers over the CTA's budget. At the same time, the city
retained control over the CTA's day-to-day operations (of vital
importance to mayor and aldermen), and this control has been
strengthened by the RTA's redefinition as an administrative
agency only.
City, suburban, and regional transit
4. A truly regional transit perspective is more than the sum
of city and suburban concerns, But this is very difficult to
achieve in Chicago or elsewhere in the US. City-suburban
conflict is so widely prevalent in the American metropolis that
regionally-organized transit often ends up splitting the
difference between city and suburban goals, rather than adopting
a regional outlook which sees beyond political boundaries.
The central city is the biggest stakeholder in the
governance of transit--and this is likely to remain the case as
long as most transit riders live in the city rather than the
suburbs. But a truly regional transit system is more than a
city-based transit property with some suburban routes and a
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combined city-suburban subsidy base.
Regional transit offers an attractive alternative to the
automobile in the suburbs as well as the city, but this is very
difficult to achieve in a cost-effective manner. Most suburbs
are developed at such low densities, and the origin and
destination points of their commuters are so dispersed, that
transit becomes little more than a charity service for those who
do not or cannot drive. Only in Chicago and a handful of other
large, older metropolitan areas do real market niches exist for
transit in the suburbs (largely focusing on suburbanites
commuting downtown and, to a lesser degree, city residents
commuting to service jobs in the suburbs).
There is a big suburban market for transit in Chicagoland,
even though this is usually overshadowed by the city's transit
ridership. Unfortunately, this has not always been reflected in
the politics of mass transit, largely because finite resources
place the city and suburbs in competition for money and power.
A truly regional approach to transit issues would seek to
nurture transit ridership wherever a market for it can be
sustained. In smaller metropolitan areas and in rapidly-growing
Sunbelt cities, this market is largely limited to the poor of the
central city. In these settings, transit on a supra-urban basis
is restricted to the provision of symbolic bus routes--at
considerable subsidy cost, because they see little use outside of
rush hours. This type of service is a charity operation, because
in contrast to a truly regional system, it does not compete with
the automobile for the loyalties of people who have the option of
driving.
But in Chicago and a few other regions, an established
suburban transit market has existed for decades. For these
places, regional transit (as opposed to just urban transit)
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becomes possible. Regional transit should mean that decisions
about service provision and quality should start by rewarding
existing customers in the city and suburbs alike. Any additional
resources should be used to develop additional markets which
stand to attract the most riders for a reasonable investment.
Only in a very few places, such as Toronto and Ottawa, have
transit systems and their political masters applied this
philosophy on a consistent basis.
Chicago is still a long way from this happy situation.
Still, Metra's ability to hold its own in financial and ridership
terms, even in the face of the recession of the 1990s, augurs
well for a truly regional approach to transit. This is all the
more important because Metra's commuter trains are the principal
purveyor of political good will for transit in the suburbs.
Metra's viewpoint is largely suburban, but ever since John
Kramer's leadership in 1983-84, the post-reform RTA has shown an
ability to make decisions which strengthen transit on both sides
of the city limits.
It was not until the RTA Transition Board took office in
late 1983 that the agency began to take a perspective which was
not obsessed with city-suburban issues. Pastora Cafferty recalls
her experience on both the pre- and post-reform RTA boards:
It used to be the RTA versus the CTA, so that the
city-suburban issues were really the issues that were
resolved on the board. After 1983, that was no longer
true. It's the RTA and Metra and Pace and the CTA.
The board is no longer jumping up and down and
saying "I'm city, you're suburb", "I'm suburb, you're
city". It starts behaving like a regional agency. It
starts looking at the region as an interactive economic
entity... You start forming a regional mentality in
that agency... So what it became is, how do we do this
in a way that's politically feasible, because there are
political boundaries here, and that's fiscally
responsible, and that does not hurt transit.
You have a board that thinks regionally. (...)
303
That's a post-1983 development. And (...) you have a
staff that thinks regionally... I would argue that
it's the only agency in the region that has a staff
that thinks regionally [interview, September 1995].
This may be the way the RTA operates now, but this is not
the way it operated before 1983. There are still a number of
transit systems where board members and their political masters
conduct negotiations through newspaper headlines and press
conferences, where financial disasters are averted only at the
last minute year after year, and where board members routinely
trade favors when they are happy and hold each others' pet
projects hostage when they are not.
This regional outlook at the RTA is a very welcome
improvement over the agency's previous situation, but it is very
difficult to translate this worldview into a consistent series of
actions. It may be too much to expect the RTA board (as opposed
to the staff) to view the metropolis as a single, interconnected
whole. Rather than overlooking political boundaries, the best we
may be able to expect is that the RTA board will make decisions
which advance the interests of various transit-oriented
constituencies across the metropolis in such a way that no part
of the region feels left out. Because transit needs government
subsidies to survive, the industry has become politicized. As a
result, many transit systems such as Chicago's have to curry
favor among the various jurisdictions they serve.
The RTA's experience suggests that city-suburban cooperation
may lead to political logrolling rather than an ecumenical
outlook that treats political boundaries as irrelevant. 9 The
9 In Chicago's transit history, the regional outlook reached
an apogee in the 1920s under Samuel Insull. Although transit was
only a minor part of Insull's far-reaching business interests,
between his ownership of Chicago Rapid Transit and his control of
the three great interurbans (North Shore Line, Chicago Aurora &
Elgin, and South Shore Line), Insull displayed a regional vision
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reformed RTA is not immune to the implicit exchange of favors
across the city line, as the experience of 1993 suggests. In
that year, city and suburban board members alike supported an
expensive rebuilding of a pair of urban "L" routes with marginal
ridership prospects, and a suburban Personal Rapid Transit
project of dubious cost-effectiveness. The RTA board's members
were clearly advancing their joint utility through these
decisions, but it remains to be seen what effect their choices
will have on the long-run financial health of the system.
We now turn to a couple of points which are more specific to
Chicago, but are nevertheless meaningful for an understanding of
the dynamics of the 1983 reforms--the importance of which has
been emphasized in point 1-above.
The importance of the reforms
What happened in Chicago is important to all transportation
professionals because it is part of a broader move towards
smaller, more accountable mass transit organizations. Chicago's
experience since 1983 shows that
5. The 1983 reforms. did include important cost controls,
particularly the 50% cost recovery requirement. But they do not
add up to a restructuring, at least not in the sense in which the
term is used in the private sector. The reforms did not bring
about any major changes in operating technology, labor practices,
employment levels, routes, fares, or service frequencies.
The requirements that the service boards balance their
budgets and that the RTA family of services, taken together, meet
at least half of their costs from the farebox and other system-
without parallel since his time. Insull saw Chicagoland as a
single market, including the northwest Indiana portion of the
region served by the South Shore Line. The collapse of transit as
a profitable industry in the Depression has made it very difficult
to rebuild the breadth of Insull's vision, even with the RTA--which
is limited to northeastern Illinois in its mandate.
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generated sources are important advances. These provisions set a
standard for fiscal stability. Instead of letting transit in
Chicago come to the brink of bankruptcy as it nearly did in the
early 1980s, the financial provisions of the 1983 reforms will
force the service boards to raise their fares and cut back their
services if they find themselves running out of money.
The 1983 reforms did affect wage rates, if only at the
margin, by prohibiting automatic cost of living agreements in
labor contracts with CTA, Metra, and Pace employees. As a
result, Metra has brought as many commuter rail operating
employees onto its own payroll as possible, rather than have them
work for private railroads. This is because the ban on cost-of-
living adjustments does not include employees of private
railroads who operate trains for Metra under contract--but it
does apply to railroaders on Metra's own payroll. All the same,
this is the only direct effect of the reforms on how transit is
provided. This provision could have been enacted on its own, and
did not require the creation of Metra and Pace.
What has happened since 1983 does not add up to a
restructuring (even though the term is used in the 1983 law
itself and in much of the literature on its aftermath). The 1983
reforms have not made major changes in the transit operators'
technology or conditions of employment. Only once in the history
of public transportation in Chicago have major changes of this
nature taken place. When the CTA took over the streetcars and
the "L" in 1947, the system had been starved of investment for
nearly 20 years, and was in desperate need of modernization and
renewal. In its first decade, the CTA made major changes in its
technology, use of human resources, and service structure.
Thousands of two-person streetcars gave way to buses run by just
a driver, and rickety wooden "L" cars requiring a gateman between
each pair of cars were replaced by new steel trains which
required only a motorman and a conductor. The result was a
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"leaner, meaner" CTA which ran much more efficiently than had
been the case in 1947.
But since 1983, with just one exception, none of Chicago's
three service boards have made changes in their mix of technology
and personnel. This exception has been the CTA's introduction of
one-person operation on the Ravenswood and Midway "L" lines in
the early 1990s. The CTA has not added large numbers of
articulated buses to its fleet, even though they can increase the
productivity of a bus driver by up to one-half. Nor has Pace
experimented widely with minibuses or the replacement of little-
used bus routes with demand-responsive transit, although these
innovations may hold considerable promise in some of the less
built-up suburbs.
Similarly, Metra has yet to seek reduced crew requirements
aboard its commuter trains. Metra's conductors still come
through the train and punch tickets as their predecessors have
since the beginning of railroading, but on GO Transit commuter
trains in Toronto, roving inspectors check tickets on a random
basis. Metra has yet to experiment with such a proof-of-payment
system, even though Toronto is happy with the results. Since the
early 1970s, the former Illinois Central Electric (now Metra
Electric) has had automatic fare collection with magnetically-
encoded tickets activating turnstiles at most of its stations.1*
Yet since 1981, conductors on the IC have been checking all
tickets on all trains, just as they do on Chicago's other
commuter railroads."
10 The turnstiles on the IC (now Metra Electric) account for
almost- all customers at one, if not both ends of their trips.
Riders getting on at stations without turnstiles buy their tickets
from the conductor.
"1 Metra may have reasons for tolerating traditional railroad
labor practices, despite their technical obsolescence. According
to Christopher Knapton, Metra's director of public relations, Metra
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Chicago has seen nothing like the changes which swept London
Transport following its 1984 reform into separate administrative
and operating organizations, under legislation which mandated
increased amounts of outsourcing in bus operations. There were
even more dramatic changes when the rest of the British bus
industry (outside Greater London) was deregulated in 1986, and
when Buenos Aires privatized all surface transit in the early
1960s. In all three of these instances, greater competition
brought about greater labor economies, and also hastened the
replacement of large, two-person vehicles with smaller buses
which maneuver easily in traffic.
Political reform. yes: financial reform, maybe
The 1983 reforms focused on administrative changes, rather
than more competitive wage levels and more efficient labor
practices, which leads us to our next finding:
6. The emphasis in 1983 was on administrative reform, as
opposed to more substantive changes in the use of labor and
equipment. The reforms did confront the earlier lack of
political accountability, but dealt only indirectly with
transit's underlying financial problems, which remain unresolved.
The 1983 reforms did not address, head-on, the fundamental
imbalance between customer demand, political demand for service,
a high cost structure, and the absence of either enough political
will to lower these costs or the financial resources to pay for
them. The funding formula, which allocates subsidy payments to
the different operators largely as a factor of where sales tax
revenues are raised, has merely postponed the reckoning. Thus,
state representative Cal Skinner Jr. from McHenry County has a
valid point when he complains that the suburbs are worse off with
finds that its customers value the human contact with conductors
who come around the train to check tickets (interview, September
1995). As a provider of high-quality transit to an affluent,
amenity- conscious market, Metra can afford such "inefficiency" more
readily than the CTA or Pace.
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the 1983 reforms than before, because the CTA now shares in some
of the sales tax money from suburban Cook County (under the
earlier setup, the gas tax monies had to be spent where they were
raised). At the same time, CTA chairman Clark Burrus and Chicago
RTA board member Pastora Cafferty are right to fear that the
rigidity of the funding formula, which keeps most of the city and
suburban transit subsidies in separate compartments, exacerbates
an imbalance between where the money is and where the most
pressing needs are.
Yet despite their current problems, the 1983 reforms fit
right into the great Illinois political tradition of logrolling,
where various bargaining agents exchange favors in order to
maximize their area of mutual benefit. There were no absolute
winners and losers in the 1983 reform, or in the earlier
legislative changes. All parties gave up certain things and
gained others, whether in 1983, 1973, or even with the creation
of the CTA in 1945.
The merger which RTA chairman Gayle Franzen proposed in May
of 1992 made sense in terms of the direct cost savings of
reducing the region's transit employment. It is a little-
publicized fact that the overall number of administrative jobs
grew following the 1983 reforms, largely as Metra and Pace sought
to staff their brand-new hierarchies. But this may not be such a
cost-ineffective outcome as it initially seems in pure accounting
terms.
A merger would make it possible to eliminate a number of
jobs. But the same merger would carry with it the potential for
very large long-term costs. For one thing, a separate oversight
agency is likely to do a better job of administrative supervision
than having one huge agency monitor itself. Also, holding all
other factors constant, large organizations are less flexible
than smaller ones. The enormous costs which result from
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diseconomies of scale need to be taken into account, because any
unified organization providing transit to a catchment area of
more than six million people would not be a small one. The
immediate financial costs of having multiple organizations may
well be outweighed by money not spent by a large centralized
agency, and by the greater accountability which the different
service boards provide.
The last three points are of a more general nature. They
have a broad application to a variety of settings beyond Chicago
and even beyond the US. At first glance, they may seem like
truisms, but they incorporate many of the institutional realities
which shape the politics of public transportation.
Transit systems do not fix themselves
7. Transit authorities in financial crisis are unlikely to
reform themselves. The political authorities ultimately
responsible for the transit system have to step in.
When the CTA started to operate at a loss in 1970, its
management and board did little to reverse the situation. They
certainly did not try to bring costs and revenues back into
balance (which would have been an uphill struggle at best,
considering that transit had started to lose money earlier in all
other large US cities). Instead, they let the CTA's problems
worsen in the hope that the state would do something about the
issue. The RTA was similarly unable or unwilling to suggest ways
in which it could solve its problems prior to the 1983 reforms,
and the late 1990s apparently finds the post-reform RTA board
likewise inclined to let the state take the initiative again.
It comes as little surprise that transit authorities in
Chicago and elsewhere are reluctant to take the lead in seeking
or making changes. Too much frank discussion of the problems of
mass transit might lead to fundamental reappraisals of transit's
proper role in an increasingly automobile-dominated metropolis.
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In cities where there is even less of a political constituency
for transit than Chicago, the risks of such a candid examination
may be even greater. Thus, few transit systems facing crises
have reformed themselves from inside."
This reluctance to change with the times is far from
praiseworthy, but it is very understandable. Few managers, be
they in business or government, are eager to hear that their
industry has a shrinking market share and is in decline or at
best stagnant, yet that is the case with transit in Chicago and
most other US cities. Nor do managers enjoy being told that to
survive the financial problems which tomorrow may bring, they may
face widespread layoffs (of management as well as operating
employees), and be forced to choose between contracting out and
closing down much of their operations. The results of a far-
reaching debate might lead to a fundamental restructuring of the
transit system--which, as we saw above in point 5, did not happen
in Chicago as a result of the 1983 legislation.
The Zen of transit controversy
8. Practically all disputes about the finance, organization,
and operation of transit stem from attempts to achieve mutually
irreconcilable goals. Different policy makers seek plentiful
service, low fares, and low subsidies. It is possible to achieve
one or two of these goals at any given point--but never all three
at once!
Buddhism teaches that people suffer because they crave
things which they cannot have. Similarly, transit is
controversial because elected officials (and their constituents)
seek policy goals which they cannot achieve. In a world of high
costs and limited resources, transit authorities cannot run
frequent and comfortable service, charge low fares, and incur
12 Exceptions to this include Seattle Metro with its "market-
driven" strategy, and Tidewater Regional Transit in Norfolk, which
started contracting out increasing amounts of its operations in
order to avoid financial crisis.
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minimal losses--at least not at the same time. Something has to
give, and the sooner this is recognized, the more rational the
debate can become.
The problems resulting from this tradeoff cause financial
crises, political controversy, and customer dissatisfaction not
only in Chicago, or even the US. In such diverse political
settings as Chicago, London, and Stockholm, limited resources
have forced elected officials to reevaluate their transit
priorities. There is little rhyme or reason as to why these
stresses result in reforms in some political contexts and not
others. The perceived political legitimacy of, or support for a
financially troubled transit system may be an important
factor." But at any rate, it has become intellectually
respectable since the early 1980s to call for a halt or even a
reversal of historic trends toward transit consolidation.
At best, a transit system can optimize by achieving two of
these goals simultaneously." Chicago's tradeoff priorities
have shifted back and forth over the years between low fares and
low subsidies, largely because the expensive and controversial
13 For example, in 1975 Cleveland and its surrounding suburbs
in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, voted by an unambiguous 70% margin for a
1% transit-dedicated sales tax. The early 1990s found Cleveland's
system recovering only a quarter of its operating costs from the
farebox, but the mandate of the referendum largely removed the
system's size and cost structure from the realm of political
controversy (interviews with Cleveland transit officials in
February and September 1995).
14 The achievement of these goals is a relative matter rather
than an absolute one. There is no generally-accepted threshold,
constant over time and across jurisdictions, for any of these
criteria. We can say, for instance, that Chicago has a certain
level of service. But this has little meaning outside of any
comparison. For instance, Chicago has more intensive transit
service than Cleveland, which in turn has more concentrated service
than Sacramento, and these comparisons give meaning to these
cities' differing levels of service.
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nature of transit in Chicago make for unstable resolutions."
Some systems (e.g., Pittsburgh) do not show a clear policy
of goal optimization. Other cities, however, have pursued a
stable set of objectives for decades, and they provide us with
different paradigms against which we can evaluate Chicago's
experience." For instance, Phoenix has affordable fares and a
deficit modest enough to avoid being a political issue. The
tradeoff is that service is infrequent. Phoenix's bus system
actually shuts down on Sundays and holidays for lack of riders,
and a contractor provides demand-responsive service instead."
Transit riders in Boston enjoy fares which have been
appreciably lower than in comparable big cities since the 1970s,
and they have intensive service with good coverage. But this has
come at considerable cost to taxpayers. By the mid-1990s, the
system was meeting barely one-third of its costs from the
farebox, amid growing political controversy."
"5 New York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles show a similar
instability of transit priorities, presumably for the same reasons
of high cost and conspicuous political controversy.
16 It is beyond the scope of this discussion to explore the
reasons why some metropolitan areas have relatively stable agendas
for transit and Chicago does not. Differences in such factors as
political culture, population density, travel habits, transit cost
structures, service quality, sources of subsidy, and institutional
arrangements for mass transit all play a role.
"7 For more on the politics of transit in Phoenix, see Cliff
Henke, "Phoenix Transit Prepares to Rise Again" (Metro Magazine,
March-April 1994).
18 The definitive account of the deep financial and political
problems of Boston's transit system is Jose A. Gomez-Ib&fiez, "Big-
City Transit Ridership, Deficits, and Politics: Avoiding Reality in
Boston" (Journal of the American Planning Association, Winter
1996). Also of interest for historical background are Office of
Technology Assessment, An Assessment of Community Planning for Mass
Transit, Volume 3: Boston (Washington: US Congress, March 1976),
and Schroeder (1956), pp. 234-240
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From the mid-1970s up until budget cutbacks in the late
1990s brought new challenges, Toronto has operated one of North
America's most comprehensive, frequent, and well-patronized
transit systems, with an admirable ratio of 68% of its operating
costs being recovered from the farebox." The price of this
efficiency is that fares are high--and if the Toronto Transit
Commission were not offering a high-quality consumer-oriented
service, its fares might have become a political issue much as
they are in New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago.
Chicago's policy makers have never considered a Phoenix-
style solution with low service intensity. This would be
politically unthinkable because too many people depend on
transit. Frequent, comprehensive service has been a constant of
Chicago transit policy, but the financial priorities have
fluctuated over the decades. The system has oscillated uneasily
between a Boston and a Toronto-style approach, even during the
private enterprise years. The first of these back-and-forth
variations started in the robber baron era before the turn of the
20th century when Charles Yerkes was in control of much of the
system. Then, private carriers provided intensive service, and
franchise holders like Yerkes reaped profits attractive enough to
lure them into the industry--and to induce the more successful
among them to bribe legislators to gain political advantage.
19 As North America's premier transit system, Toronto has
brought forth a rich literature, including "Urban Transit in
Canada: Integration and Innovation at Its Best" (Transportation
Quarterly, July 1986); Frank C. Colcord and Ronald S. Lewis, Urban
Transportation Decision Making: Vol, 9. Toronto: A Case Study
(Washington, US Department of Transportation, 1974); Tom
Ichniowski, "Canada in Transit: For new and expanding systems the
choice is fixed guideway" (Railway Age, August 14, 1978); Toronto
Transit Commission, "TTC Revenue / Cost Ratio: An Overview" (TTC
Corporate Planning Department, 1984) ; Julian Wolinsky, "Integrated
Transit: Toronto has proven the concept since 1921" (Bus World,
Fall 1989) and David Young, "Toronto: Taking the Lead Again" (Mass
Transit, November 1980).
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The reaction against Yerkes' abuses led to the regulated era
which spanned most of the first half of the 20th century. In
large part because Yerkes had so completely alienated the
traveling public, fares and service levels were now tightly
regulated at the expense of the transit companies.2" For all
practical purposes, the streetcar and elevated companies were
subsidizing the riders. Despite Samuel Insull's attempts to
reach a politically and financially sustainable resolution in the
late 1920s (which attempt crumbled in the Depression), in the end
there was no future for private companies within the limits of
regulation.
The result was a combination of public takeover and a
deregulated transit monopoly with no subsidies. The CTA survived
under these rules from 1947 through 1969, but then in 1970 the
CTA started to lose money (as other comparable US systems had
been doing for years already). Not only Democrats, but also
Republicans like Governor Richard Ogilvie and House Speaker
Robert Blair recognized that transit on both sides of the city
line had to be subsidized.
Under the initial RTA setup, Chicago moved away from a
Toronto-style set of policy choices, accepting high fares as the
20 In the case of Chicago Surface Lines, the stockholders were
arguably subsidizing the system for years. (This is not to feel
sorry for the stockholders, as many of them or their predecessors
had enjoyed substantial gains during the Yerkes era thanks, in
large part, to underhanded manipulations of the political process.)
Chicago Rapid Transit was somewhat more fortunate. Electric
utility leader Samuel Insull reorganized and improved the bankrupt
elevated lines, largely because the "L" helped his more important
electricity and real estate holdings. Prior to the collapse of
Insull's empire, buyers of his real estate and electricity were for
all practical purposes cross-subsidizing the "L" (although this was
not a great hardship at the time, as Chicago then enjoyed the
world's cheapest electricity, even after deducting the costs of
cross-subsidy to the "L").
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price of plentiful self-sustaining service. During the 1970s,
the move was towards a more Boston-like arrangement, with high
deficits as the cost of ample service at more affordable fares.
By 1970, things had clearly gone too far in the direction of
forcing full cost recovery regardless of such side effects as
deferred maintenance. But by 1980, when the RTA literally
started to run out of money, it was clear that the pendulum had
swung too far in the other direction. The 1983 reforms move
Chicago back towards a higher-fare Toronto approach. The
emphasis on fiscal responsibility, embodied in the 50% cost
recovery requirement and the RTA's obligation to disallow service
board budgets which are not in balance, is unlikely to be
overturned in the foreseeable future. Instead, more likely areas
for change include the funding formula and more direct cost
control tools such as privatization.
Today's solutions, tomorrow's problems
Conflicting views of how much of the costs of transit should
be the responsibility of users versus the broader community will
be underlying future transit debates. These conflicts will be
resolved through political give and take, which brings us to our
final point:
9. Political officials respond to crises immediately at
hand, Voters elect them to solve today's problems, not to
anticipate those of tomorrow, The resolution of today's transit
problems inevitably contains the seeds of the next transit
crisis, As long as the Chicagoland political scene includes both
proponents of low fares and of low subsidies, the debate is
likely to go on,
Each successive institutional setup is only as firm as the
assumptions underlying it--which in a context like that of
Chicago is not always saying very much. At first glance, all of
this seems terribly short-run and inadequate. The rational
reader may well ask why Chicago cannot pull itself together. One
answer would be that transit is so controversial and the
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stakeholders are in such contention that the outcome is a
succession of temporary rearrangements of money and power. This
is certainly true as far as it goes, but there is more to it than
this pessimistic view, which gives little credit to the officials
who grapple with the issues.
In a setting such as Chicago, the political and financial
uncertainty surrounding transit is such that no hard and fast
solution is appropriate, however well thought-out it may be.
Elected officials tacitly recognize the unpredictability of the
future by making no arrangements which cannot readily be changed
by their successors. Illinois politicians rarely address issues
before they reach a crisis point, but this may reflect the need
for elected officials to ration their limited time and finite
influence. Machine Democrats in Chicago and suburban Republicans
may not agree on much else, but neither of them are in the habit
of "fixing" institutions which are not clearly "broken".
Illinois politicians are accustomed to dealing with problems
on a pragmatic basis, and do not pretend to see omnisciently into
the indefinite future. Each successive institutional arrangement
inadvertently sets up the transit system for the next emergency,
as today's solutions become tomorrow's problems. This recurring
pattern is due to a combination of finite resources, a "crisis
management" approach to policy making, and an unpredictable
future.
The limited money available, the necessity of political
compromise, and the seemingly infinite needs of transit and other
government functions all but guarantee continued conflict among
the various participants. The political and time pressures on
legislators to reach agreements often lead to suboptimal
outcomes. As politicians and their advisors seek resolutions
which will satisfy a variety of stakeholders, it is inevitable
that electoral calculations sometimes take precedence over the
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financial sustainability of the new setup. And the
unpredictability of the future ensures that changed circumstances
will undercut even the most rational set of arrangements sooner
or later.
The past century of transit politics in Chicago shows how
quickly successive resolutions wear out (and contribute to their
own obsolescence). The excesses of Charles Yerkes in the 1890s
led to the regulated system of the early 20th century. State
regulation of urban transit eliminated the earlier abuses, but in
the long run it denied the traction companies enough money to
sustain themselves as businesses.
The next big change was the creation of the CTA in 1945.
The private companies had long suffered from a lack of political
legitimacy--an outcome of the robber baron era. The CTA's status
as a public authority solved that problem. The regulated regime,
which had helped rein in the traction companies in the early 20th
century, had also contributed to the companies' financial woes,
so the state simply exempted the CTA from regulation of its fares
and services. The idea was that the board, rather than the state
regulators, would make the CTA accountable.
The lawmakers who set up the CTA 1945 may have thought that
transit would be self-sustaining for a long time to come, but
history would soon show that the industry was entering a long,
secular decline of lasting proportions. In the end, the myth of
the self-sustaining transit system led the CTA to put off
maintenance and postpone replacing old equipment, which was
penny-wise but dollar-foolish.
The CTA deficits led first to a series of emergency
bailouts, and then to the creation of the RTA. The RTA solved
the immediate problems of a lack of structured sources of
subsidies and an absence of institutional capability for managing
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transit in all parts of the region. Indeed, the political
spillover of transit problems beyond the city, as suburban bus
lines went bankrupt and commuter railroads became anxious to
eliminate their losses, may have helped make the RTA palatable to
transit riders in the suburbs (although the 1974 referendum
results show that non-users strongly opposed the RTA).
Yet the 1973 legislative debate over the RTA had barely
started before a number of lawmakers from the suburbs warned of a
politically unaccountable agency, spending other people's money
generously. By the early 1980s many of their fears had become
true, as the RTA itself neared bankruptcy.
The 1983 reform package was the state's (and the suburbs')
response to the RTA's lack of budgetary and political checks and
balances. The creation of Metra and Pace made the suburbs
explicit stakeholders in the continued future of regional
transit. For the first time, there developed a pro-transit
consensus in the suburbs, which was no mean feat when compared
with the depth of anti-RTA sentiment in the 1974 referendum.
The 1983 reforms worked well enough when there was money
coming in. But the sales tax is the budget maker's fair weather
friend. The volatility of the sales tax ensured that with the
recession of the 1990s, the honeymoon of the reforms would be
over.
The pressing problems likely to be addressed in the next
legislative round are the rigidities of the funding formula
between the city and suburbs, the gap between the costs of
service and the resources at hand, and how this gap should be
closed--with more taxes, higher fares, service cuts, outsourcing,
or some combination of all of these. How the Illinois
legislature and the RTA board will deal with these issues remains
to be seen, and there is little point in trying to anticipate the
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unforeseen problems which tomorrow's solutions will inevitably
create. We can only anticipate with certainty that tomorrow's
resolutions will lead to further problems, because the financial
and political environments will change over time in ways that
cannot be foreseen.
But whatever resolutions are reached, this time and again
indefinitely into the future, we can predict a few things. One
is that no change will occur outside the shared space of the
financially and the politically possible. Another is that there
will be a number of players with a stake in the outcome involved
in a complex set of negotiations aimed at maximizing the space of
mutual advantage. In order to accomplish anything, each side
will have to surrender something in order to gain something else
which they want even more. No agreement will command a
politically sustainable majority unless a variety of negotiating
agents are able to point to specific benefits for their
constituencies.
And finally, as long as people in Chicagoland take transit
for work, school, business, doctors' appointments, shopping, and
other vital needs, transit will continue to be a lively political
issue. Successive crises will call forth successive resolutions.
Each may be definitive when it is enacted, but none of them will
be final. Sooner or later each will be overtaken by events.
Like the long, straight streets or railroad tracks of Chicago,
the region's transit history stretches out into the future
towards the horizon--and from where we are now, it is too far to
walk.
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GLOSSARY of abbreviations and terms
(Chicago area unless otherwise indicated)
Boulevard: In the Chicago area, a street from which commercial
vehicles other than taxis and buses are prohibited. Michigan
Avenue in the downtown area, all drives within city parks, and
the Outer Drive (q.v.) are also part of the boulevard system.
Within the city limits of Chicago, boulevards are administered
not by the Chicago Department of Streets and Sanitation, an
integral part of the city goverment, but by the Chicago Park
District, a special-purpose government (limited to the city)
responsible for the city's parks and recreation facilities.
BN: Burlington Northern. Railroad, operates commuter service.
CA&E: Chicago Aurora & Elgin. Electric interurban under Insull
management in the 1920s; passenger service discontinued in 1957.
CATS: Chicago Area Transportation Study; the officially-
designated Metropolitan Planning Organization for purposes of
allocating federal transportation money.
CB&Q: Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad; merged with other
railroads to form the Burlington Northern in 1970. The commuter
service in the Chicago area was not affected by the merger.
CMATS: Chicago Metropolitan Area Transportation System; a
regional mass transit agency proposed in the early 1970s but
never implemented.
CMC: Chicago Motor Coach: operator of downtown-oriented routes
along selected boulevards (q.v.) administered by the Chicago Park
District and its predecessors. Smaller than its rivals CRT and
CSL (q.v.), CMC was formed in the 1920s and absorbed into CTA
(q.v.) in 1952.
CNS&M: See North Shore Line.
C&NW: Chicago & North Western. Railroad, operates commuter
service.
COLA: Cost Of Living Adjustment; included in the collective
bargaining agreements between Chicago Transit Authority
management and unions from 1954 until this provision was
abolished by state legislation in 1983.
CRT: Chicago Rapid Transit; formed 1924 under Insull management
by consolidating all of Chicago's elevated railroads, and
absorbed into CTA (q.v.) in 1947. The only Chicago-based transit
company to provide service beyond the city limits,
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CSL: Chicago Surface Lines; formed 1914 and absorbed into CTA
(q.v.) in 1947. Primarily an operator of streetcars, but also
ran buses and trolley buses. The only Chicago-based transit
company to serve all parts of the city.
CSSMTD: Chicago South Suburban Mass Transit District; formed in
1967 as a funding conduit for purchase of new Illinois Central
Electric cars.
CSS&SB: Chicago South Shore and South Bend. Electric railroad,
operates commuter service between Chicago and northwestern
Indiana. Also see NICTD below.
CTA: Chicago Transit Authority. Formed 1945; acquired CRT and
CSL (q.v.) in 1947, and CMC (q.v.) in 1952.
El: See "L".
Expressway: A multiple-lane divided highway, completely grade-
separated, with access and exit only at interchanges to and from
local streets and other expressways. Synonymous with a freeway
in the western US and a motorway in Europe.
FTA: Federal Transit Administration. Post-1991 successor to the
Urban Mass Transportation Administration (q.v.)
IC: Illinois Central Railroad, known as Illinois Central Gulf
from 1973; Metra (q.v.) acquired its electric commuter rail
operation in 1986 and renamed it Metra Electric.
ICC: Illinois Commerce Commission, a state regulatory agency.
Not to be confused with the Interstate Commerce Commission, a
federal regulatory agency with the same initials.
IDOT: Illinois Department of Transportation.
Illinois General Assembly: The state's bicameral legislature,
composed of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
IVI: Independent Voters of Illinois; a liberal-reform counterpart
to the Regular Democratic Organization (i.e., the Chicago
machine). The IVI's precinct-level apparatus is the Independent
Precinct Organization.
"L," The: Short for "elevated," i.e., elevated rapid transit
railroad. By extension, can refer to any part of Chicago's rapid
transit system, including downtown subways, lines at grade.
expressway median strip lines. Thus, Chicagoans speak of the Dan
Ryan "L," which is located almost entirely within the median
strip of the expressway of the same name. (The same term is
spelled "el" in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston.)
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Loop: Chicago's traditional downtown area, as distinct from North
Michigan Avenue (q.v.). Roughly bounded by Grant Park and Lake
Michigan to the east, and the Chicago River to the north and the
west. The southern boundaries are more fluid. In its strictest
interpretation, the term can be used to refer to the confines of
the Loop elevated line running above Wabash Avenue, Lake Street,
Wells Street, and Van Buren Street. This interpretation,
however, is not historically correct, as the term "The Loop"
antedates the elevated and once referred to the city's center
where cable cars turned around.
LRT: Light rail transit (up-to-date streetcar service, often on
private right-of-way).
Metra: The commuter rail division of the RTA (q.v.); stands for
"Metropolitan _Rail".-
Metra Electric: The former IC Electric operation, purchased by
Metra (q.v.) in 1987.
Milwaukee Road: Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific.
Railroad, operated commuter service until 1982 when operations
transferred to NIRC (q.v.). Operated today as the Milwaukee
District of Metra (q.v.).
MPC: Metropolitan Planning Council, formerly the Metropolitan
Housing and Planning Council. A nonprofit organization seeking
to promote intergovernmental and public-private initiatives on
planning issues.
NICTD: Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District
(pronounced "Nicktee"). Subsidizes and operates South Shore Line
(q.v.)
NIPC: Northeastern Illinois Planning Council (pronounced
"Nipsee"). In bureaucratic terms, NIPC was the Chicago area's
federally-recognized A-95 review agency until the A-95 review
process was discontinued in the early 1980s.
NIRC: Northeast Illinois Railroad Corporation. Predecessor of
Metra (q.v.); set up to take over commuter rail operations of
bankrupt Milwaukee Road and Rock Island lines. NIRC has never
had a board of its own; instead, it has been used by RTA and,
since 1983, Metra, as a legal mechanism to permit ownership and
operation of commuter rail lines.
North Michigan Avenue: Technically, any part of Michigan Avenue
north of Madison Street, the north-south zero point in Chicago's
house numbering system. To Chicagoans, however, the term
indicates that portion of Michigan Avenue and adjacent streets
north of the Chicago River, an area which has emerged since the
1960s as an increasingly fashionable alternative to the Loop,
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especially for the upper end of the retail sales market, but
increasingly for hotels and offices as well.
North Shore Line: Chicago, North Shore & Milwaukee Railway;
interurban line under Insull management during the 1920s and
abandoned in 1963.
Nortran: North Suburban Mass Transit District. Formed in 1972 to
preserve service on United Motor Coach (acquired by Nortran in
1975); also served as a funding conduit for new equipment for the
Milwaukee Road (q.v.).
NSCA: North Shore Commuters Association. Formed in 1958 to fight
abandonment of, and buy North Shore Line (q.v.), which
discontinued service in 1963.
N&W: Norfolk & Western. Railroad, operates commuter service.
Outer Drive: Lake Shore Drive, as it is known to Chicagoans. The
formal name is used only as an address, e.g., 1200 Lake Shore
Drive. When giving directions or discussing traffic conditions,
however, Chicagoans invariably refer to it as the Outer Drive.
Owl service: The CTA's term for all-night service.
Pace: The name chosen by the suburban bus division of the RTA for
its dealings with the public (not an acronym of any sort).
PRT: Personal Rapid Transit, consisting of small automated
vehicles running on a fixed guideway. The RTA (q.v.) chose this
mode for use in the suburb of Rosemont, near O'Hare Airport.
Regular Democratic Organization of Cook County: The full and
proper name of Chicago's Democratic political machine.
Supporters frequently refer to it as the "Regular Organization"
or simply "the Organization," and an Organization Democrat is a
machine candidate or party official. The Regular Organization's
liberal counterpart is the IVI (q.v.).
Rock Island: Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad; operated
commuter service until its liquidation in 1980, when operations
were taken over by NIRC (q.v.). The former Rock Island line
between Chicago and Joliet is owned and operated by Metra (q.v.)
as the Rock Island District.
RTA: Regional Transportation Authority of Northeastern Illinois.
(This name for the RTA took effect with the 1973 legislature
which created it; the January 1973 report which recommended its
creation referred to it as the Regional Transportation Agencv.)
South Shore Line: Chicago, South Shore & South Bend Railroad; an
interurban between Chicago and northern Indiana, under Insull
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management in the 1920s. Funded and operated today by NICTD
(q.v.)
STC: Suburban Transit Corporation; proposed in the early 1970s
but never implemented.
Tollway: An expressway (q.v.) for the use of which a toll is
charged.
UMTA: Urban Mass Transportation Administration. Agency of the
United States Department of Transportation. Became the FTA
(q.v.) as a result of the 1991 changes in federal transportation
funding.
USDOT: United States Department of Transportation.
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GOVERNORS OF ILLINOIS, 1932-1994
(Year of election and partisan affiliation noted)
1932 Henry Horner (D)
1936 Henry Horner (D); died in office, 1940
Replaced by Lieutenant-Governor John Stelle
1940 Dwight Green (R)
1944 Dwight Green (R)
1948 Adlai Stevenson II (D)
1952 William Stratton (R)
1956 William Stratton (R)
1960 Otto Kerner (D)
1964 Otto Kerner (D); appointed to the federal bench, 1967
Replaced by Lieutenant-Governor Samuel Shapiro
1968 Richard B. Ogilvie (R)
(last election held under Constitution of 1870)
1972 Daniel Walker (D)
(first election held under Constitution of 1970)
1976 James R. Thompson (R)
(elected for a two-year term to bring gubernatorial
elections to presidential off-years, as provided in the
Illinois Constitution of 1970)
1978 James R. Thompson (R)
1982 James R. Thompson (R)
1986 James R. Thompson (R)
1990 James Edgar (R)
1994 James Edgar (R)
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MAYORS OF CHICAGO, 1915-1995
(Year of election and partisan affiliation noted)
1915 William H. Thompson (R)
1919 William H. Thompson (R)
1923 William Dever (D)
1927 William H. Thompson (R)
1931 Anton J. Cermak (D)
Assassinated, 1933; Edward Kelly appointed acting mayor
1933 Edward Kelly (D)
Special election for the remainder of Cermak's term
1935 Edward Kelly (D)
1939 Edward Kelly (D)
1943 Edward Kelly (D)
1947 Martin Kennelly (D)
1951 Martin Kennelly (D)
1955 Richard J. Daley (D)
1959 Richard J. Daley (D)
1963 Richard J. Daley (D)
1967 Richard J. Daley (D)
1971 Richard J. Daley (D)
1975 Richard J. Daley (D)
Died in office, 1976
Michael Bilandic appointed acting mayor
1977 Michael Bilandic (D)
Special election for the remainder of Daley's term
1979 Jane Byrne (D)
1983 Harold Washington (D)
1987 Harold Washington (D)
Died in office, 1987; Eugene Sawyer appointed acting mayor
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1989 Richard M. Daley (D)
Special election for the remainder of Washington's term
1991 Richard M. Daley (D)
1995 Richard M. Daley (D)
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